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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is about investment and access in network industries. More 
specifically, the aim of the thesis is to build theoretical models to examine 
some of the aspects of the link between access prices and incentives to invest 
in network infrastructure. We consider two basic questions relating to these 
issues, namely (i) how best to fund an incumbent network owner's 
investment when the network is an essential input for the operation of 
downstream providers, and (ii) what level of coverage a new firm which 
enters a market by building its own network infrastructure will choose. 
The choice of access prices has drawn a lot of attention from regulation 
economists and is a central aspect of regulatory planning. However, while 
becoming central to policy debate in the area, the effect of this choice on 
firms' incentives to invest in network infrastructure has received only 
limited attention. 
The questions considered here are motivated by examples in several 
network utilities in the UK and abroad. In both cases, substantial debate 
taking place concerning the choice of access prices and, at the same time, 
major investment in network infrastructure is required and is indeed taking 
place. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The subject of this thesis is access and investment in regulated the networks oper-
ated by regulated utilities. While the questions covered are motivated by issues in telecmns, 
post and rail, some of them could (to varying extents) arise in others like gas, electricity 
and water. The aim of this chapter is to explain the background and sketch subsequent 
chapters. 
In the past two decades, there has been major restructuring in the way utility 
markets (including telecoms and public transport) operate. There has been a worldwide 
trend of privatizing the traditionally state owned utilities, liberalizing privately owned m.o-
nopolized utilities and opening the previously monopolized 1narkets in which they used to 
operate to competition, at least in parts. The leading example of this trend is the UK where 
all utility markets have been opened to competition, by one or another of the above means 
(Newbery, 1999). The same trends have been followed in Western Europe (Newbery, 1999), 
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and have now started to spread to Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union 
(Davis, Carter, Mcintosh, and Stefanescu, 1996), where attempts to restructure, privatize 
and liberalize utility 1narkets have typically started from telecoms (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1991). Major restructuring of utilities has taken place in the US. A typical example is that 
of AT&T, the sole telecoms provider up to 1984, which is now split into smaller units offer-
ing telecoms services at the local level (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994). The most 
radical example of restructuring utilities is provided by the New Zealand telecoms market 
which was opened to competition in 1989, followed by privatization of the ·incumbent op-
erator in the next year. The distinctive feature of restructuring New Zealand telecoms was 
that the regulatory body was abolished (1990), and the operation of the 1narket was left to 
forces of competition (Blanchard, 1995). 
The scope of these worldwide changes appears to have broadened over the years 
following an initial focus on monopoly power and consumer protection, the interests of regu-
lators, policy makers and academics now include (more explicitly) interconnection, efficient 
use of essential facilities, entry, asymmetries of information, opthnal industry structure, 
optimal choice of instruments and, ultimately, the establishment of an environment which 
will allow the abolition of regulation itself. Several of these topics form the basis of this 
thesis. 
Utility industries can traditionally be thought of as requiring a network for their op-
eration; e.g. gas, rail telecommunications, electricity, water, post1 . So for example, telecom-
munications providers offer services over a network of links to customers and switches; in 
1In fact, if we define utilities networks in terms of their technological characteristics, then the industries 
involved may change over time as technology does. The development of mobile telephony provides such an 
example. 
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the case of electricity, operators have to use a transmission network; in the case of the rail, 
train operating companies (TOCs) have to use a network of tracks, signalling services and 
stations. Before restructuring, services were provided by a single, in most cases, publicly 
owned operator. Today, however, there is a large number of firms supplying telecommu-
nications services, gas, electricity, transportation and so on. Depending on the costs of 
new infrastructure, the structure of the industry, the technology involved, and the types of 
services offered, these operators use the existing networks owned by incumbent monopoly 
operators or build their own networks, or parts of them, to enter the market and offer ser-
vices to consumers. Economically, such networks raise two types of questions, relating to 
investment in, and access to, the network. Consider investinent. Building, maintaining and 
upgrading the network can involve incurring prohibitively high sunk investment costs. In a 
competitive environment like the one most utilities operate in today, it is thus difficult to 
induce new entrants to build infrastructure, and for incumbents to upgrade and maintain 
their existing networks. 
Irrespective of the nu1nber of networks involved in the operation of the industry, 
supplieTs of services need access to those networks to be able to operate or offer full services. 
According to Newbery (1999, p. 407) the setting of efficient access prices is "the main 
regulatory challenge" facing today's network industries. Armstrong (2001a, p. 36) expresses 
a similar view: "It is hard to find a more controversial issue in industrial policy than that 
concerning the terms on which the entrant can gain access to an incumbent finn's network" . 
These joint themes of network investment and access (and their regulation) are 
the foci of this thesis. While becoming central to policy debate in this area, one can argue 
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that they have received only limited attention from economic theorists. Whilst it is not 
possible for a thesis to provide a complete response to this observation, _ the current work 
addresses two issues related to access arid investment: the appropriate method of funding 
network investment when access (and retail price) revenues are available·and a new entrant's 
incentives to invest in market coverage in the presence of potential interconnection with an 
incumbent. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides some examples that 
demonstrate the importance of access and investment in network utilities and the link 
between the two. Section 1.3 then identifies some interesting questions arising from the 
need for access to networks and the requirement to invest in network infrastructure. It also 
links these interesting questions to the chapters of this thesis. 
1.2 Some Examples 
In this section, we seek to establish the view that access and investment are im-
portant policy issues in utilities networks by providing smne examples of policy debate they 
stimulated. 
1.2.1 Access to networks 
Before the restructuring and the opening of the relevant markets to competition, 
the networks over which services were delivered were the property of the (publicly owned 
in most cases) monopoly operators. When restructuring started, inevitably the networks 
re1nained properties of the incumbent firms. Incumbents were either privatized intact, 
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retaining both the network operation and service provision businesses, as in the case of 
British Telecom (BT) which was privatized as a single entity (Valletti, 1999), or vertically 
separated before privatization, diversifying service provision from transportation through 
the network, as in the case of CEGB (Newbery, 1999) or the liberalization of AT&T in the 
US (Newbery, 1999). 
At privatization and liberalization, depending on the thning and characteristics of 
the industry and the regulatory context, different strategies were followed with respect to 
granting access to entrant firms. Thus, for example, when Mercury was given a licence to 
compete with BT, it was guaranteed access to BT's network (Newbery, 1999). In contrast, 
when British Gas (BG) was privatized as a vertically integrated finn, new entrants in the 
market were not guaranteed access and they had to negotiate with BG to acquire access 
to its pipelines. A few years later, BG was forced to liberalize access to its pipelines, 
because entrants were disadvantaged by BG's discretion over the terms of granting access 
(Newbery, 1999). In the US, the 1996 Telecommunications Act specifies that interconnection 
charges should be negotiated between operators, with the regulatory bodies intervening in 
the absence of an agreement. The Act also specifies that access charges should be cost 
based and reciprocal (Laffont and Tirole, 2000). In the extreme example of New Zealand's 
telecmnmunications market, access prices are left to negotiations between operators with the 
default option of resorting to courts under competition law (Laffont and Th·ole, 2000). In 
the EU, access prices are to be freely negotiated within European law under the supervision 
of National Regulatory Agencies (Laffont and Th·ole, 2000, p. 35). In the case of the UK 
mobile telecommunications the fifth operator will have to negotiate access with the four 
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existing networks. If it fails to reach an agreement with any of them then Oftel will impose 
an access price set according to a set of predetermined principles (Oftel, October 1999). 
Access prices have raised a lot of debate among competing firms and between firms 
and operators. A good example of this is the dispute between Telecom, the New Zealand 
incumbent telecom1nunications operator and Clear Communications which entered the New 
Zealand long-distance market in 1991. Clear failed to interconnect with Telecom when it 
tried to enter the local market ( agree1nent was already achieved in the long distance market). 
After years of fruitless negotiations Clear had to resort to the High Court of New Zealand 
in 1991. Following a series of appeals and counter-appeals Telecom and Clear signed an 
interconnection agreement in 1996. However, this did not last long and a year later they 
had to resort to law once more (because Clear, which felt that the agreement was biased in 
favor of Telecom, began withholding pay1nents to it) (Carter and Wright, 1999b). A shnilar, 
more recent, example of disagreement between operators and the regulator in the UK is that 
concerning the charges mobile telecommunications operators make for terminating calls on 
their network. The regulatory body (Oftel) argues that "current charges set by the mobile 
operators are greatly in excess of their costs., (Oftel, May 2002). It has thus required that 
mobile operators reduce their charges and has imposed a price cap on calls to mobile phones. 
Operators, however, have refused to comply with the regulator's requirements and the case 
has been referred to the Competition Commission. Telecommunications are not the only 
example of controversy. For example, when British Gas was privatized the tenns of access 
to its network were left to entrant firms to negotiated. As Newbery (1999, p. 193) notes, 
"Between 1982 and 1990 there were ten attempts to secure access, but none was successful. 
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Ofgas felt constrained by the Act [the Oil and Gas Enterprise Act 1982] to allow transport 
tariffs at the average cost of transport, which were above the marginal cost. This was in 
sharp contrast to Oftel's pro-competitive access charging adjudications., 
It is evident from the examples above that different strategies have been followed 
in different cases to determine the terms and price of network access. The setting of access 
prices is a difficult task for several reasons. Too low access prices rnay lower incumbents' 
incentives to maintain and upgrade their infrastructure if entrants are to acquire access 
to that infrastructure at very low cost, or they may induce inefficient entry if the cost of 
interconnecting to the incumbent and attracting subscribers is too low. On the contrary, 
too high access prices may deter entry or induce inefficient duplication of facilities. The 
choice of the correct access prices requires knowledge of key features like the cost involved 
in providing access to the network, the structure of demand for the services offered over the 
network and the quality of the network service. Normally, the regulator's task will be made 
more difficult here to the extend that he is less informed about all these attributes than the 
network owners. 
An important policy distinction exists between one-way and two-way access. Cases 
where one (or several) operator(s) need access to another operator's network but the reverse 
is not true we call one-way access cases2 • Cases where each operator in the rnarket must 
have access to the others' networks we call two-way access cases3 • 
2When British Gas was privatized it retained the ownership of the network of pipelines over which gas 
was delivered to consumers. Entrant service providers had to acquire access to this network of pipelines in 
order to reach their customers. Similarly Railtrack, the incumbent in the UK rail industry, was limited at 
privatization to the supply of the network of tracks, signaling services and stations. All the train operating 
companies (TOCs) needed access to Railtrack's network to offer transportation services to their customers. 
Similarly in the case of electricity, the National Grid is the incumbent monopolist from whom competitive 
service providers need access. 
3The best example of two-way access is mobile telecommunications. Take again the example of the UK, 
ＭＭＭ ｾＧＭＢＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ ＭＭＭＭ ﾷＭＭﾷﾷＭ .. .. 
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1.2.2 Investment in networks 
As mentioned above, building, maintaining and upgrading a network involves in-
curring high investment costs, and it is difficult to give operators the right incentives to 
invest efficiently in network infrastructure. 
Depending on the costs and technological characteristics of the industry, the struc-
ture adopted and the time at which the industry was privatized, investment in network 
infrastructtu·e was either encouraged or indeed required as a term for entrants to obtain a 
licence to operate, or sometimes discouraged. So for example, in the case of BT, which 
was the first utility in the UK to be privatized, because the cost of duplicating (at least 
parts of) the network was not considered excessively high and in order to open the market 
to competition as early as possible, the first operator to be granted a licence to compete 
with BT, Mercury, was obliged by terms of its licence to invest in network infrastructure4 • 
In contrast, when for example British Rail was privatized, network duplication was discour-
aged and indeed did not take place (Affuso and Newbery, 2000), mainly because the costs 
of building a new railway network were considered excessively high. 
One of the most recent examples of licensing entry under the term of building own 
facilities, is the case of auctioning the 3rd generation licences of mobile telecoms in the UK 
in 2000. There were five licenses granted, four to the existing operators and a fifth to a new 
entrant (TIW UMTS (UK)). All five of them will have to build their 3rd generation networks 
where there are four network operators (a fifth was licensed in 2000 with the introduction of 3rd generation 
(3G) services). The four operators can reach their own subscribers without requiring access to their rivals' 
networks. However, when a subscriber of operator A wants to call a subscriber of operator B, A needs access 
to B 's network to deliver the call. 
4 
"The Mercury consortium received a licence to build and operate an independent network to compete 
across the full telecommunications services" (Oftel) 
" ... Mercury undertook some obligations to ･ｸｰｾｮ､＠ its netw01·k." (Valletti, 1999) 
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and the entrant firm will have to build its 2nd generation network as well. In particular, the 
entrant will have to have 20% 1narket coverage before being allowed to "roam" on any of the 
4 existing networks. By 2007 it must have an 80% national coverage and in 2009 roaming 
rights will cease (OFTEL, June 1999 and October 1999)5. Similar issues face post-auction 
entrants in other countries. 
Another example, although quite different because of the type and cost of invest-
ment required, is that of the UK Postal Sector, where the regulator (Postcomm) has recently 
announced its intentions to deregulate the current market6• For example, it has licenced 
Hays plc to c01npete with the incumbent monopolist Consignia. Hays has to "lay down" its 
own network (which, in principle, could include collection points and distribution systems), 
and has agreed short-term coverage levels. Another company (Deya) is reportedly keen to 
enter this market with different coverage levels (100%). 
Apart from building a network or parts of it, a different type of investment is that 
required by a network operator to keep the network to such a state that delivery of services 
over it is safe, efficient and of high quality. One of the best examples in the UK where 
large amounts of money are being invested in maintenance and upgrading is the privatized 
rail industry7 . Here, Railtrack is responsible for ensuring that Train Operating Companies 
(TOCs), and freight operators have access to suitable track (see Glaister, 1994, Swift, 1995, 
5With the introduction of 3G (3rd generation) services, substantial investment takes place in mobile 
telecommunications markets throughout Europe. In the UK the five operators (the four existing, and a 
new entrant) spent around £22.5 billion simply to aquire their licences. In Germany the revenue from the 
licensing of 3G services reached £30 billion, in !tally £7.3 and in the Netherlands nealy £2 billion. On top of 
that central banks and credit rating agencies were warning the UK companies at the time they aquired their 
licences that building the network infrastructure over which the new services will be offered would entail 
incurring total costs up to £300 billion. (Guardian, November 17 and December 22, 2000) 
6See "Consignia set to lose its postal monopoly" (Financial Times, 31 January, 2002). 
7 A related example involves the debate on how to provide £16 billion of investment in the London 
underground network (Guardian, February 7 2002). 
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Bradshaw, 1998). The need for investment in maintenance was made very clear after the 
recent indications of failure of Railtrack to provide a safe and efficient network to TOCs8 • 
Recently, the rail regulator announced that Railtrack will be granted a lump-sum transfer 
to assist it cover a part of its investment costs. The remaining costs will have to be covered 
through the access charges the company receives from the TOCs which use the network to 
offer transportation services (ORR, 2000)9 ,10 . 
This and the previous sections illustrated the importance of setting efficient prices 
for network access and the scale of invest1nent that takes place in utilities networks. The 
final section of the Introduction links the issues discussed in the preceding sections with the 
chapters that follow. 
1.3 Questions and Contributions 
As we mentioned earlier, the aim of this thesis is to build theoretical models to 
examine some of the aspects of the interaction between access prices and network invest-
ment. We do this by considering two types of network investment, first we consider the 
investment in maintenance and upgrading made by an incumbent network operator which 
has to supply its network to competitive service providers, and then we turn to the issue 
8Two examples best demonstrating Railtrack's alleged failure are the rail crashes at Hatfield two years 
ago and more recently at Potters Bar. 
9More specifically, in 2000, after the evidence that Railtrack had failed to supply a safe network, the 
company was granted £8 billion of government funding to invest in maintenance renewal and replacement of 
track and singalling. According the the Rail Regulator the company was meant to spend: (i) "£3.5 billion 
for track maintenance and renewal,, (ii) "£4 billion on maintenance and renewal of signalling systems", and 
(iii) 11£500 million on signalling enhancements such as train protection warning system". (ORR, 2000) After 
recent evidence of failure, the government seems to consider granding additional funds to the company to 
invest to a safer network. (The Obse1·ver, Sunday March 31, 2002) 
10Large amounts of money are invested in network maintenance and upgrading in other utilities as well. 
For example, Vodafone is spending £5 billion this year with a plan to spend 6.5 next year on impoving its 
existing network and on infrastrucutre required to offer its 3G services. (The Observer, April 14, 2002) 
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of facilities-based entry where a new entrant enters the market by building its own full or 
partial coverage network and competes with an incumbent firm. 
Given the scale ( de1nonstrated in this chapter) of investment needed in n1any 
networks, what is the appropriate mechanism for funding this investment: ta:x: financed 
transfers or (access/retail) price revenue? This question is considered in Chapter 3 in the 
context of a one-way access setting. (Such a setting seems particularly appropriate because 
the sunk costs justifying monopoly networks are, perhaps, most likely to qualify for state 
funding.) The theoretical background to this question lies in the debate amongst regulation 
economists concerning whether regulatory policy is more appropriately modeled using lump-
sum transfers or price regulation. The analysis assumes that the regulator has incomplete 
information about the network operator's costs and the level of investment and he needs 
to elicit information about the former while encouraging the latter. It is shown that price 
regulation is a special case of transfer regulation and that the latter is therefore superior 
in terms of relative welfare gains. Simulations show that this effect can be large. These 
results are particularly interesting in the light of recent developments in the rail sector, 
where encouraging the appropriate investment, and the extent of government involvement 
has become a fundamental regulatory issue. It should be noted that the chapter ignores a 
number of important issues-dynamics, incentives for investment etc.-but it is the first to 
highlight this basic question. 
As we have seen, the fifth mobile telecommunications operator in the UK (which 
will enter the market by building its own facilities) is faced with exogenously set coverage 
targets while building its network. However, the decision of how fast to install coverage in 
12 
the intermediate stages is left to the entrant. In a situation like this, where the choice of 
coverage is left to the entrant firm, what level of coverage will it choose to install? Will the 
entrant's choice of coverage differ from that of a benevolent regulator? Chapter 4 models 
a new entrant's (costly) decision to invest in market coverage, given the existence of an 
incu1nbent capable of serving the whole market. The analysis of this chapter assumes that 
the two network operators offer spatially differentiated services and the entrant's decision 
is compared with the decision of a regulator who maximizes social welfare. It is shown that 
the entrant's and the regulator's decisions may differ, with the precise details depending 
on the elasticities of retail demand: More elastic demands generate larger-scale entry and 
more competitive retail sector. For some parameter values, no pure strategy equilibrium in 
retail prices exists. Under- and over-investment relative to the regulator's preference may 
occur. Simulations are used to illustrate this11 • 
Without access to the four existing networks it will be difficult for the new nlo-
bile telecommunications operator to compete with the existing operators. How does the 
choice of the prices competing networks have to pay to their rivals to access each other's 
networks affects the entrant's choice of market coverage? Chapter 5 builds upon Chapter 4 
to consider the effect of access prices to the entrant's coverage decision. This chapter adds 
interconnection requirements to the analysis of the preceding chapter; each network opera-
tor requires access to its rival's network and pays an interconnection charge to its rival. We 
find that whether the choice of the access price affects an entrant finn's choice of coverage 
depends on the structure of demand. While the addition of interconnection requirements 
when consumer demand is inelastic does not affect the entrant's decision, when demand is 
11 Armstrong (2001a, p. 62) notes the potential for using numerical methods in network models of access. 
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elastic there is a clear link between the access price and the scale of entry. We also find that 
when the firms are allowed to choose their access price they collude and earn excessively 
high profits. Sub-optimal investment relative to the regulator's preference 1nay still occur. 
Chapter 6 concludes and discusses the results of the previous chapters, derives 
some policy implications and suggests some extensions to the work presented in this thesis. 
14 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Utility industries, including telecmns and rail, are network industries, their op-
eration necessarily involves the use of a network. So, for example, telecommunications 
providers offer services over a network of links and switches to customers; in electricity, 
operators have to use a transmission network; in the case of the rail, train operating compa-
nies (TOCs) have to use a network of tracks, signalling services and stati?ns. The services 
offered to consumers by firms operating in network industries are combinations of several 
components and several service providers offering the same or different components. In the 
UK, for example, travelling by train from one place to another involves using the tracks, 
signalling services, stations which are owned by Railtrack and carriages which are property 
of one or maybe several TOCs. This cmnbination of elements and providers raises a number 
of issues associated with technical standards and compatibility of the several components 
and technologies used by the providers, interoperability, network externalities, quality stan-
15 
dards. However, as Economides (1996, Footnote 1) notes "The literature on networks is so 
extensive that it is futile to attempt to cover it". In this chapter we focus on the issues of 
access and investment and the link between these two1 . 
Today there is a large number of providers of utility services. These providers, 
depending on the structure of each industry, either own the network (or parts of it) over 
which they offer services or use the incumbent's network to deliver their services. With 
a single network in the market, service providers need to acquire access to reach their 
customers, while in the case of multiple networks each network operator may need access to 
its rivals' networks to offer full services to consumers. Thus, access to network infrastructure 
is essential for the competitive operation of utility industries. 
As discussed in the Introduction, the determination of the tenns under which 
operators should access networks has raised a lot of controversy. During the privatization 
and liberalization processes across a variety of countries different rules have ·been used, and 
economists have devoted a good deal of their attention to building theoretical models to 
analyze the choice of access prices. This chapter provides a summary of the literature on 
determining access prices to provide a background for the following chapters. Although the 
choice of access prices influences the firms' incentives to invest in network infrastructure, the 
relationship between access prices and investment has received limited attention as noted 
in the Introduction (Armstrong 2001a and Laffont, Rey and Tirole 1998a and b). The aim 
of this chapter is to identify a particular gap in the literature: the analysis of endogenous 
network investment. 
1There are many aspects to networks that our survey does not cover. For example, the question of 
network compatibility that arises in (say) computing (see Matutes and Regibeau, 1992); the question of 
how networks of buyers aud sellers for (see Kranton and Minehart, 2001); the network externalities that are 
generated by network susbscribers (as in telecommunications; see Economides, 1996 ). 
16 
Depending on whether there is a single network operator (in which case service 
providers need one-way access to the network) or several operators (which need two-way 
access to their rival networks) the issues involved, the dangers arising from sub-optimal 
choice of access prices and the modelling approach adopted in the ｬｩｴ･ｲ｡ｴｭ ｾ ･＠ are different. 
For example, one-way access arrangements typically arise as a result of sunk-costs in network 
provision, so that the network owner is a monopolist. As a result, regulatory intervention 
is considered necessary, and thus, theoretical models assu1ne that the incumbent finn is 
regulated and are concerned with the regulator's optimal choice of the access price. On the 
contrary, markets where rivals may choose to build their own networks (thus "bypassing" 
others), in which case two-way access arrangements will be relevant, are considered more 
competitive. Here, it is common practice to assume that the retail market and often the 
market for access are not regulated and networks choose their prices to maximize their 
profits. 
It is, thus, natural to divide this literature review into two parts: one su1nmarizing 
one-way access pricing and one summarizing two-way access pricing (to which we will often 
refer as interconnection pricing). Consequently, Section 2.2 is a review of the analysis of 
choosing access prices in an environ1nent with a single owner of an essential facility necessary 
for operation. Section 2.3 considers cases where a network owner requires access to several 
networks operating in a different market (the best example of this is a fixed-line network 
operator requiring access to the networks of mobile telecommunications operators). Section 
2.4 then moves on to the literature concerning the choice of access prices in an environment 
with several network operators, including both symmetric situations, where networks are 
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sym1netric in terms of size and subscribers, and asymmetric situations, where there are 
dmninant and partial coverage operators in the 1narket. Section 2.5 concludes and identifies 
the thesis's contribution to this literature. 
2.2 One-way access 
Imagine a situation where there is a single network in the market owned by an 
incumbent firm (which may or may not use the network to provide services to consumers), 
and a group of competitive retailers which need access to the incumbent's network to offer 
services to consumers. Armstrong (2001a, p. 36) identifies three broad kinds of access 
pricing policy in situations like this: (i) "pricing access at (direct) cost", (ii) "Ramsey 
pricing, i.e. choosing the incumbent's retail prices and access charges shnultaneously to 
maximize welfare" and, (iii) "the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), i.e. pricing 
access at direct cost plus the incu1nbent's opportunity cost". 
Pricing access at (direct) cost is readily dealt with since it is optimal in only a few 
situations, under a specific set of assumptions. As Laffont and Th·ole (2000) argue, in a 
world without any asymmetries of infonnation, and where transfers to regulated firms entail 
no distortions, efficient pricing of access would involve the retailers facing the incumbent's 
marginal cost of providing access, or in other words setting the access price equal to the 
1narginal cost of providing access. Retail prices would also be set equal to marginal cost of 
production and fixed costs (if any) would be covered by the government through taxation. 
As Armstrong (2001a and b) argues, an incumbent firm choosing its retail and access prices 
to 1naximize profits would choose to price access at marginal cost if it could use enough 
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instruments (for example, if it could impose an output tax on the retail sector) to make 
sure that it extracts all the available surplus (both consumers' and retailers'). 
These results are interesting because they imply that an incumbent monopoly 
network provider will not necessarily set access prices inefficiently high. However, in a 
number of cases, the required assumptions are restrictive. Transfers from the government 
to regulated firms may be prohibited, so that the latter have to cover their costs through 
(direct or indirect) charges to consumers and retailers, and even when transfers are allowed 
raising the 1noney for them through taxation will be distortionary. Infonnation is not 
complete: typically regulators are less well informed than firms about costs of production, 
efficient operation, or the structure of demand. Additionally, incumbent firms are rarely 
allowed to impose taxes (or use other similar instruments) on service providers that use 
their networks. Finally several obligations, like the Universal Service Obligation, imposed 
on incumbents imply that marginal cost pricing of access will threaten the ability of the 
incumbent to meet those obligations. Thus, pricing access at cost is rarely optimal. 
This observation generates a need for regulatory intervention in settings where 
one-way access is required is common. An incumbent firm which uses its network to com-
pete with entrants in the provision of services will find it optimal to disadvantage the 
entrants when choosing the terms to grant them access to its network, since allowing en-
trants to access its network will intensify competition and lower retail prices. But even if 
the incumbent does not compete with the entrants downstream, it will always want to use 
its monopoly power over the network to make as much profit as possible, possibly to the 
detriment of efficient entry, once the above conditions do not hold. Authors analyzing the 
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choice of access prices in one-way access frameworks thus assume that incumbent operators 
are regulated. The incumbent's prices are chosen by a regulator who seeks to maximize 
an objective function, typically a welfare function which is a (weighted) sum of consumer 
surplus plus industry profit. 
2.2.1 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule 
The above discussion suggests that incurnbent monopoly network operators may 
have opportunities (and incentives) to increase access prices above cost thereby threaten-
ing efficient retail competition. Accordingly, a need for regulated access prices arises. An 
intuitive solution to this problem is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule. The Efficient ' 
Component Pricing Rule was suggested by Baumol (1983) and Willig (1979) and discussed 
by Baumol and Sidak (1994a) as the (allocative) efficient method to set the price of access 
to inputs (like the network) sold to competitors in the context of the rail and telecommu-
nication industries. 
This section considers the choice of the access price under the assumption that the 
incumbent's retail price is determined outside this model (and thus is fixed in the analysis). 
Under this assumption typically the problem of setting the access price is modeled as follows 
(see Armstrong 2001a). The incumbent supplies its network to a fringe of entrants and uses 
the network itself to compete with the fringe downstream. The fringe's price is driven 
(by competitive forces) down to rnarginal cost of providing the service. It is assu1ned also 
that the fringe cannot bypass the incumbent's network (or in other words, cannot find an 
alternative source of access), and that it needs one unit of "network supply" to produce one 
unit of its final service (as does the incumbent). Consumers enjoy a surplus from consuming 
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the service (this 1nay be different depending on which finn they buy from). A regulator 
(who has full information about all firms' costs) chooses the price the fringe should pay 
to the incumbent to access the latter's network to maximize social welfare, defined as the 
sum of consumer surplus plus industry profit (which with a competitive fringe reduces to 
incumbent profit)2 • According to Annstrong (2001a) and Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 
(1994)3 , the optimal access price should be given by the Efficient Component Pricing Rule 
(ECPR), which states that 
access charge = cost of providing access 
+ incumbent's lost profit in retail 
markets caused by providing access 
Mathe1natically, if p1 and P2 are the prices of the incumbent>s and the fringe's final service 
respectively, the incmnbent has a marginal cost co of providing the network and a marginal 
cost c1 of providing its final service (turning one unit of "network supply'' into its final 
service) then the access price a should be given by 
(2.1) 
where a is a substitutability parameter (termed "the displacement ratio" by Armstrong, 
Doyle, and Vickers, 1996) and 1neasures the units of final service the incumbent loses by 
providing one unit of access to the fringe4 . This access price is above the marginal cost of 
2Note that in setting the access price the regulator is not concerned with whether the incumbent breaks 
even or not since this is assumed to be taken into account when determining its retail price which is done 
outside this model. 
3Valletti and Estache (1999) also discuss the Efficient Component Pricing Rule and the conditions under 
which the rule is valid. 
4In particular, if the incumbent's and the fringe's demands are q1(p1,p2) and q2(p1,p2) respectively, then 
it is straightforward to show that u = - ｾＺｾＷｾｐｾ＠ > 0 when the products are substitutes (see Armstrong 
2001a, p. 9) 
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providing access, co, when the downstream products are substitutes (i.e. whenever a> 0). 
The 1nark-up compensates the incumbent for the loss of retail profit every time it gives a 
unit of access to the entrants. The mark-up is equal to the margin of the incumbent's retail 
price over its marginal cost of providing the final service multiplied by the number of units 
of service it loses when it gives one unit of access to the entrants. If the incumbent's and 
the fringe's services are highly differentiated so that the incumbent hardly loses any custom 
by providing access to the fringe, in which case a ｾ＠ 0, then the ECPR states that the 
appropriate access charge should involve no 1nark-up over the incumbent's marginal cost of 
providing access since providing access to the entrants does not "harm" the incumbent at 
With the access price set according to the ECPR entry does not threaten the 
incumbent's viability, every time entrants take part of its custom it is compensated through 
the access price by an amount equal to its lost profit in the retail sector. Because entry does 
not "harm" the incumbent-its profits are not altered-the incumbent has no incentive to 
distort efficient entry (e.g. via non-price means, like supplying the entrant with lower quality 
network services)6 . Additionally, entrants are given the right incentives to enter a market. 
Think for exa1nple the case where the entrants' and the incu1nbent service substitute one-
for-one, so that a = 1. Then and entrant will enter the ma1·ket and take the incumpent 's 
5In a similar environment Spulber and Sidak (1997) study the choice of the access price under the 
condition that the incumbent voluntarily chooses to grant access, which in other words means that the 
incumbent's earnings from selling access must exceed or at least just off-set the incumbent's lost profit in 
the retail sector caused by entry assuming several alternative modes of competition. They also argue that 
the access price should be set to compensate the incumbent firm for the lost profit from granting access to 
the entrant. Then the incumbent will voluntarily grant access to more effi.ceint entrant firms. 
6 As Baumol and Sidak (1994a, p. 186) argue the rule "achieves the principle of indifference". In other 
words the incumbent is indifferent as to whether access is granted or not since it is compensated for its lost 
profit if access is granted. 
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customers if and only if it is more efficient than the incumbent (since it would be making 
losses otherwise). 
However, the optimality of the ECPR is based on a set of strong assumptions. 
For exa1nple, as Economides (1996) argues, the production of the two competitive goods 
must not entail any economies of scale. In the presence of scale economies, the incumbent 
network provider may ·be unable to cover its costs of providing the network if access is 
priced according to the ECPR. Also the rule protects monopoly incumbent finns from 
the threat of entry by failing to take into account the benefits from entry by firms less 
efficient than the incumbent resulting frmn refraining incumbents' monopoly profits 7. Most 
importantly, the rule ignores the issue of how the incumbent's retail price is set. Thus, the 
rule is optimal only under the assu1nption that the incu1nbent's retail price is optimally 
set, while the rule preserves allocative inefficiencies resulting from the non-optimal choice of 
that price. In practice there are a variety of reasons why incumbents' retail prices may not 
be optimally set (for example incumbents may be unregulated at the retail level, or they 
may be subsidizing loss making segments from profitable ones, or have private information 
about their true costs which allows them to inflate their retail prices). It is, thus, optimal to 
endogenize the choice of the incumbent's retail price. Additionally, as Valletti and Estache 
(1999) argue, if entrants are more efficient (and in the absence of product differentiation-
a = 1) than the incun1bent firm then they take all production of the final good and the 
incumbent disappears from the final market, in which case the incumbent's retail price 
becomes irrelevant, while if the incu1nbent is more efficient than the entrants then entry 
7Baumol and Sidak. (1994, p. 196) argue that the rule "undercuts the tenant's [access seeker's) power 
to introduce effective competition into the final product market and, thereby, its ability to reduce prices to 
their competitive levels." 
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does not occur and the incumbent retains the downstream sector, in which case the access 
p1·ice becomes irrelevant. 
2.2.2 Ramsey pricing 
According to Armstrong (2001a, p. 37) "Once a regulator has chosen a measure 
of social welfare then the opthnal policy is to choose access and retail charges to maximize 
this welfare function, subject to constraints on the profitability of the finn and/or the costs 
of public funds" or, in other words, according to Ramsey pricing principles. This addresses 
the criticism of the ECPR above. 
Armstrong (2001a) and Laffont and Til·ole (1993, 1994 and 2000)8 extend the 
analysis to endogenize the choice of the incu1nbent's retail price. The regulator now chooses 
both the regulated firm's retail and access prices to maximize social welfare which is a 
(weighted) sum of consumer surplus plus industry profit. However, now that the retail 
price is endogenous to the model, the regulator has to make sure that the incumbent covers 
all its cost. Two different approaches have been followed; one where the incumbent firm's 
revenue goes to the government and its costs are reimbursed by the government and another 
where the incumbent finn covers its costs through charges to consumers and/ or competing 
firms (via an access charge). 
The incumbent continues to supply its network to a fringe of firms and uses it to 
compete with the fringe. The incumbent produces q1 units of its service and charges -a price 
Pl and the fringe produces a substitute service at quantity q2 and charges a price P2. Taking 
into account that with a competitive fringe P2 = c + a, where c is the fringe's marginal cost 
8See also Valletti and Estache (1999). 
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of turning one unit of "network supply" to its final service, the regulator can choose PI and 
P2 instead of choosing Pl and a. Laffont and Th·ole (1993, 1994 and 2000) show that, under 
both alternative methods to fund the regulated firm's costs, both the incumbent's and the 
fringe's retail prices should follow Ramsey principles. 
Mathe1natically the two retail prices should be determined by 
Pl- co- Cl A 1 (2.2) = ---Pl 1+Arh 
and 
P2-co-c A 1 (2.3) =---
P2 1 +A 772 
where co, c1 and c are as above, A represents either the social cost of public funds when 
transfers are allowed, or the cost associated with price increases necessary when the firm has 
to balance its budget9 , and 1]1 , 772 are the superplasticities of demand of the incumbent's and 
the fringe's service which account for cross-price effects between the two services10 •11 . This 
rule states that optimal retail prices should be above the marginal cost of production, with 
the relative mark-up of price above marginal cost being proportional to the superplasticity 
of demand for the relevant service. Thus, for services with more elastic demands the relative 
mark-up should be lower, and conversely for less elastic demands. The access price should 
9N ote that ,\ will generally differ between the two cases. 
10The ｳｾｰ･ｲ･ｬ｡ｳｴｩ｣ｩｴｩ･ｳ＠ are given by 
where "'i = - ｾ＠ ｾ＠ is service i's normal elasticity of demand and 'r/ij = ｾ＠ * is service i's cross-price 
elasticity. Note that the superelasticities are smaller than the normal elasticities if the two services are 
substitutes. 
11 An interesting question which tends to be overlooked by the existing literature is what are the relative 
merits of these two regimes ((i) allowing for the use of transfers, and (ii) relying on price regulation). Chapter 
3 looks at this question, in the context of the current model 
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then be given by 
a P2- c 
= 
co+ [A/(1 + A)(c/772)] 
1- [A/(1 + A)(1/7]2)] (2.4) 
A 1 
= co + 1 + A 7]2 P2 
Thus, like retail prices, the access price is above the marginal cost of providing access. 
This is because, either with a social cost of public funds or with a cost associated with 
the requirement that the incumbent balances its budget, deficits are costly and the access 
revenues raised are used to cover those costly deficits. 
Alternatively, (2.2) and (2.4) can be written as (see Armstrong 2001a) 
PI - co- c1- O"(a- co) A 1 (2.5) =---
PI 1 +A 771 
and the access price 
a - c - o-(pl - co - c1) A 1 
P2 = 1 +A 772 
(2.6) 
These have the benefit of endogenizing the incumbent's lost profit in the retail and access 
sectors. According to these, the relative mark-up of prices above perceived marginal costs 
is proportional to the inverse of the relevant normal elasticity of demand. In (2.5) the 
perceived marginal costs accounts for the incumbent's net cost or benefit from supplying 
the network (o-(a-co)). In (2.6) the perceived marginal cost takes account of the net loss of 
profit from supplying the network ( o-(p1 -co- c1)) and thus makes sure that the incumbent 
is not harmed by granting access to the entrant12 . 
12These formulae are equivalent to (2.2) and (2.4) (we need to take into account that P2 = (a- c2 ) and 
that a=- ＺｾｾＷＺＺｾ＠ (see Footnote 4) which is what Laffont and Tirole's superplasticities account for). 
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2.2.3 Bypass 
The preceding analysis assumes that entrants cannot bypass the incumbent, by 
for example using smne alternative source of access (the entrant may provide the access 
service itself or buy it from elsewhere)13 . When bypass is an option entrants may choose 
to seek access elsewhere whenever the incumbent increases its access charge, even if it is 
not efficient to do so (for example the alternative source of access may be of higher cost 
or lower quality). Thus, when bypass is an option, the access price is called to play an 
additional role, namely to give entrants the correct bypass incentives (or, in other words, 
induce efficient use of the incumbent's facilities) . What happens to the optimal ECPR and 
Ramsey access charges when bypass is an option? 
The ECPR 
When the incumbent's price is fixed, Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) show 
that the access price should again follow the ECPR but this time the "displacement ratio" 
should account for the fact that the entrants m_ay not need one unit of the incumbent's 
((network activity" to produce one unit of their final service. According to them if z(p1 , a) 
is the entrants' demand for access (where now z(p1, a) :::; q2) and ｾＨ｡Ｉ＠ is the entrants' 
marginal cost of producing one unit of final service (concave in a)14 , then the appropriate 
13 According to Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1994, p. 142) another reason why the fringe may be able 
to substitute away from the incumbent's network service is that "the technology used by the fringe may not 
be of the fixed-coefficient type, and for high access charges it may be able to use proportionately less access 
service (from any source)." This means that the entrant may not need one unit of access to produce one 
unit of its final service for high access charges. 
14This marginal cost is equal to c + a whenever the incumbent is the cheapest source of access and c +a, 
with a being the alternative source's access charge, whenever the alternative source is cheaper. The concavity 
of e(a) stems from the entrant's ability to substitute away from the incumbent's network. 
27 
displacement ratio is 
which measures the units of final service the incumbent loses by providing one unit of access 
to the entrant. Notice that this displacement ratio is now a function of the entrants' demand 
for access (not their output, q2). Also with no bypass and the entrants requiring one unit 
of "network supply'' to produce one unit of the final service (i.e. z(pl, a) = q2), e(a) =a+ c 
and ((a)= 1. Thus, when there is no bypass the above ratio reduces to a in (2.1) above. 
Note that the above can be decomposed to 
8q1j8p2 (8q2j8p2)e'(a) 
8q2j8p2 (8zj8a) 
1 
= a----=--:-::---8z/8a 
This "displacement ratio, is smaller than a (see Annstrong, 2001a, p. 25) and, thus, the 
access price when bypass is feasible is lower than in the case of no bypass, a natural result 
since the access price now has to attract the entrants to use the incumbent's facility in an 
efficient mode. 
Ramsey Pricing 
Bypass may cause the entrants' demand for the incumbent's "network supply" 
z(p1, a) to differ from their production of the final service q2. Thus, the regulated firm's 
retail price should be set as in (2.5), with the relevant "displace1nent ratio" taking into 
account the fact that the incumbent may not lose one unit of final supply if it provides one 
unit of access to the entrant. Additionally, in determining the price of the fringe's retail 
price (or access price) the elasticity of demand for the entrants' service has to be replaced 
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by the elasticity of the entrants' demand for the incumbent's access service. Thus, ry2 in 
(2.6) will be substituted by TJz, the elasticity of the entrant's demand for the incu1nbent's 
"network supply''. As Armstrong (2001a) shows the incumbent's retail and access prices 
must now be given by 
Pl - co - c1 - ｡ｾ＠ (a - co) A 1 
Pl = 1 +A 'r/1 
(2.7) 
and 
a l+ATJz 
(2.8) 
h · th ' (2 1) d b fJzjfJpl l ' f fi l · h w ere a IS e same as In . , an ar = -oql/ap
1 
measures t 1e un1ts o na service t e 
incuinbent loses by providing one unit of access to the entrant. Thus, again the regulated 
finn's retail price and the access price are given by Ramsey type formulae, with prices 
proportional to the inverse of the relevant elasticity of demand. As in (2.5) and (2.6), these 
formulae include the incumbent's perceived marginal costs in each activity. In (2.7) the 
perceived marginal cost accounts for the incumbent's net cost or benefit from supplying 
access to the network Ｈ｡ｾＨ｡Ｍ co)) and in (2.8) it accounts for the incumbent's net loss of 
profit from supplying access (a(p1- co- c1)). 
2.2.4 Vertical separation 
When the network operator's business is confined to the network supply, like rail-
road infrastructure companies or electricity transmission in several countries, the network 
operator is not concerned with losing custom when granting access to service providers. 
However, even though there is no need to regulate the incumbent downstrea1n, there is a 
need to determine the price of access to the network since this will influence the incumbent's 
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ability to cover its costs, and the entrants' price downstream. 
In a perfectly competitive environment, Laffont and Th·ole (2000) argue that the 
access price should be set as with a vertically integrated firm, or in other words as in (2.4), 
to allow the incumbent to cover its costs and impose the second-best Ramsey pricing in the 
downstrea1n sector. This determines the fringe's price as well, which will again be given by 
(2.3). 
However, because as Laffont and Tirole (2000) note infrastructure suppliers often 
supply their network to large service providers with substantial market power, it may be 
best in these cases to allow network operators to charge two-part tariffs for use of their 
network. This will allow the network operators to extract more of the service providers' 
profit and induce more efficient use of the network with a variable access charge equal to 
or even lower than the marginal cost of providing it15 . 
2.2.5 Asymmetric information 
Up to this point we have assu1ned that the regulator had all the information he 
needed to set the access price. However, information between the regulated firn1 and the 
regulator is in general not symmetric. · Regulated firms are better informed about their 
efficiency, their costs of production and the demand for their services and as Annstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers (1994, p. 155) note "asymmetric information is an essential part of 
a good model of regulation" . In a world of asym1netric information the regulator has to 
design regulatory contracts in such a way that they will give incentives to regulated firms 
15Valletti and Estache (1999) discuss the issues of entrant market power and high unrecoverable costs of 
entry. 
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to reveal the private information they possess. 
Returning to the assumption of a vertically integrated network operator, Laffont 
and Th·ole (1993 and 1994) extend their analysis to account for the case where the regulator 
is less well informed about the characteristics of the incumbent firm. The incumbent firm 
supplies the network and uses it to produce a monopolized good and a good for which it faces 
competition from a competitive fringe. They assume that the incumbent is characterized 
by a technological parameter {3 which determines its costs of supplying the network as well 
as its costs of supplying the final service to consumers. The technological parameter {3 is 
drawn from ｣ｾｵｬ｡ｴｩｶ･＠ distribution F(.) with strictly positive density f (.). The regulated 
incu1nbent supplies a level of effort, which is not observed by the regulator, to reduce the 
costs of both the network supply and the production of its competitive service. 
Laffont and Tirole argue that whether the addition of asymmetries of information 
affects the choice of retail and access prices depends on the structure of the incu1nbent's 
costs. In particular they argue that if the incu1nbent's cost functions are such that "quality 
levels do not affect rates at which technological improvements can be converted into rents 
by the firm" (Laffont and Tirole, 2000, p. 129), then prices should not be used to pro-
mote incentives for truthful revelation of information. Incentives should be promoted solely 
through the manipulation of effort supply. 
Mathematically, they assume that the incumbent incurs a cost Co ({3, e0 , Q) to 
supply a network of size Q, where eo is the effort supplied to reduce the cost of network 
supply and the cost function satisfies Co{3 > 0, Goe0 < 0 and CoQ > 0. This network is 
used by the incumbent to produce qo units of a monopolized service, and q1 units of a 
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service for which it faces competition by a fringe of entrant firms, which produce q2 units of 
their competitive service. It is assumed that the production of one unit of the monopolized 
or the competitive goods requires one unit of network supply, thus, total network supply 
is Q = q0 + q1 + q2. The incumbent incurs a cost G1(f3, e1, ql) for the production of its 
competitive service, where er is the effort supplied in reducing the cost of production of this 
service, and this cost function satisfies Gr{3 > 0, Ore1 < 0 and Orq1 > 0. The competitive 
fringe has a marginal cost of production equal to c. The incumbent is assumed to incur a 
disutility for supplying effort which is given by 1/J( eo+ er) with 1/J' > 0, 1/J" > 0 and 'l/J 111 ｾ＠ 0. 
Consrnners are assumed to enjoy a surplus from the consumption of the monopolized service 
and additional surplus from the consumption of the competitive services. 
A regulator is assumed to receive the regulated firm's revenue and transfer a lump-
sum t to the firm. So if the incumbent charges Po for its monopolized service and PI for its 
competitive service and an access price a for giving access to the fringe then the regulator 
receives poqo + prqr + aq2 and the regulated firm's utility is U = t- 'ljJ(eo + er). 
With incomplete information the regulator chooses the regulated firm's retail and 
access prices and effort supply to maximize expected welfare over the range of {3s, which is 
given by the expected su1n of consumer surplus plus industry profit evaluated at the social 
cost of public funds ,\. 
Laffont and Th·ole show that both prices and efforts are distorted by the asymmetry 
of infonnation (assuming general forms for the regulated firm's cost functions) . Under 
asymmetric information the Lerner indices (recall that these are given by (2.2) and (2.3) 
under full information-and an equivalent for Po) are modified by terms that correct for the 
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more efficient firms, incentives to mimic inefficient firms and report higher cost and receive 
higher transfers from the regulator. Thus, retail and access prices are generally influenced 
by information asymmetries16 . Effort supply is optimal only for the most efficient firm 
(with technological parameter !}) , while all the other types of finn are required to supply 
less than efficient effort. This is because effort is used as a means to reduce the rents of 
more efficient firms and thus reduce their incentives to mimic17 . 
If the regulated firm does not get any transfers from the regulator but has to 
balance its budget, then the social cost of public funds must be replaced by the social cost 
of distortions in consumption caused by prices increases required to cover the regulated 
finn's costs. Otherwise the analysis is the same as with transfers (see Laffont and Tirole, 
1994, Section 5). 
2.2.6 Investment and one-way access 
Although it has been argued that the choice of access prices influences the in-
cumbent 's choice of how much to invest in network infrastructure18 , investment has been 
largely neglected when determining access prices. Investment is either not included when 
modelling the choice of the access price or treated as exogenous to the analysis (with the 
16If the regulated network operator's cost functions are such that there exist function ( 0 and ( 1 such 
that Co= Co((0 (,8,eo),Q) and Ct = Ct((1 (,B,et),qi) then prices (both retail and access) are not used to 
promote incentives. In this case asymmetric information prices are given by standard Lerner indices (like 
(2.2) and (2.3) and ｐｯｾ｣ｯ＠ = Ｑ ｾ＾Ｎ＠ 7110 for the monopolized service, where superelasticities like those in (2.2) 
and (2.3) account for cross price effects if the two competitive services are substitutes), and incentives for 
truthful revelation of information are solely promoted through the distortion of efforts which are lowered 
relative to their full information levels. 
17Laffont and Th·ole (1994) consider two extentions of the above analysis, one where the incumbent is 
faced with a competitor with market power, in which case the choice of the incumbent's prices must take 
into account that the competitor maximizes its profits and one where the regulator's role is restricted to 
choosing prices only for activities of the incumbent which are not considered competitive (like the production 
of q1 above). 
18For example, Laffont and Th·ole (2000) argue that the choice of access prices affects an incumbent firm's 
rate of return on investment and, thus influences its investment decisions. 
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exception of Laffont and Th·ole (1994) to which we will return later). 
Laffont and Th·ole (1993) extend the analysis of the previous section to consider 
a case where the incumbent firm has to add new capacity to its existing network (and thus 
incurs an additional, exogenous cost when providing access to its competitors compared to 
when it uses the network itself) 19 • They conclude that under asymmetric information the 
regulated network operator is more tempted to inflate its access price because it can claim 
that it is too costly to provide access to its rivals without revealing any infonnation about 
its cost of supplying the network to itself. As a result less access is granted compared to 
the case where the network operator incurs the same cost when giving access to its rivals 
or using it itself. The regulator gives less rent to the regulated finn if access is not granted 
to induce it to give as much access as possible. 
Wildman (1997) uses Laffont and Tirole's general framework to determine, in a 
two period model, the optimal access price a fringe of potential entrants should pay an 
incumbent finn in Period 2 so that the incumbent receives adequate compensation for the 
investment is has undertaken in Period 1. The incumbent firm undertakes invest1nent I at 
the beginning of Period 1 but entry cannot occur immediately. The incumbent produces 
a service in Period 1 in quantity qf and offers a price p}. In Period 2 a fringe of entrants 
may enter the market with probability 'Y· If entry occurs, the entrants need access to 
the incumbent's investlnent to produce a perfect substitute for the incumbent's service in 
quantity q2 and offer a price P2 (because the incumbent's and the entrants' services are 
perfect substitutes, only one of the two-the most efficient-gets to produce in Period 2). 
19Here, they do not model the choice of additional capacity. They are only concerned with the effect of 
the additional endogenous cost on the choice of the access price. 
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If entry does not occur the incumbent offers its service in Period 2 in quantity qf and offers 
a price PI. Because in the absence of entry the incumbent's problem of choosing its price 
is the same in both periods, Pi = PI and ql = qf. A regulator chooses the incumbent's 
and the entrants' prices (retail and access) to 1naxhnize intertemporal welfare subject to 
the incumbent covering its costs (including the cost of investment). Wildman shows that 
the optimal retail prices follow Ramsey principles; they are given by (2.2) and (2.3) (where 
superelasticities are substituted by normal elasticities since the market in each period is 
served by a single firm) and the access price is determined by the condition that the fringe 
makes zero profits in equilibrium. The social cost of distortions caused by price increases 
(A) is determined by the break even constraint and is a function of the probability of entry, 
the incumbent's invest1nent cost and the factor by which the regulator discounts the future. 
Armstrong (2001a) adds exogenous investment by the incumbent firm in network 
infrastructure to study a dynamic version of his analysis of choosing the access price in 
an one-way access framework. He assumes the incumbent invests in network infrastructure 
every period but he does not solve for the optimal choice of investment. He concludes by 
arguing that the principle for the choice of access prices in a static set-up follow through to 
the his dynamic analysis. 
The only endogenous treatment of the incumbent's investment decision (to our 
knowledge) can be found in Laffont and Tirole (1994 Remark 3). They extend their analysis 
to account for the choice of an unobservable action I (they refer to investment as an example} 
which increases the incumbent's cost of the network but reduces its cost of producing its 
competitive good. More specifically, Co= ｾ＠ Q+Co(f3, eo, Q) and C1 = -Iq1 +C1({3, e1, q1). 
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They show that the complete information optimal level of the choice of I is I= ｾ＠ while 
they argue that incomplete information may distort investment decisions-as we will show 
in Chapter 3. They also argue that the access price should be manipulated to induce the 
incumbent's incentives to choose the level of I. 
An attempt to 1nodel the optimal timing of infrastructure investment has been 
made by Gans (2001) and Gans and Williams (1999a and b). In a complete information 
framework they examine the effect of access regulation on firms' incentives to become the 
infrastructure provider when the infrastructure may be subject to access requirements, fo-
cusing on the choice of investment timing. They consider a market with two firms both 
of which can build and provide the infrastructure which has natural monopoly characteris-
tics. The infrastructure provider can build the infrastructure today or wait (technological 
progress is ｡ｳｳｵｾ･､＠ to reduce the cost of investment). They study the finns' incentives to 
invest before their rival and become the provider of the infrastructure and they ·compare the 
firms' choice of investment time with the choice of a regulator who is only concerned with 
the value of the infrastructure for the two firms and commits to an access pricing formula 
before investment is undertaken. They also cmnpare the timing of investment chosen by the 
infrastructure provider when it does not compete downstream with its rival (which buys 
access to the infrastructure) with investment timing when the two firms compete down-
stream. They find that so long as the access pricing regime is designed to compensate 
the infrastructure provider for its cost of undertaking the investment, the private timing of 
investment can coincide with the socially optimal timing. 
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2.2. 7 Summary 
This section considered the choice of the price imposed on retail providers by an 
. incumbent owner of an essential facility (the network) to allow access to the essential facility. 
In situations like this the incumbent is a monopoly provider of the network. Thus, if it uses 
the network itself to compete with service providers is will have an incentive to foreclose 
entry, while even if the incumbent is confined to the supply of the network there are still 
concerns that it may charge an excessively high price for access to the network. 
In models where the incumbent does not use the network to compete with the 
service providers, the optimal access price follows Ramsey pricing principles. If the in-
cumbent uses the essential facility to compete downstream then the choice of the access 
price depends on the assumptions made about the incumbent's retail price. The Efficient 
Cmnponent Pricing Rule is an intuitive solution to the problem of choosing the access price 
whenever the incumbent's retail price is exogenously fixed. If the incumbent's retail price is 
endogenous to the analysis then the access price follows Ramsey pricing principles. Whether 
information asym1netries affect the choice of the access price depends on the structure of 
the cost of providing the network. The choice of access prices influences an incumbent net-
work owners incentives to invest in network infrastructure. However, this section illustrated 
that the choice of investment in access pricing models has received limited attention. In 
particular, the scale of investment is rarely exmnined. 
The next section considers a different type of one-way access where access is re-
quired to the networks of several operators which compete for subscribers. 
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2.3 Fixed-to-mobile calls 
Up to this point the discussion has asstuned a single network operator which was 
supplying its network to the retail sector which needed access to the network to deliver their 
service to their customers. A different type of one-way access is that required by an operator 
of a certain type of network to the networks (of a different type) of several competing 
operators. The best example to think about is that of a fixed-line network operator and a 
mobile telecommunications sector with more than one operator (as is typically the case). 
The fixed-line operator will need access to the mobile networks to deliver its subscribers' 
fixed-to-mobile calls. 
Termination charges for calls from a fixed-line to a mobile operator have drawn 
attention as a separate issue, mainly on the grounds that since the originating and the 
terminating network are of different nature and operate in different markets, the nature 
of termination of such calls is different to that of fixed-to fixed or mobile-to-mobile calls 
(both physically and economically). As Wright (2000a and b) argue, for a fixed-to-Inobile 
call to be terminated, the fixed-line networks have to pay an access charge to the mobile 
networks. However, which of the mobile network will receive the access charge depends 
on a 1nobile subscriber's choice of network. Thus, a mobile network's access revenues are 
､･ｴ･ｲｭｩｮｾ､＠ by the fraction of mobile subscribers choosing to join the network. Thus, even 
though the providers of access control the termination of fixed-to-mobile calls they have an 
incentive to compete with each other and attract additional customers and thus generate 
rnore fixed-to-mobile calls to their networks. As a result "... an important consequence 
of higher termination charges is the more aggressive pricing of cellular services to capture 
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greater 1narket share" (Wright 2000b, p. 25) 
Based on this argument, Wright (2000a and b) and Gans and King (2000) study 
the effect of fixed-to-mobile termination charges to a monopoly fixed-line carrier on mobile 
penetration rates and the retail price of such calls. 
Two (not necessarily symmetric) mobile network operators compete for a given 
set of consumers (all of which are assumed to purchase mobile telephony). A fixed-line 
operator uses its network to offer its fixed-to-fixed calls and at the same time needs access 
to the 1nobile networks to deliver its subscribers' fixed-to-1nobile calls. The mobile networks 
have a cost co at the originating and tenninating ends and a fixed cost f per year of 
serving a subscriber. They charge their subscribers a non-linear tariff which consists of 
a variable charge for mobile-to-mobile calls (they are not allowed to price discriminate 
between mobile-to-mobile calls tenninating on their own or on their rival's network), a 
variable charge for mobile-to-fixed calls and a fixed (or rental) fee. They also charge an 
access price ai, i = 1, 2, to the fixed-line network for terminating its calls. Carter and 
Wright (2000a and b) show that the choice of the access price affects the fixed fees the 
mobile networks charge their subscribers. More specifically, the fixed fee is a decreasing 
function of the access prices. Thus, although an increase _in the access charge increases the 
price of fixed-to-mobile calls (and may lower the per customer volume of such calls) the 
mobile networks have an incentive to increase the access charge because this allows them to 
attract more subscribers by lowering their rental fee20 (which, all else equal, will increase 
their revenue from mobile-to-mobile calls, and at the same time may increase demand for 
fixed-to-1nobile calls since there will be more 1nobile subscribers to call). In fact, whether 
20Handset subsidies is a very good example of this. 
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such an increase in access prices above cost is welfare enhancing will depend on the relative 
loss of surplus of the subscribers of the fixed-line network because of the increased price 
of fixed-to-mobile calls compared to the gain of the subscribers of the mobile network due 
to the reduction in the fixed fee they are charged. With partial consumer participation in 
the mobile market, such an increase in access prices above marginal cost has an additional 
effect of attracting more subscribers to the mobile market (who would not have subscribed 
otherwise) which increases the surplus of those new subscribers and the surplus of both the 
mobile and fixed-line subscribers who now have the chance to call more people21 . 
Often subscribers do not know the identity of the network the person they are 
calling has joined. Gans and King (2000) extend the above analysis to take account of 
fixed-line custmner ignorance as to the identity of the mobile carrier they are calling. They 
assume there are n ｾ＠ 2 (not necessarily symmetric) mobile network operators. A fixed-line 
network requiring access to those networks to deliver its fixed-to-mobile calls is assumed to 
charge a different price 11. for fixed-to-mobile calls to network i. However, customers, not 
knowing the identity of the mobile network they are calling, base their decision to call on 
an average price P = l:i Pi. Gans and King show that customer ignorance gives the mobile 
networks an additional incentive to inflate their access price. This is because an increase 
in a mobile network's access price brings about only a limited reduction in the volume of 
fixed-to-mobile calls it receives because of the externality due to custmner ignorance (given 
21 Armstrong (2001a) considers a similar case with the additional assumptions that all calls originating on 
the mobile network terminate on the fixed-line network and that the mobile sector is perfectly competitive 
which means that mobile operators end up with zero profit. He also finds that the mobile networks, fixed 
fee is a decreasing function of the access price and thus mobile networks have an incentive to increase their 
access price and compete fiercely for subscribers. Further, if the price of fixed-to-mobile calls is optimally 
regulated at marginal cost then the access price that imposes the socially optimal marginal cost of the mobile 
calls is equal to the marginal cost of providing access. 
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that consumers base their decision to call on the average price of such calls), while the 
increased tennination revenue allows it to lower its rental charge and compete more fiercely 
for consu1ners. 
2.3.1 Summary 
This section considered a different type of one-way access, that is required by 
an operator of a network of a certain type to the networks of different type of several 
operators which compete with each other for subscribers22 . Based on the obvious exa1nple 
of a fixed-line telecommunications network operator requiring access to the networks of 
several mobile operators, the literature analyzing this type of one-way access arrangements 
has focused on the effect ·of mobile termination charges on the price of fixed-to-1nobile calls 
and on the interaction between 1nobile termination charges and the fixed fee paid by mobile 
subscribers and penetration rates in the mobile market. 
The next section moves from one-way access to consider two-way access arrange-
ments when each firm in the 1narket owns its own network and requires access to its rivals' 
networks to offer full services to its customers. 
2.4 Two-way access (Interconnection) 
Either with a single network operator and an entrant (or fringe of entrants) requir:-
ing access to that network, or with a group of competitive mobile operators and a fixed-line 
220f course the two frameworks are very different. Additionally, these papers' analysis of access charges 
for fixed-to-mobile calls isolates the choice of access charges for fixed-to-mobile from alternative settings 
like mobile-to-fixed, mobile-to-mobile and perhaps fixed-to-fixed access charges. Including these would add 
features of a two-way access pricing problem to the analysis. However, fixed-to-mobile access charges have 
raised a lot of regulatory concern (see Introduction) which justifies the distinct attention devoted to their 
determination. 
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operator (or fringe of operators) requiring access to the mobile operators' networks, the 
above analysis describes a problem where one of two parties requires access to the other 
party's network when the reverse is not true. In this section we present the literature 
studying the problem of choosing access prices when each service provider owns its own 
network, and needs to interconnect with other networks to offer full services to their cus-
tomers. As we argued in the Introduction, this type of market structure is more relevant in 
the telecommunications markets where there is a large number of (full or partial coverage) 
network operators23 • Imagine for example the 1narket for mobile teleconnnunications in 
the UK. When a Vodafone subscriber calls a Cellnet subscriber, Vodafone needs Cellnet to 
terminate the call originated on the former's network and vice versa. This type of intercon-
nection is also relevant to fixed-line telecommunication both a1nong long-distance carriers 
and among local telecommunications providers with the introduction of competition to the 
local loop. Interconnection arrangements are also relevant to the banking sector and the 
airlines industry. 
Industries with more than one network operator in the market are typically consid-
ered to be more competitive than those with monopoly networks and, as a result, requiring 
less regulatory intervention. However, as Laffont and Tirole (2000, p. 9) argue " .. .intercon-
nection requires an agreement between competitors." This raises concerns when operators 
are left to determine these prices on their own, because on the one hand small operators 
may be handicapped relative to big powerful operators, and on the other hand operators 
may collude on the access prices if higher access prices increase their retail prices and thus 
their profits. 
23It may also emerge in a deregulated postal sector. 
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Papers analyzing interconnection terms (like Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1997, 1998a 
and b, Armstrong, 1998, 2001a and c, Carter and Wright, 1999a and b and Gans and 
King, 1999 and 2000) assume that the market is deregulated and present regulated solutions 
mainly for the sake of benchmarking the privately opthnal outcomes. The analysis focuses on 
the conditions under which retail equilibria exist, on the role of access prices in determining 
retail prices and the extent to which access prices can be used by operators as an instrument 
to collude· and increase their retail prices and thus their profits, the role of regulation in 
determining interconnection prices, and the kinds of mechanisms used to set these prices. 
The analysis of a two-way access problem can quickly become complicated because 
of the range of decisions open to a mobile operator: network operators are deregulated, they 
compete for subscribers, they negotiate over their access prices, etc. As an intermediate 
stage Armstrong (2001a) analyzes interconnection terms in a simple framework where net-
work operators do not compete for subscribers24 . Having fixed subscriber bases implies that 
when operators set their prices they only have to worry about excluding some consumers 
from the service and altering consumer demand for it, but they do not have to worry about 
losing a customer to the other operator and then having to pay access charges to that other 
operator for calls delivered to the lost customer. He shows that allowing the two opera-
tors to negotiate over their access prices is beneficial since it forces them to internalize the 
effects of their access price in each other's retail prices (and profits). He also shows that 
if the retail price of international calls is equal to their marginal cost (either regulated or 
competed down to that level) then setting access charges equal to each operator's marginal 
24 As an example of such a market consider international calls where a carrier in country A needs to 
interconnect with a carrier in country B to deliver an international call and vise versa, but the subscribers 
bases (i.e. national populations) are clearly fixed. 
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cost of terminating a call is optimal. 
When networks cmnpete for subscribers they have to take into account the effects 
of losing a subscriber to the rival network. Laffont, Rey and Th·ole (1998a, p. 4) define 
a network's coverage as "the fraction of consumers who can be served by the network at 
a given point of time." The literature distinguishes between two frameworks, one where 
symmetric network operators (in terms of cost structure and market coverage) compete for 
subscribers and one where the 1narket is dominated by a full coverage incumbent which 
faces competition by an entrant firm which builds its own (full or partial) coverage network 
to compete with the incumbent (facilities-based entry). 
2.4.1 Symmetric operators 
Imagine a situation where there are two sym1netric (in terms of cost structure 
and market coverage) network operators in the market for telephony, each competing for 
subscribers. Each network has a marginal cost co at the originating and terminating ends of 
a call and a marginal cost c1 in between, so that the marginal cost of a call originating and 
terminating within the same network (an on-net call) is c = 2co + c1. Serving a customer 
is assumed to entail a fixed cost Ji, i = 1, 2. Additionally each network is assumed to pay 
the other network an access charge ai, i = 1, 2 for terminating off-net calls (calls originating 
on one network and tenninating on the other), so that the marginal cost of an off-net call 
originating on network i is co+ c1 + aj. To reflect the variety of mobile operators/packages 
available the two networks are assumed to be horizontally differentiated. More specifically, 
the 1narket (following Hotelling's model of spatial differentiation) is assu1ned to be a unit 
interval and the networks are (exogenously) located at the two ends of the interval, Firm 1 
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at point 0 and Firm 2 at point 1. Consu1ners are assumed to be uniformly distributed along 
the interval. A consumer who consumes Qi units of firm i's service at a price Pi, is assumed 
-(17-1) 
to enjoy a net surplus v(pi) = Pi
71
_ 1 • It is also assumed that each consumer subscribes 
to one network at most and that consumers value the service enough to join at least one 
network (so that the whole market is covered). Finally, it is assumed that constnners incur 
a "transport cost" t to get (to) the service so that if a consumer is located at point x of the 
unit interval and subscribes to Firm 1 the total transport cost is tx while if the consumer 
subscribes to Firm 2 that is t(1- x). A high transport cost makes consumers more reluctant 
to "travel" and this makes the two services less substitutable25 • 
For prices Pl and p2, the two firms' 1narket shares are determined, as in Hotelling's 
model, by that consu1ner who is just indifferent between buying frmn either firm. If the 
indifferent consumer is located at a then 
which determines the location of the indifferent consumer 
and thus Firm 1 's market share is a1 = a (consumers to the left of the indifferent consumer 
buy Firm 1's service) and Firm 2's 1narket share is a2 = 1- a (consumers to the right of 
the indifferent consumer buy Firm 2's service). 
25This interpretation oft follows Hotelling's model of spatial differentiation which may be appropriate if 
we think of the power of a signal diminishing as we move away from transmitters at points 0 and 1. However, 
spatial differentiation is analogus to differentiated tastes which is perhaps a more suitable interpretation of 
the model (given the heterogeneity of services mentioned above). Think for example of two products each 
with one different attribute, and consumers who have differentiated tastes as to which attribute they prefer, 
and incur a utility cost t every time they have to consume away from their most prefered attribute. 
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Turning to the fraction of a firms' calls that terminate off-net, it is assumed that 
it is equally likely for a subscriber to call another subscriber on the same network as on 
the rival network26 . This means that the fraction of calls originating on network i and 
terminating on network i is ai and the fraction of calls originating on i and terminating on 
The two networks choose their access prices first and then, given these, they choose 
their retail prices non-cooperatively. The assumption that the retail market is um·egulated 
and the networks choose their retail prices is natural given competition for subscribers and 
the symmetry of the market. However, the question is then, should the firms determine 
their access prices as well, or is there a role for regulatory intervention? 
Consider first the case where the firms are not allowed to price disrciminate be-
tween on-net and off-net calls and they charge linear prices. For a given reciprocal access 
charge, as Laffont, Rey and Til·ole (1997, pp. 704-705) argue, when the two firms set their 
retail prices they have to take into account that "An increase in the final price generally 
decreases the market share (market share effect), but increases the retail revenue gener-
a ted by each customer (retail revenue effect) as long as the retail price does not exceed the 
monopoly level; however, since such a price increase decreases the volume of calls gener-
a ted by the network's subscribers (while having no impact on the calls received from the 
rival's subscribers), it is likely to also increase the access revenue (or decrease the access 
deficit) generated by cross-networks communications (access revenue effect)." Thus, each 
26 An example of a different calling pattern is what Carter and Wright (1999b) call "an isotopic calling 
pattern, . Here, there are two types of customers, business and residential, and there are the same number of 
calls from business to residential customers as there are from residential to business. A similar calling pattern 
can be found in Dessein (2001). He assumes there are two types of callers, light and heavy. Light callers 
receive a fraction ln of a heavy caller's calls and a fraction lL of a light caller's calls, where (ln, lL) E [0, 1]2 • 
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firm has an incentive to increase its retail price especially if the access price is high. As 
a result of this incentive, Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a), Armstrong (2001a) and Wright 
(1999a) argue that an equilibrium in retail prices fails to exist whenever the services the 
two networks offer are close substitutes (tis small) and/or the access prices are very high. 
Intuitively, with closely substitutable services a small price cut is enough to corner the mar-
ket. Similarly with excessively high access prices, and thus, high retail prices, each network 
has an incentive to slightly lower its retail price and corner the market. However, if a retail 
equilibriu1n exists (for sufficiently substitutable services and/or suitably low access prices) 
the two networks collude over their access prices to inflate their retail prices and increase 
their profit. Thus, there is a reason to regulate the access price which is an important result 
given the apparently competitive downstream n1arket27 • While, whenever there exists an 
equilibrium, the firms collude on an access price above their marginal cost of providing 
access, the regulated access price that brings prices down to the socially optimal Ｈｒ｡ｾｮｳ･ｹＩ＠
price that just allows the networks to break even is below marginal cost. 
When the firms set their access prices cooperatively, each of them internalizes the 
effect of its choice of access price on the other firm's access revenue or deficit. However, 
when they set their access prices non-cooperatively this is not the case. The two networks 
then have a unilateral incentive to increase their access prices which results in even higher 
access prices28 . 
27Wright (1999a) argues that this collusive outcome prevails even with n > 2 firms in the market (Corrol-
lary 2, p. 8). 
28Carter and Wright (1999a) use the general framework of this sub-section to compare a set of interconnec-
tion agreements in terms of social welfare consumer surplus prices and profits using simulation techniques. 
They consider a market with two symmetric networks which compete for customers. They assume linear 
prices and a linear demand function for the two networks' services. They compare the following access 
pricing regimes: i) choosing access prices to maximise total surplus (socially optimal solution), ii) choosing 
zero access prices ('bill and keep'), iii) choosing access to maximize total profits (cooperative solution), iv) 
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This collusive behavior between the network operators can be eliminated if they 
are allowed to charge two-part tariffs (or more general non-linear prices). If the firms 
charge a tariff Ti = Piqi + fi then, the best marginal price they can offer is a reciprocal 
price equal to the (perceived) marginal cost of a call. This (perceived) marginal cost is 
again an increasing function of the access price and thus retail prices are increasing in the 
access price. However, with two-part tariffs an increase in the access price, which in turn 
increases the retail price and thus reduces the firm's market share, can be competed away 
with an appropriate reduction in the fixed fee. Thus, the increased profit from increasing 
the access charge is competed away through the fixed fee. Laffont, Rey and Th·ole (1998a) 
show that with two-part tariffs the firms' profit is independent of the access charge and 
thus the networks have no incentive to inflate that charge. Even further, the networks, in 
theory at least, are indifferent as to the level of the access charge and thus they should not 
oppose to socially optimal marginal cost pricing of access29 • 
If networks are allowed to practice price discrimination according to the destination 
of a call (between on-net and off-net calls) then (with both linear prices and two-part tariffs), 
by lowering their on-net prices they can build market share without having to alter their 
off-net price and thus without having to pay additional termination charges per subscriber. 
the Nash bargaining solution (with a disargeement point the point of no interconnection), v) no intercon-
nection, and finally vi) the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. They find that it is optimal for the firms to 
interconnect under any access pricing regime rather than stay unconnected. They also find that there is an 
obvious role for regulation of the access prices since that increases substantially the welfare of consumers. 
Finally, they demonstrate the argument that when the choice of access prices is left to the firms, not allowing 
them to negotiate (or in other words collude) over theh· access prices is harmful for both consumers and the 
firms. 
29 Armstrong (2001a and c) considers a case of nonlinear pricing with heterogeneous subscribers. More 
specifically, a fraction 8 of subscribers have a high demand for calls and the rest 1 - 8 have a low demand for 
calls (subscribers may also differ in the number of calls they receive). He concludes that, as with homegeneous 
subscribers, the firms are indifferent as to the level of the access price since profits from increasing access 
revenues are competed away through the fixed fee. 
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However, if a network can attract more consumers by lowering the price of an on-net call, 
then it will inevitably generate more off-net calls than it will receive. Thus, networks now 
have an incentive to keep access prices down and let the other network gain more market 
share while they are getting more access revenue. As Armstrong (2001a) demonstrates, 
under two-part pricing the networks prefer to set their mutual access charge below the 
Inarginal cost of termination. Subscribers then find it cheaper to call off-net and thus 
they prefer to subscribe to the smaller network. In turn networks have lower incentives to 
compete for subscribers (which leads to higher retail prices). Note again that this "below-
cost access price" is not socially optimal and thus there is again a role for intervention. 
2.4.2 Facilities-based entry 
The assumption of symmetric network operators competing for subscribers is more 
appropriate when the market under study has reached a mature stage. Before this however, 
it is likely that small firms who enter the market by building their own network will have to 
compete with well established incumbent firms. This is exactly what the new entrant in the 
UK 1nobile telecommunications market (which acquired its licence with the introduction of 
3G services) will have to do. The concern in cases like this is that incumbent firms may 
not want to provide access to their networks in order to avoid competition. In that case 
entry may not occur at all or entrants may have to strategically under- or over-invest to 
strengthen their position. 
Returning to the assumption that the networks cannot price discriminate according 
to the destination of a call, imagine an asymmetric situation where Firm 1 is an incumbent 
firm and Firm 2 a potential entrant (or fringe of entrants) which initially has no network 
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and enters the market by building its own (full or partial coverage) network. The incumbent 
covers the whole market and the entrant has to decide how 1nuch of the market to cover. 
The incumbent's 1narginal cost at the originating and terminating ends is cfi, the marginal 
cost in between is cy, and the fixed cost is !1. Similarly, the entrant has a marginal cost c5 
at the originating and terminating ends, a 1narginal cost ｣ｾ＠ in between and a fixed cost !2. 
The incumbent charges a price a1 to the entrant for access to its network and similarly the 
entrant charges the incumbent an access price a2. 
Consider first the case where the dominant incumbent firm is regulated at the 
retail level. Its price is fixed throughout the analysis (and it can be linear or nonlinear). A 
competitive fringe of entrants with an exogenously determined level of coverage (less than 
full) enters the market to compete with the incumbent. If the fringe is charging a two-
part tariff then it will choose a variable price equal to its perceived marginal cost of a call, 
P2 = ｣ｾ＠ +a where a = a1 a1 +a2a2 is the weighted (by market shares) sum of the access prices 
the incumbent and the fringe charge each other for termination. Armstrong (2001a) shows 
that if the average access price is regulated and then the two finns bargain over the balance 
of access prices that satisfy this average access price, the optimal average access price that 
sets the fringe's variable price equal to perceived marginal cost P2 = c5 + a1 cfi + ｡Ｒ｣ｾ＠ is 
equal to the average marginal cost of termination. The balance between the two access 
prices will then depend on the relative bargaining power of the two firms30 . 
However, a more accurate analysis of the important question of facilities-based 
entry should endogenize coverage. Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) suggest a framework 
30 Armstrong (1998) considers the case where the entrant is a single umegulated firm which charges a linear 
price to its customers. In that case given the access charge the entrant chooses P2 to maximize its profits. 
The reciprocal access charge that allows the em·ant to just break even should correct for the enrtant's market 
power in the retail sector. 
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for doing this but do not solve or analyze it in detail. This framework forms a basis 
for Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. Imagine that the entrant chooses a level of coverage 
J.L E [0, 1] and incurs an investment cost d(J.L) (increasing and convex) . Now· that the entrant 
covers J.L of the market, market shares are given by a1 = 1- J.L(1- a) for the incumbent 
firm and a 2 = J.L(1 - a) for the entrant31 • The retail market is unregulated and two 
firms choose their (linear) retail prices taking access prices as given. Laffont, Rey and 
Tirole suggest that whether the entrant is handicapped by its "smallness, depends on 
whether the access price is regulated or not. They argue that the entrant may choose to 
strategically under- or over-invest to avoid fierce competition (if the access price is regulated 
and interconnection is guaranteed) or to strengthen its position and induce and agreement 
with the incumbent (if access prices are unregulated and there is no interconnection in the 
absence of an agreement )32 • 
2.4.3 Extensions 
Brand loyalty 
Carter and Wright (2001) extend the basic framework of Section 4.1 to include 
brand loyalty. There are two networks in the market and they both have full coverage. 
However, the two networks are different in that the subscribers of network 1 enjoy additional 
benefits (3. Carter and Wright (2001) model this asymmetry by assuming that with the 
standard Hotelling unit-line, Firm 1 is located at point 0 while Firm 2 is located at point 
31For the derivation of those market shares see Laffont, Rey and Th·ole (1998a, Section 7) and our Chapter 
4, Section 4.2. 
32They also argue that the entrant may be in a more difficult position if the firms are allowed to price 
discriminete according to the terminating network since in this case it is easier for the incumbent to corner 
the market by making access prohibitively costly. 
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1 + {3. ·Thus, if both firms are charging the same price Firrq. 1, called the incumbent, will 
have a higher market share than Firm 2, the entrant33 • Networks are not allowed to price 
discriminate according to the destination of a call and they offer two-part prices. They are 
also assumed to negotiate over a reciprocal access charge. It is shown that, unlike the case 
where the two networks were sym1netric, the two firms are not any more indifferent as to the 
level of the access charge because with asymmetric firms the net flow of calls depends on the 
level of the access prices. Additionally, the incumbent's and the entrant's interests coincide 
only when f3 is sufficiently large in which case the entrant is sufficiently small (in tenns of 
the market share it can attract). Otherwise, while the incumbent wants a reciprocal access 
charge equal to the marginal cost of access, the entrant prefers and access price either above 
or below cost34 • They show that whenever the access price is above the marginal cost of 
termination the entrant generates less off-net calls than the incumbent, while whenever the 
reverse is true the entrant generates more off-net calls. While both of the above are bad 
for the incumbent (in the former case it has to pay the entrant for tenninating its calls a 
price above cost, while in the latter case its is paid less than its cost for terminating the 
entrant's calls), they are beneficial for the entrant which makes a positive access revenue 
in the former case and a higher retail revenue frmn increased volumes of calls in the latter 
33Here the coverage decision is not modeled. The entrant enters by installing an exogenously determined 
level of coverage. 
34Under the assumption of brand loyalty, Carter and Wright (1999a) use simulations to compare the fol-
lowing access pricing regimes: i) choosing access prices to maximise total surplus (socially optimal solution), 
ii) choosing zero access prices ('bill and keep'), iii) choosing access to maximize total profits (cooperative 
solution), iv) the Nash bargaining solution (with a disargeement point the point of no interconnection), v) 
no interconnection, and finally vi) the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. There they demonstrate the argu-
ment that not allowing the firms to negotiate (or in other words collude) over their access prices is harmful 
for both consumers and the firms. The former enjoy lower surplus because they are faced hith higher retail 
prices and the latter (because of the double marginalization effect) enjoy lower profits. 
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case35 . 
Regulation of the access prices 
It is clear from the analysis of two-way access situations that, although markets 
are considered more competitive, the determination of access prices n1ay require regulatory 
intervention. Laffont, Rey and Th·ole (1997, 1998a and b), Armstrong (2001a) and Wright 
(1999) suggest that in a symmetric environment network operators may collude over exces-
sively high access prices, to increase their profits, while in an asymmetric situation, where 
one network is dominant compared to its competitor(s), the access price may be used by 
the dmninant network to squeeze entry. 
Gans and King (1999 and 2000) extend the basic analysis of two-way access situa-
tions to consider the effects of regulation of access prices on competition among networks36 . 
They assume there is a dominant firm in the market and n - 1 non-dmninant (not neces-
sarily symmetric) networks offering differentiated services to consumers who are ignorant 
as to the identity of the network they are calling37 • They find that regulating the domi-
nant firm's access price reduces call prices (because the smaller firms are faced with lower 
costs). However, the whole benefit of the reduction of the dominant finn's access price is 
not passed to consumer since the non-dominant networks off-set a part of it by increasing 
their termination charges. They also find that extending regulation to the non-dmninant 
networks has ambiguous effects on competition. On the one hand, the reduction of the 
35Valletti (1999b) models a situation where two mobile networks choose the level of their network coverage, 
in a market where consumers are constantly mobile and value market coverage as a dimention of the network's 
ccquality". 
36Gans and King (1999 and 2000) do not consider the problem of how to optimally determine access prices. 
Rather they focus on the effects of changes in the access prices on retail prices and competition. 
37Note that this analysis does not consider any entry decisions; the non-dominant firms have already laid 
down their networks. 
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access prices non-dominant networks charge among each other reduces the price of calls 
among non-dominant networks. On the other hand, the reduction of the access price the 
non-dominant networks charge to the dominant network reduces the dominant network's 
retail price but at the same time reduces the non-dmninant networks' incentives to compete 
for subscribers as their termination revenue is lowered. Thus, if the non-dominant networks 
are of small size then regulating their access prices will raise prices rather than reduce 
them. In contrast, regulating the access prices of sufficiently large non-dominant networks 
will increase competition (because firms will be faced with lower costs). 
2.4.4 Summary 
This section considered interconnection arrangements among several competing 
network owners. Industries with more than one network operator in the market are typically 
considered to be more competitive than those with monopoly networks and, as a result, 
requiring less regulatory intervention. Thus, typically retail (and possibly access) prices 
are not regulated. However, because each network operator sets a price that must be paid 
by its rivals, allowing network operators to choose these prices raises concerns. Under the 
assumption of symmetric network operators, the main concern stemming from the analysis 
is that depending on the structure of retail prices charged by the network operators, they 
may be able to collude over high access prices to inflate their retail prices and increase 
their profits. With asymmetric operators and under facilities-based entry the lhnited work 
available suggests that an entrant firm may have to engage into non-optimal choices of 
coverage to strengthen its position and induce a viable interconnection agreement with the 
incumbent firm. With both symmetric and asymmetric network operators, the analysis 
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shows that there are potential gains from regulating access prices (to avoid collusion or 
entry foreclosure). 
The following section summarizes this chapter and links the literature presented 
above with the following chapters of the thesis. 
2.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates that the problem of choosing the price of access to 
networks is a complicated one. As shown in Chapter 1, it has raised a lot of controversy 
and drawn a good deal of the attention of regulatory planning. The choice of access prices 
depends on a number of parameters. So, for example, it depends on the structure of 
the downstream market (whether this is regulated or competitive, vertically integrated or 
separated), the access seekers' ability to find alternative sources of access (bypass), the 
information available to the regulator whenever he is the one that chooses the access price, 
etc. 
The issues involved in choosing access prices differ depending on whether one or 
both of two parties require network access. In one-way access frameworks, because of the 
incumbent's monopoly supply of the network, the 1nain concern is to prevent the incumbent 
from charging excessively high access prices to service providers (to the detriment of efficient 
competition or entry). This is achieved by regulating access prices. 
In two-way access frameworks the issue is not one of monopoly supply of a network 
but of control of the termination of a call on an operator's network. The 1nain concerns 
are then (i) whether powerful operators will collude over high access prices and earn exces-
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sive profits or (ii) whether powerful operators will deny access to small operators to avoid 
competition. 
The chapter also demonstrates that there is an natural link between the choice 
of access prices and a network operator's incentives to invest in network infrastructure. 
On the one hand, with a monopoly provider of a network the choice of the access price 
determines the network operator's return on its investment to expand, maintain or upgrade 
its network. On the other hand, with more than one network operators in the market, the 
choice of access prices determines the viability of an entrant which enters the market by 
building its own (full or partial coverage) network. 
Despite the importance of the choice of access prices as a factor determining a 
firm's incentives to invest in network infrastructure, this chapter suggests that the issue of 
the interaction between access and invest1nent has only received limited attention. Both 
investment in 1naintenance and upgrading (in one-way access frameworks) and an entrant's 
decision to enter a market by building its own network facilities-especially the entrant's 
choice of coverage-(in two-way access frameworks) have 1nainly been treated as exogenous 
by the literature. Indeed, this is the basis for Armstrong's (2001a, p.67) assertion that 
research into providing "long-run, stable incentives for the incumbent (and other firms) to 
invest efficiently in infrastructure and innovation" is an important future step in this area. 
The interaction between access and investment is the ｴｬｾ･ｭ･＠ of Chapters 3, 4 and 
5 of the thesis. In particular, Chapter 3 considers the possible mechanisn1s for regulating 
an incumbent network operator's access price and investment in maintenance and upgrad-
ing, when the incumbent supplies the network to a cmnpetitive fringe of service providers. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 consider an entrant's decision to enter a market dominated by a full cov-
erage incumbent by building its own (full or partial coverage) network assuming first that 
the entrant does not need access to the incumbent's network to operate (Chapter 4) and 
then that interconnection is required (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 3 
Transfers and Prices: Comparison 
of Regulatory Regimes . 
3.1 Introduction 
In a relationship between a regulator and a firm, inevitably the finn possesses more 
information about its technology and its ability to produce at different levels of cost. Given 
this asymmetry of information, a regulator must design contracts in such a way as to allow 
the regulated firm to break even (possibly with the aid of a subsidy) and at the same time 
create incentives through giving it rents sufficient to induce it to produce as efficiently as 
possible, at the lowest possible costs. In the literature on optimal regulatory contracts (see 
Laffont and Th·ole, 1993) the commonest source of such funds has been the regulator, who 
is assumed to give lump-sum transfers to the firm as compensation for the revelation of the 
private information it possesses, at some exogenously determined social cost (capturing the 
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distortionary effects of raising the necessary tax revenue) 1. 
However, the use of transfers as an instrument to model optimal regulation has 
been criticized, mainly on the ground that transfers are rarely used in practice. It is argued 
that regulators do not often transfer lump-sums to firms but rather regulate prices to meet 
their targets (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994). One of the reasons suggested for this 
is that transfers may promote regulatory capture since they give too much discretion to 
regulators. 
Yet, the removal of transfers as an instnnnent to promote efficient operation is not 
universally accepted. Some authors have advocated that whether transfers should or should 
not be modelled depends on the specific structure of each problem, making the choice of one 
or the other instrument endogenous to the assumptions of each 1nodel2 . It is argued that 
the abolition of transfers is mainly motivated by a 1nistrust of regulatory agencies rather 
than the low performance of the instrument itself (Laffont and Th·ole, 1993). 
At the same time it is possible to find a variety of regulatory contexts where 
transfers are authorized by regulators (or at least by govenunent depart1nents )3 . Perhaps 
the best example of this in the UK is the privatized rail industry. Here, the rail network is 
operated by Railtrack, which is responsible for ensuring that Train Operating Companies 
(TOCs), and freight operators have access to suitable track (see Glaister, 1994, Swift, 1995, 
1A variety of papers confirm this view: e.g. Laffont and Tirole, 1994, Auriol and Laffont, 1992, !ossa, 
1999, Dalen 1995. 
2 E.g. "... the prohibition of transfers when in application should be explained by the analysis rather 
than assumed in an ad hoc fashion.'' (Gasmi, Ivaldi and Laffont, 1994, p. 153). 
3 
"'I\·ansfers are also quite common when the regulated firm is a state enterprise. For instance, U.S. 
railroads received subsidies after their nationalization in 1976. Similarly the U.S. Postal Service has received 
appropriations." (Laffont and Tirole, 1993, p. 10) 
" .. .in many contexts transfers are allowed, as for example in public transportation, ... " (Gasmi, Ivaldi and 
Laffont, 1994, p. 153) 
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Bradshaw, 1998). As these authors make clear, rail privatization differed from others in 
the UK by explicitly allowing for an element of (ongoing) central government subsidy to 
the TOCs and to Railtrack. Recently, the regulator of Railtrack, after the evidence of the 
rail industry's failure to operate efficiently and safely, announced that Railtrack will be 
granted a lump-sum transfer to help it cover part of its investment costs (OfRail, 2000). 
The re1naining costs will have to be covered through the access charges the company receives 
from the companies which use the network to offer transportation services (see Footnote 8 of 
Chapter 1). Deciding how much to rely on tax, as opposed to access revenue has prompted 
former rail regulator, John Swift to ask "What is the optimum system of rules under which 
the private sector can assist in the maintenance, renewal and enhancement of the railway?" 
(Swift, 1999, p. 219). Privatized buses provide another example: the industry received a 
subsidy of £1.2 billion to assist operators in running unprofitable routes and keep the prices 
of tickets for elderly and young passengers low (The Observer, April14, 2002). 
Transfers have been advocated as a way to fund universal service obligations 
(Yarrow, 1996, OFTEL, 1997, Cremer, Gasmi, Grimaud, and Laffont, 2001). Universal 
service has been traditionally financed through cross-subsidization; business users subsidize 
residential users, low-incmne consumers have been provided support financed by charges 
on specific services (Laffont and Tirole, 2000). However in a highly competitive market, 
cross-subsidization of non-profitable segments from profitable ones may be increasingly in-
feasible4 • Indeed, cross-subsidization between services is in many cases prohibited (the US 
1996 Telecommunications Act prohibits subsidizing universal service programs from inter-
4
" ... competition and universal service requirements based on cross-subsidies are at odds with each other, 
... " (Valletti, Hoernig and Barros, 200l, ,p. 1). 
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connection and unbundled network revenues; Laffont and Th·ole, 2000). Given this, among 
the alternative ways to finance universal service obligations, are transfers fr01n the regulator 
to the firm which offers these services. 
As a final example, it has been reported that c01npanies which recently acquired 3G 
spectrum licences 1nay require subsidy from the EU to help fund their roll-out committnents 
(Doward, 2001). This comes in response to the debts run up by the companies when 
acquiring their licences. 
Clearly, the notion that regulated utilities fund their activities solely through (reg-
ulated) access/sales revenue is inaccurate. In particular, where large-scale network invest-
ments are required, it is not clear that c01nmercial considerations alone will provide sufficient 
funds. Further, we have seen that theoretical disagreement exists over the suitability of (ad 
hoc) assumptions about which mechanisms are available to the regulator. Bearing these 
observations in mi:Qd, the aim of this chapter is to compare transfer and price regulation in 
a regulated network industry. The framework developed follows Laffont and Tirole (1994), 
where a one-way static access pricing proble1n is studied. They analyze the optimal choice 
of retail and access prices in an environment where a dominant finn owns an essential fa-
cility (the network)5 and uses it to compete with a number of competitive retailers which 
need access to the incumbent's essential facility in order to offer services. They assume the 
regulator is allowed to transfer money to the incumbent firm and they consider both full 
and asymmetric information about the regulated finn's technological ability. 
We use this model to c01npare transfer and price regulation in terms of social wel-
5 A network is a natural example of an essential facility which is likely to be subject to access claims 
because of the large sunk cost involved in building it and the large investment requirements to maintain and 
upgrade it. 
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fare. Laffont and Th·ole (1994) consider the problem when transfers are forbidden. However, 
they do not study it in detail and, most importantly, do not compare the outcomes under 
the two instruments. Further, they do not build investment into the model-a central com-
ponent of the above examples. To examine the effects of investment (in 1naintenance and 
innovation by the regulated firm) on the choice of access prices and the relative perf or-
mance of the two types of regulation (both with and without transfers) we therefore add 
this to Laffont and Tirole's model. Having Rail track in mind (and to keep things simple 
and tractable) we consider a network owner which provides access to a retailer (or number 
of retailers) for which access to the network is essential, but we assume the network owner 
does not offer services downstream. In order to see how investment influences the choice 
between instruments we assume that the network owner undertakes a certain investment 
project which will reduce its marginal costs of providing the network. The exact amount 
by which investment reduces marginal costs of network provision is cmnmon knowledge, as 
is the cost of investment. However, we assume that a certain investment project can result 
to an efficient firm or an inefficient firm6• The firm observes its type once it has invested 
but the regulator cannot observe the type of firm he is faced with. We fully characterize 
the equilibrium contracts in this setting with and without transfer regulation, and present 
several comparisons of the instruments under full information. Then given the complexities 
that emerge under asymmetric information, we use simulations to illustrate the quantitative 
difference between the two regimes in this setting. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents general features 
6Thus, our model is a rare example where the distribution of types is endogenous: see also Dalen (XXXX), 
Laffont and Th·ole (1993, Ch. 1) and Bom·geas and Worrall (2001). 
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of the model, before Section 3.3 compares the instruments under complete information. 
Section 3.4 then characterizes the contracts under asymmetric information and Section 3.5 
presents simulation results and a discussion. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 General features of the model 
A network operator supplies an essential facility (the network) to a fringe of re-
tailers, which use it to supply a final good to consumers. The network operator undertakes 
an investment project I which reduces its cost of supplying the network by f(J), for which 
we assume f' > 0 and f" ::; 0 (the 1narginal effects of extra investment are positive but 
diminishing) and f(O) = 0. If the network operator supplies q units of the essential facility 
the cost of doing so is 
Co ({3- f(I) -eo) q (3.1) 
coq 
where f3 is an efficiency parameter (with a higher f3 indicating that the firm is less efficient), 
eo is the effort the firm supplies to reduce the cost of the operation of the network and 
co= f3- f(I)- eo is the network operator's marginal cost of providing the network. 
The competitive retailers use the network to produce q units of the final good at 
cost cq where cis the retailers' marginal cost which is com1non knowledge7 . For every unit 
of access the retailers get they have to pay a price a to the network operator8 . 
7This assumes that the fringe needs one unit of network supply for every unit of the final good it produces. 
In other words, it assumes the retailers cannot bypass the network operator. For an analysis of the choice 
of access prices (in a framework without network investment) under bypass see Armstrong (200la). 
8 Here we assume that the network operator does not compete downstream with the fringe. Adding 
downstream competition does not add much to the results although additional complications are caused 
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Finally, for the supply of cost reducing effort, the network operator is assumed to 
incur an increasing and convex disutility. Where necessary, this is given by 
'l/J (eo) = ｾ＠ [max (0, eo)]2 (3.2) 
1 > 0, for which one can check that 'l/J' > 0, 'l/;11 > 09. 
Consumers derive gross utility from consuming the retailers' product, which is 
given by S (q) and pay a price p for the it. 
3.3 Full Information 
We start our analysis by assuming first that the regulator has full information 
about effects of investment and, thus, of the characteristics of the incumbent he is faced 
with. More specifically, we assume here that the incumbent undertakes a certain investment 
project which results in a type f3 incumbent and, thus, the regulator knows the exact 
technological characteristics of the regulated finn. Efforts are observed and the cost of 
investment and its cost reducing effect are common knowledge. The regulator is assumed 
to observe realized costs and quantities and choose the access price, effort and investment 
to maximize social welfare. 
by such factors as cross elasticities of demand. For an analysis where the network operator and the fringe 
compete downstream (in a framework without network investment) see Laffont and Th·ole (1993), Ch.5 and 
Tzavara (1999). 
9 Note that we choose a specific functional form for the disutility finction. This is mainly to allow us to 
derive closed form solutions for simulations. More generally, any disutility function '1/J(eo) which satisfies 
'1/J' ｾ＠ 0 for eo > 0, '1/J" > 0 and '1/J(O) = 0, limeo->/3 '1/J(eo) = +oo would lead to the same conclusions. See 
Laffont and Th·ole (1993) for a more general treatment. 
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3.3.1 Price regulation 
We study first the case where the regulator is prohibited from transferring money 
to the firm. In this case, the regulated finn has to cover all its costs through direct charges 
to the competitive retailers (and indirectly to consumers through the access price), so its 
utility is given by 
U = aq - Co - I - 'lj; (eo) (3.3) 
where I is the cost of investment, and a is the access price the network operator charges the 
retailers for use of the network. The cmnpetitive retailers set the price of the final service 
equal to 
p=c+a (3.4) 
Note that this implies that instead of the access price the regulator can set the price of the 
final good (which uniquely defines a). 
The regulator chooses price, effort and investment to maximize social welfare which 
is a sum of consumer surplus plus industry rent (U) 
w = s (q(p))- pq(p) + u (3.5) 
subject to U 2: 0 (which guarantees the network operator's participation). Maximizing 
welfare (subject to the constraint) with resect top, eo and I yields the following first order 
conditions: 
p-co-c J..L 1 
p = l+J..Lry (3.6) 
'lj;'(eo) = q (3.7) 
f'(I)q = 1 (3.8) 
. -------- ·-·· .. --------- -
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In this full information environment (and in the absence of transfers), the regulated firm's 
rent is financed through markups on prices, which distort consumption and are thus unde-
sirable. For this reason, in equilibrium the regulator will leave the lowest possible rent to 
the regulated firm, U = 010 • 
(3.6) defines the relative markup (given ft > 0) of the retail price over the marginal 
cost as a function of the value of regulated incumbent's revenue (J.t) and the inverse of the 
(negative of the) normal price elasticity of the retailers good. The markup of price above 
marginal cost is higher the less elastic the demand for the retailers' good is. 
Thrning to the optimal supply of effort, the left-hand side of (3.7) is the incum-
bent's marginal disutility of supplying additional effort. Thus, (3. 7) says that marginal 
disutility of effort equals marginal cost reduction in q units of network output when the 
first best solution is imposed. Next, according to (3.8) marginal cost reduction due to 
investment must be equal to the marginal cost of investment. 
As we mentioned earlier, setting the retail price uniquely defines the access price. 
Solving (3.6) for a (implicitly) yields 
Co+ [(J.t/ (1 + J.t)) (c/17)] 
｡］ＭＭｾｾｾＭｾｾｾｾ＠
1- [(J.t/ (1 + J.t)) (1/17)] (3.9) 
Given that the social value of the firm's revenue is positive, and 17 > 1, the access price 
charged to the fringe is above the network operator's marginal cost of providing access. 
This is, however, a first best solution and, thus, an access price above cost is not a sign 
10Suppsoe the constraint does not bind. Then Suppose the constraint does not bind. Then p. = 0 and 
(3.6) says that p = c +co. But, in this case, it is clear that U =-I- '1/J(eo) < 0: a contradiction VJ, e > 0. 
With a constant elasticity of demand function, quantity is positive for all finite p (e.g. p = c +eo) and so, 
from (3.7) and (3.8), J, e > 0. 
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of exploitation of the network operator's monopoly power. The access price is set above 
marginal cost to help the firm cover its deficit which is costly for consu1ners. 
3.3.2 ｮｾ｡ｮｳｦ･ｲ＠ regulation 
Here we assume that the regulator, by legislation, is allowed to transfer money to 
the regulated firm to assist it in covering its costs. Like Laffont and Th·ole (1993 and 1994), 
we make the accounting convention that the regulator receives the regulated firm's revenue, 
covers all its operational and investment costs, and transfers a net a1nount of money t to 
the firm, which is raised from taxing consmners/taxpayers. We denote the social cost of 
raising n1oney in this way by .A > 0. The regulator is again assumed to observe realized 
costs and quantities and to set the access price, efforts and investment to maximize social 
welfare. 
Given the net monetary transfer t, the regulated firm's profit now is 
(3.10) 
(recall that the regulated firm's revenue goes to the regulator who then transfers t to the 
firm). 
Again the price the competitive retailers charge consumers is equal to the marginal 
cost of supplying the good to consumers-as in (3.4) 
p=c+a (3.11) 
In this full information case social welfare is given by 
vV = S(q(p))- pq(p)- (1 + .A)(t +Co+ I- aq(p)) + U 
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The regulator's problem is to choose t, p, eo and I to maxhnize social welfare subject to 
U ;;::: 011 • The expense of raising transfers means that, in this full inforn1ation case, the 
regulator leaves no rent to the regulated firm, U = 0. Maximization with respect to t, p, eo 
and I yields 
p-eo-c .X 1 
=---
p 1+-Xry (3.12) 
'1/J'(eo) = q (3.13) 
f'(I)q = 1 (3.14) 
with t = 'lj;(eo). The retail price pis again given by a Ramsey type formula. The markup 
above marginal cost is now a function of the social cost of public funds and (as before) the 
inverse of the (negative of the) elasticity of the retailers' service. As before, the more elastic 
the demand for the retailers service the s1naller is the relative markup of price over costs. 
Again, as before, marginal disutility of effort equals marginal cost reduction in q units of 
network output when the first best solution is imposed. Finally, as with price regulation, 
marginal cost reduction due to investment must be equal to the marginal cost of investment. 
The access price is again uniquely defined through the retail price 
co+ [(.X/(1 + .X))(c/7J)] 
a= 1- [(.X/(1 + .X))(l/7])] 
and, as with price regulation, it is above the marginal cost of suppiying the network. 
(3.15) 
11The fact that the regulator still regulates price, as well as the transfer follows Laffont and Tirole's 
specification of the transfer rproblem. Thus, the comparison we make explicitly compares this well known 
version of the price/transfer settings. 
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3.3.3 Examining the two regimes under full information 
Within price regulation 
Recall that the first-order conditions frmn the regulator's 1naxhnization problem 
under price regulation are given by (3.6), (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9). First, note that the con-
straint (U ｾ＠ 0) binds (p, > 0). Suppose not: then p = co+ c frmn (3.6). But then 
U = -I- 'lj;(e) < 0, VI, e > 0. If I= e = 0, then J.L = 0 could hold while U = 0. But, 
in this case p > 0 (from (3.6)), so q > 0, so I, e > 0 (from (3.7) and (3.8)): a contradic-
tion. Given this result, our comparative static analysis must incorporate the network's 
rent constraint. 
In order to perform comparative statics, we can write this system of equations in 
total differential form as: 
dp de+#}. ｾ､＠p p - ＨＱＫｾＭｴＩ＠ 1] 'TJ 
de 0 
f::l.. = 
dl 0 
dJ-1. qdc + qd{3 
where \ 
c+go ! f!_ 1 
p p p - ＨＱＫｾＭｴＩＲＱｊ＠
I 
} 
l' 
-q' 'lj;" 0 0 
f::l.= 
f'q' 0 f"q 0 
(p- co- c)q' + q q-'lj;' f'q -1 0 
Notice that the middle two entries in the bottom row of f::l. equal zero, from the first-order 
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conditions. It is readily shown that 
ＱｾＱ］＠ '1/J"[(p- co- c)q' + q]f" q ＮＮＮ［Ｎ｟ＮＮ［ＺＮＮＮ［Ｌ｟｟ＬＮＭＭｾＭ｟Ｎ［［ＮＮＮＮ｟｟［｟＠ > 0 (1 + ｾｴＩＲＷｊ＠
where the sign stems (p- co- c)q' + q > 012 . 
Now consider how access price and investment vary with the exogenous c and (3. 
By symmetry, we focus on the effects of c. Since p = a + c we know that ｾｾ＠ = ｾ＠ - 1. 
Thus, we need *. Frmn Cramer's rule, we have 
de .! J!... 1 
p p p - (l+tt)27J 
0 'l/J11 0 0 
0 0 f"q 0 
q 0 0 0 
dp = ..:...._---.....,.....---,-------!. I ill 
ｾ＠ ＨｾＩ＠ q >1 
* de ｾ＠ ("""[(p-co-c)q'+q]f"q) = (p- c0 - c)q' + q (l+ttF?J 
Thus, ｾｾ＠ > 0. Thus, in response to a rise in downstream costs (or the network's cost 
parameter, (J), the regulator allows a higher access price. In the former case, this is to 
compensate the network for the loss of revenue caused by the associated reduction in retail 
sales (and the higher value of Co resulting from lower cost-reducing effort); in the latter 
case, it covers the network's additional costs. 
12Rearanging (p- co- c)q' + q > 0 we get (p- eo- c)q' > -q '¢:? (p- co- ｣Ｉｾ＠ > -1 this can be written 
as p-';-c ｾｾ＠ > -1 which reduces to -r!{:j;*7J > -1 which holds since f.L > 0. 
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Next, we turn to ｾｾﾷ＠ We have 
c+co 1 de 1 
p p p - ＨＱＫｾＭｴＩ Ｒ ＷＷ＠
-q' 'lj;" 0 0 
f'q' 0 0 0 
(p- co- c)q' + q 0 q 0 
dl= I ill 
Hence, the regulator also responds to an increase in c (or {3) by lowering investment: the 
1narginal benefits of investment are spread across less units of output as price rises in 
response to these changes and, as a result, less investment is required. 
We therefore have 
Proposition 1 Under price regulation with full information, the regulator raises the access 
price and lowers network investment in response to increases in network or retail costs. 
Within transfer regulation 
Recall that in this case the first-order conditions are given by (3.12), (3.13) and 
(3.14). There is also an additional ｲ･ｱｵｩｲ･ｾｮ･ｮｴ＠ that t = '1/;(e) but, because any level of 
t can be chosen (and t appears nowhere else in the above equations), this can be left for 
now. Notice that an inverse relationship between p and tis implied by the above, however: 
higher p means lower q, hence lower e and, therefore, lower t. Effectively, the regulator has 
the option trading these revenue sources off when selecting the {p, t} combination to cover 
the firm's costs. 
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In similar fashion to the previous section, we can analyze the effects of cost rises ( e 
and {3) on the access price and investment. The equivalent of.!::::.. (say, f::::..T) has a determinant 
given by13 
Thus, we have 
dp (!" q'l/J") I P 
de= lf::::..TI > o 
and 
di -(f'q''l/J")/p 
de= lf::::..TI < 0 
The regulator responds to the increased costs by raising price. However, it is 
immediately apparent that ｾｾ＠ = * -1 is now ambiguously signed. It may be that the 
regulator prefers to respond to increases in cost using the transfer rather than the regulated 
firm's access revenue. As with price regulation, the regulator also responds to an increase in 
e (or {3) by lowering invest1nent: the marginal benefits of investment are spread across less 
units of output as price rises in response to these changes and, as a result, less investment 
is required. These results, therefore suggest that, when provided with an extra instrument 
with which to cover the network's costs, the will opt to soften the effects of eon the access 
price if retail prices are already 'high'. 
Acknowledging the symmetry between c and {3, we have the following result: 
Proposition 2 Under transfer regulation with full information, the regulator increases the 
retail price and investment in response to rising costs. However, the effect of higher costs 
on a is ambiguous. 
13The matrix !:l.T is Hessian matrix and, thus, it has a negative sign (from the second-order conditions). 
Of course this posses restrictions on !", 1/J" and q1• 
[" , 
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Comparison 
We now seek to compare the two regimes. Two types of comparison can be 
considered. The first seeks to examine the relative values of the access price and investment 
under the two instru1nents; the second considers the welfare effects of each. 
The first comparison proves to be particularly awkward, even in the current com-
plete information setting. The reason is the endogenous value of J.L under price regulation. 
It is clear from the two sets of first-order conditions that when J.L =A, the two instruments 
generate the same levels of access price, retail price, output, effort and investment. We 
can imagine a set of parameters {c, /3} that brings this about: J.L(c, /3) = A. With this in 
mind, if we could establish the behaviour of J.L in c and {3, it may be possible to describe 
relative prices, investment levels, etc., under the two regimes as c and f3 vary around {c, /j}. 
Unfortunately, there is significant ambiguity in df-l/dc (and, therefore, dp,jd{3) and we are 
therefore not able to provide general results here14 . We note, however, that the simula-
tion results in Section 3.5 confirm that relative prices (and, thus, the other variables) vary 
directly with J.L/ A. 
Now consider welfare under the two regimes. With price regulation (as modelled by 
Laffont and Th·ole, 1994), the regulator has three instruments (p, I, e) to maximize welfare 
subject to the network's individual rationality constraint. With transfer regulation (again, 
14In particular, using the matrices above, we have 
dp, / 11 q2 [(c + co),P"- q'] + { 7/J" !" q[(p- c- co)q' + q]}(l- !') 
de = Pl.6.1 
Whilst the first expression in the numerator is negative, the second cannot readily be signed. Qualified 
comments can be made: for example, if q > 1 then we know from (3.8) that 1 > f' and sa dJ..L/dc < 0. In 
this case, we would expect c > c to generate lower retail/ access prices and higher investment under price 
regulation than transfer regulation since J..L < p,(C, ·). 
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as defined by Laffont and Tirole, 1994), his problem is the sa1ne but an extra instrument is 
available: t. Since transfer regulation is, thus, a less constrained programme, we have 
Proposition 3 Welfare under transfer regulation will never be less than under transfer 
regulation. 
Perhaps the easiest way to see this is to note that the regulator always has the 
option of setting t = 0 and giving the firm its revenue. 
3.4 Incomplete Information 
3.4.1 Price regulation 
Consider now a case where there is asymmetric information about the effect of 
investment. An investment project can result in an efficient firm or an inefficient firm. The 
regulator does not know the effect of investment and thus does not lmow the efficiency 
para1neter {3 he is faced with. Also he cannot observe the effort supplied. The regulator 
expects investment I to lead to an efficient firm (i.e. (}_)with a probability v1 = (1-exp( -I)) 
and an inefficient firm (i.e. 73 > [!) with a probability 1 - v115 . Higher investment increases 
the probability of the regulated firm being efficient Ｈｾ＠ = exp( -I) > 0) at a decreasing 
rate (8;ji = - exp( -I) < 0)16 . The cost of investment I and the marginal cost reduction 
due to investment f(I) are cmnmon knowledge. Given the asymmetry of information the 
15 As mentioned in the Introduction, this provides a way of endogenizing the distribution of types of 
network faced by the regulator. 
16Note again that for pmposes of tractibility we have assumed a specific functional form for v1 . Generally, 
any probability v1 which satisfies!!;;- ;?::: 0 (investment reduces the operating cost) and 8:ri < 0 (investment 
reduces the operating cost at a decreasing rate) would lead to the same conslusions as our v1 does. See 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) chapter 1 for a more general probability function, in a framework with a single 
firm in the market. 
ｾＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ ＭＭ - --
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regulator now has an additional target, he must provide enough incentives to the firm to 
induce it to reveal its true type, realize its real costs and get the rent designed for it. 
Incentive compatibility (IC) constraints for the two types of firm, which guarantee that it 
is optimal for each type of firm to reveal its true technological characteristics rather than 
mimic the other firm, are 
(p_- c)g_- C0 - ｉＭｾ＠ [max (O,s;:0)] 2 
> (p- c)q- Co- ｉＭｾ＠ [1nax (0, e0 - D.{J)] 2 
for the efficient type, and 
(p- c)q- Co- ｉＭｾ＠ [max (0, eo)]2 
> (p_- c)g_- C0 - ｉＭｾ＠ [max ＨＰＬｾ Ｐ＠ + D.fJ)]2 
for the inefficient type of firm. Notice that we are now using the explicit functional form for 
'ljJ(eo) introduced in (3.2). As will be apparent below (see, for example, (3.31) and (3.33)), 
we need to distinguish different cases for the inefficient network's effort, and because our 
subsequent shnulations require explicit expressions for these, it is convenient to produce 
them now. 
The individual rationality (IR) constraints, which guarantee the participation of 
the two types of firm, are 
0 :::;; (E.- c)g_- C0 -I- ｾ＠ [max (0, ｾｯＩｦ＠ (3.16) 
0:::;; (p- c)q- Co- ｉＭｾ＠ [max (0, eo)] 2 (3.17) 
i.e. U ｾ＠ 0 in our previous notation. 
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The regulator wants to maxhnize social welfare which is a weighted average of 
welfare with an efficient network operator plus welfare with an inefficient network operator 
w = lll {S(q)- pq + U} + (1- Vt){S(q)- pq + U} 
subject to the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. 
In equilibrium we have 
and thus 
So the incentive compatibility constraints can be written as 
and 
(p- c)q- C- I- 'l ＨｾｯＩＲ＠
- - 2 
> (p- c)q- C- I- ｾ＠ [max (0, e0 - ｾＬＶＩ｝ Ｒ＠
(p- c)q- C- I- 'l (e0) 2 2 
> Ｈｾ＠ - c) !l - C - I - ｾ＠ (:S - Qo) 2 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
The incentive compatibility constraint for the efficient firm can be reduced to 
(3.21) 
where 
(3.22) 
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Thus, the individual rationality constraint of the inefficient firm implies the individual 
rationality constraint of the efficient firm. We ignore for the moment the inefficient firm's 
IC (we check in our simulations that the equilibrium outcome satisfies the inefficient firm's 
incentive cmnpatibility constraint). Thus, the regulator maximizes expected social welfare 
subject to the efficient firm's incentive compatibility constraint and the inefficient firm's 
individual rationality constraint. 
The Lagrangian for the regulator's problem is 
+v1 (1 + J!:.){pq- cg_- ((}_- f(I) - ｾ Ｐ ＩＹＺＭ I- 'ljJ Ｈｾ Ｐ Ｉ＠ - <.P(eo)} 
+(1- v1)(1 + Jl){pq- cq- ＨｾＭ f(I)- eo)q- I- 'ljJ (eo)} 
where !!:.. ｾ＠ 0 and ]l ｾ＠ 0 are the Kuhn-Thcker multipliers on the efficient firm's IC and 
the inefficient firm's IR constraints; they reflect the social value of the efficient and the 
inefficient firm's revenue respectively. 
Given that rents are costly for the economy, the regulator in equilibrium leaves no 
rent to the inefficient firm and exactly U = q> (eo) to the efficient firm. Equilibrium prices 
are given by 
p-QJ-C J.L 1 
］ｾＭ
'!!. 
(3.23) 
for the efficient type, and 
p-co-c 71 1 
=---
p 1+1177 (3.24) 
for the inefficie.nt type. Notice that the structure of prices is not distorted by the asymmetry 
of information, they are still given by Ramsey formulas and the relative 1nark-up of price 
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over marginal cost for a good with less elastic demand is higher. Both retail prices increase 
with the social value of the relevant firm's revenue both marginal costs co and c. Access 
prices are 
(3.25) 
for the efficient type, and 
_ co+ [(JL/ (1 + 71)) (c/ry)] 
｡］ＭＭＺＺＮＮＺＮＺＬ｟ｾ＠ _ _;_.:.,.:-.;....:...-:..:...:. 
1 - [(71/ (1 + JL)) (1/ry)] (3.26) 
for the inefficient type and again these are not distorted by the asymmetry of information 
(recall a= p-c). The fact that prices (retail and access) are not distorted by the asymmetry 
of infonnation is due to the specific form of the cost functions chosen (the dichotomy 
property; Laffont and Th·ole, 1993) 17 • In practice, this says that the regulator does not use 
prices to promote incentives for revelation of information. 
Optimal efforts are given by 
for the efficient type, and 
1 
ｾＰ＠ = -q 
ｾＭ
_ 1_ 1 Vl jJ, 
eo= -q- ---- -_<Pea 
I 'Y 1 - Vl 1 + jJ, 
(3.27) 
(3.28) 
for the inefficient type, where <P-e0 is the derivative of <P(eo) (see (3.23)) with respect to eo 
(recall that the probability v1 is a function of investment). 
17The dichotomy property holds if and only if there exists a cost function (such that 
0 = 0 (( ({3, e), q) 
In words this implies that the quantity produced is separable from the technological parameter and efforts 
in forming costs. When this holds the firm's reward can be a function of f3 and e solely (Laffont and Tirole, 
1993). Our cost function Go = ({3- f(I)- eo)q satisflies this property. For a more general cost functions 
and a case where prices are distorted to promote incentives see Laffont and Tirole, 1993 Ch.3. 
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Comparing efforts with the full information case, we see that the efficient type's 
effort is not affected by the asymmetry of information. The regulator still expects the 
efficient firm to perform optimally. The inefficient firm's effort is distorted due to the asym-
1netry of information and this is how the regulator gives incentives for truthful revelation 
of information. He allows the inefficient firm to supply less than optimal effort and get zero 
rent and demands that the efficient firm supplies optimal effort and gets a strictly positive 
rent. At the same time by allowing the inefficient firm to supply lower effort, he limits the 
informational rent left to the efficient firm, which is a function of inefficient effort levels 
(U ］ｾＨ･ｯＩＩＮ＠
According to whether [}_-co is positive, or not, we can distinguish between two 
cases for the inefficient firm's efforts: 
1. max ( 0, (}_-co) =§_-co (effort supplied by an efficient firm which chooses to pretend 
to be inefficient is positive). In this case the efficient firm's rent is given by 
(3.29) 
and so solving for the inefficient type's efforts yields 
_ 1_ Vl JL 
eo = -q- ---=-D./3 
'Y . 1 - V! 1 + jl (3.30) 
2. 1nax ( 0, §_-Co) = 0 (effort supplied by an efficient firm which chooses to pretend it is 
inefficient is non-positive). In this case the efficient firm's rent is given by 
(3.31) 
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and solving for the inefficient type's efforts yields 
(3.32) 
The optimal level of investment is chosen to satisfy 
8vl avl -0 = ar{S(g)- pq + U}- Bf{S(q)- pq + U} (3.33) 
8vl 
+ 8I (1 + ｾＩｻｰｱＭ c_q- (/}_- j(I)- ｾ Ｐ ＩＹ｟Ｍ I- 'ljJ Ｈｾ Ｐ ＩＭ <I>(eo)} 
+v1(1 + ｾＩ｛ｦＧＨｉＩ｟ｱＭ 1) 
_ 
8
v
1 (1 + p;){pq- cq- (73- f(l)- eo)q- I- 'l/J (eo)} 81 
+(1- v1)(1 + JI,)[f'(I)q- 1] 
Note that, like the inefficient firm's effort, investtnent is distorted (see (3.8)). The above 
reduces to f'(I)_q = 1 when v1 = 1, i.e. when the regulator is certain he is faced with an 
efficient firm. Similarly, when v1 = 0, we have the full information investment for 7J. 
3.4.2 'Transfer regulation 
Consider now the case where transfers are allowed and investment can lead to 
an efficient firm with probability v1 = (1 - exp-1) and an inefficient with an inefficient 
firm with probability 1 - v1. The regulator does not know f3 and, again, cannot observe 
efforts. The cost of investment as well as the marginal cost reduction due to investment 
are still common knowledge. The regulator must provide incentives for true revelation of 
information. Incentive compatibility constraints are 
t.- ｾ＠ [max (0, ｾ Ｐ Ｉ｝ Ｒ＠ 2:: t- ｾ｛ｭ｡ｸ＠ (0, eo - ｾＯＳＩ｝ Ｒ＠ (3.34) 
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for the efficient type of firm, and 
(3.35) 
for the inefficient firm (there is no revenue term here since the regulated firm's revenue goes 
to the regulator). 
Individual rationality (participation) constraints are 
"1.- ｾＨｭ｡ｸ＠ ＨＰＬｾ Ｐ Ｉ｝ Ｒ＠ 2:: 0 
t- ｾ＠ [1nax (0, e0)] 2 2:: 0 
(3.36) 
(3.37) 
The regulator's target is to maximize social welfare which again is a weighted 
average of welfare with an efficient network operator plus welfare with an inefficient operator 
W = v1 ｻ｛ｓＨｾＩ＠ + Apq- (1 +.A)((§.- f(I)- ｾｯＩ｟ｱ＠ (3.38) 
+I+ ｣ｾ＠ + 'lj; (§.0))]- AU} 
+ (1- v1) {(S(q) + Apq- (1 +A) ((7J- j(I) - eo)7J. 
+I+ cq + 'lj;(eo))]- AU} 
subject to the two types' incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. 
Following the same reasoning as above (see (3.20), (3.21)), we can reduce the 
incentive compatibility constraints to 
(3.39) 
(3.40) 
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We can write the efficient firm's IC as in (3.22) with <P (.)given by (3.23), which again implies 
that the individual rationality constraint of the inefficient firm implies that of the efficient 
firm. As with price regulation we maximize social welfare subject to the inefficient firm's 
individual rationality and the efficient finn's incentive cmnpatibility constraints; it can be 
shown that the solution satisfies the inefficient firm's incentive cmnpatibility constraint. 
Rents are costly for society as they are raised through taxation, so the regulator will 
leave no rent to the inefficient firm and exactly U = ｾ＠ (eo) to the efficient firm. Substituting 
rents into the welfare function and maximizing with respect to prices for both types yields 
retail prices given by (3.24) for the efficient type, and (3.25) for the inefficient type, efforts 
are again given by (3.28) for the efficient type, and (3.29) for the inefficient type and we 
can again distinguish between the same two cases for efforts depending on <P (.) yielding the 
same effort levels as in (3.31) and (3.33), where fi and!!:. are substituted by A.. Access prices 
are as in (3.26) and (3.27), where again!!:. and fi are substituted by A. Investlnent is given 
by (3.34) where!!:. and fi are replaced by A. 
Again comparing the full and the incomplete information cases we see that prices 
are not affected by the asymmetry of information, and incentives are promoted through the 
inefficient firm's effort and optimal investment, as in the price regulation case. 
3.5 Discussion 
We now seek to compare the two regimes under full and asymmetric infonnation. In 
the latter case, the complexities observed in Section 3.3 are magnified now by the presence of 
two (possible) firms. In particular, the presence of two endogenous multipliers under price 
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regulation, and the fact that investment is a function of both of these, makes comparison 
difficult. It is still the case, however, that under transfer regulation the regulator has 
recourse to extra policy instruments (t. and t) and thus, 
Proposition 4 Welfare under transfer regulation is still above that under price regulation. 
A useful way to proceed in the presence of such complexity is to use simulations. 
These allow us to quantify the outcomes under the two reghnes and compare the results. 
Whilst, of course, this does not necessarily provide general results, the illustrations are a 
valuable aid to intuition. 
3.5.1 Simulations 
Along with (3.2) and v1 = exp( -1), we specify the other functional forms necessary 
for simulation as follows: 
f(J) = Kfu 
where K > 0 and 0 < a :::; 1 and represents how fast investment reduces the marginal cost 
of supplying the network18 , and 
q = Aop-11 
The baseline values we have given to the parameters are Ao = 100, 1 = 0.5, a = 0.2, K = 5, 
7] = 1.7, {3 = 35, 7J = 36. We use the following notation (with suitable amendments): 
18This satisfies our earlier assumptions when CJ ｾ＠ 1: 
and 
8f(I) = CJI<Iu-1 > 0 81 
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• p{: Retail price under with information and a low (3; price regulation. 
• p£: Retail price under with information and a high (3; price regulation. 
• Pl= Retail price with asymmetric information and a low (3; price regulation. 
• Ph: Retail price with asymmetric information and a high (3; price regulation. 
• pt{: Retail price under with information and a low (3; transfer regulation. 
• pt£: Retail. price under with information and a high (3; transfer regulation. 
• ptl: Retail price with asymmetric information and a low (3; transfer regulation. 
• pth: Retail price with asymmetric information and a high (3; transfer regulation. 
• I p: Asymmetric information investment; price regulation. 
• It: Asymmetric information investment; transfer regulation. 
To begin, Figure A.l presents the multipliers from the two price regulation models 
along with the social cost of public funds under transfer regulation. For the parameters 
chosen, all price regulation multipliers are below A = 0.3. From the Ramsey equations 
for retail prices, this could lead us to expect lower retail (and access) prices under price 
regulation, and this is what we observe in Figures A.2 and A.3. As would be expected, the 
prices for a high (3 finn are above those for a low (3 firm. F\uther, as (3 increases under full 
information, Proposition 1 is confirmed (as, of course, if Proposition 2). 
Next, consider network investment (Figure A.4). Under full information, the in-
verse relationship between I and a from Propositions 1 and 2 is confirmed. It is notable 
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that the asymmetric information level of investment is higher than its full information 
counterpart under both regimes, and that these increase with 7J. The reason for this is that 
investment now has the added benefit of increasing the prospect of a §_ firm and, of course, 
this benefit rises with the disparity between the two firms. The additional investment under 
asymmetric information in Figure A.4 is a clear indicator of the cost of the regulator being 
uninformed. The fact that invest1nent under each version of transfer regulation is lower 
than its price regulation equivalent suggests that the regulator is happy to keep retail prices 
higher and accrue the resulting access revenue (thereby economizing on transfers) under the 
transfer regime. 
Another element of investment in our model is its general effectiveness (as mea-
sured by a). As Figure A.5 shows, higher a raises investment-with asymmetric infor-
1nation investment being greater than its full infonnation counterpart under both regimes. 
Interestingly, Figure A.6 notes that this may not be beneficial: welfare falls as a rises, as 
the cost of extra investment apparently outweights the gains. 
Another observation from Figure A.5 is that it confirms Proposition 3 and our 
discussion about relative welfares under asymmetric information: welfare is higher under 
transfer regulation than (Laffont and Tirole's version of) price regulation. Figure A. 7 also 
illustrates this, for increases in 7J. 
Finally, it is interesting to examine the size of the welfare difference between the 
two regimes: while we know that transfer regulation will be higher, the extent of this gain 
may be important for policy19 • To pursue this we plot the relative change (RC) in welfare 
19For example, we have seen some authors argue that transfer regulation suffers from problems we have 
not modelled-such as regulatory capture. If this is the case, it increases the need for a large gap to exist 
between the transfer and price regulation in our model. 
··-- . ---·-·-·--------. 
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under asymmetric infonnation due to moving from price to transfer regulation; with obvious 
notation: 
WT-WP 
RC= WT X 100 
Figure A.8 presents the results for increases in 73. It can be seen that, for 73 close to 
/}_, there is a 90% gain from transfer regulation. However, as 7J increases, this gain falls 
(ultimately to 40%). One reason for this is that under price regulation the regulator 
requires more investment anq this increases the prospect of a /}_ (more under price than 
transfer regulation. This reduces the rent the regulator has to give up to the efficient firm 
faster under price regulation. Thus, there are potentially large gains from using transfer 
regulation, particularly when the degree of asymmetric information is slight. 
3.5.2 Extensions 
There is a variety of ways in which the analysis of this chapter can be extended. 
One obvious way is to change the assumptions about investment. We have assumed that 
the regulated firm undertakes an investment project which has a certain cost and reduces 
the regulated firm's marginal cost in a certain way. Following Laffont and Th·ole (1993, Ch. 
1) we have also assumed that the investment determines the distribution of the regulated 
firm's type; it can result in an efficient firm with probability v1 or an inefficient finn with 
probability 1 - v1. 
One alternative, which may often be the case, would be to assume the regulator 
is uncertain about the cost of investment which may be a function of the firm's ability to 
invest cost effectively. Or, following Laffont and Tirole (1993; Ch.1) the regulator may lack 
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information about the effectiveness of investment as well as the cost of production. To model 
this set-up, one could assume that the investment project can be effective I(B) or ineffective 
I (fl.), where fl. < 0 and a higher e makes investment more effective ( e would be a second 
characteristic, along with {3 of the network). As in our model investment determines the 
regulated finn's type; it results in an efficient firm with a probability v1 and an inefficient 
type with a probability 1 - VI. Thus, a highly effective investment project can result to 
an efficient firm with probability VI (0) and an inefficient firm with a probability 1 - v1 (0). 
Similarly, an ineffective investment can result to an efficient firm with probability v1 (fl.) 
and an inefficient firm with probability 1 - v1 (fl.). The regulator expects investment to be 
effective with a probability p and ineffective with a probability 1- p. 
As another extension, our analysis is static and does not consider optimal timing 
of investment. Imagine a situation where the regulated firm has to undertake a certain 
investment project of size I, but now it can do so in two periods and at the same time it 
has to supply the network to the fringe of service providers. In that case the firm has a first 
period production cost 
and a first period utility 
and a second period cost 
and a second period utility 
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Such an extension might be appropriate for considering particularly large projects. Inter-
estingly, a ratchet effect may emerge, to the extent that the outcmne of Period 1 investment 
signalled the underlying value of f3. 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter considers the question of whether price regulation or the use of trans-
fers to regulated incumbent networks is the best mechanism to fund their investment (in 
network infrastructure) when the network is an essential facility for operation downstream. 
In particular, we have amended Laffont and Th·ole's (1994) version of price and transfer 
regulation in an access setting to include network investment. This investment is costly but 
has the benefit of reducing costs and, in an asymmetric information setting, increasing the 
probability of a low cost network. 
We find that, under full information, investment can be used by the regulator to 
keep retail and access prices down, although he may use transfers (when available) as an 
alternative to access revenue if costs receive an exogenous shock. This inverse relationship 
between investment and retail prices disappears (or, rather, is offset) under asymmetric 
information because of the additional benefits frmn investment in this setting: it generates a 
more favorable distribution of types and helps keep down the efficient network's information 
rent. Thus, we find that the regulator calls for more investment when network types are hard 
to observe: this extra network investment (under either sche1ne) is effectively a measure of 
the cost of the asymmetry. These points are worth bearing in mind when assessing policy 
calls for extra investment in network industries: high investment need not be associated 
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with low prices because it may be performing a screening role for the regulator. Under 
full and asym1netric information, our simulations suggest that investment is higher under 
price regulation than transfers: apparently the regulator is less concerned to forego any 
constraining effects that investment 1nay have on price because he values the associated 
access revenue20 • 
When comparing the welfare effects of the two mechanisms, we find that transfer 
regulation is preferable to price regulation because it is (in this Laffont and Th·ole set-up) 
a less constrained mechanism. The welfare gains frmn transfer regulation can be large-at 
least when the information asymmetry is sufficiently small to keep information rent down. 
This welfare result is interesting given the debate (summarized in the Introduction) about 
whether transfers should be used by regulators, and the fact that we do observe instances 
of this taking place. Of course, in practice, a number of constraints (such as regulatory 
accountability, capture and the 1nechanisms for providing the regulator with revenue) may 
prevent such 1neasures from being popular. However, the current chapter adds some weight 
to the point made by Gasmi, Ivaldi and Laffont (1994), that this choice should be endogenous 
to the model at hand, and that ad hoc decisions here could prove damaging to welfare. 
While we have ah·eady mentioned some useful extensions to our work, the above 
arguments point to perhaps the 1nost hnportant way in which the chapter's material should 
be extended: it would be valuable to examine a setting where the regulator and the network 
could interact and, thereby, allow the prospect of capture. Laffont (2000) and Grossman 
and Helpman (2001) survey models with this 'political' flavor. Such analysis should allow 
for capture under both regimes (it is not clear a priori that a price regulator cannot be 
20This is true, at least, for our parameters, where .A > p,. 
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captured) and could then compare the prospects of this happening in each case, before 
continuing to look at their welfare effects. Hopefully, the above work helps to indicate that 
work needs to be done before deciding when particular regulatory 1nechanis1ns are most 
suitable. 
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Chapter 4 
Facilities-Based Entry 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the investment (and access) decisions of a regu-
lated monopoly network. The remainder of this thesis now switches attention to a (more) 
competitive environment, in which duopoly networks compete with each other. The previ-
ous framework involved a single network owner and service providers depending on acquiring 
access to that network to offer services. We move now to a different modeling approach 
where there is not a single network owner in the market we study and each firm in the 
market operates its own network. The focus remains on investment (and access), however, 
while others have made progress on studying investment in these models, we seek to en-
dogenize the investment (i.e. scale of entry) decision. In so doing, we provide an explicit 
treatment of the idea that networks seek to achieve geographical coverage. 
A potential entrant to a 1narket 1nust make a variety of decisions. Where to locate 
in product space and what price to charge are two examples. Issues of location and pricing 
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in horizontally and vertically differentiated markets have received considerable attention, an 
observation confirmed by surveys such as Eaton and Lipsey (1989), Gabsewitz and Thisse 
(1992), Beath and Katsoulacos (1991) and Tirole (1988). This chapter is about another 
decision faced by potential entrants: their level of market coverage. Entry decisions in 
models of product differentiation are typically modeled as involving an exogenously fixed 
cost, with resulting market shares arising as the result of post-entry competition. Yet they 
will also be determined by the extent of entry by the new firm-by the a1nount of the market 
it chooses to cover. 
It is easy to think of situations where a finn might make a coverage decision 
prior to entry. However, some interesting recent examples can be found in UK utilities 
regulation: in particular in telecommunications and postal services. Thus, in the UK, 
following the granting of a fifth licence or UMTS (3G) mobile operation following the 
spectrum auctions in 2000, the winner (TIW UMTS (UK)) must now decide how fast to 
roll out its network. Although it faces externally-set targets here, the interim decisions on 
coverage are its own1 . Similar issues face post-auction entrants in other countries. Another 
example can be found in UK postal services, where the regulator (Postcomm) has recently 
announced its intentions to deregulate the current market2 . For example, it has licenced 
Hays plc to compete with the incumbent monopolist Consignia. Hays have agreed short-
term coverage levels. Another company (Deya) is reportedly keen to enter this market 
with different coverage levels (100%). The fact that, in all these cases, the entrants have 
stressed the differentiated nature of their product, relative to incumbent facilities, makes 
1The new entrant must to have a 20% market coverage before it is granted any right to 'roam' on any of 
the four existing networks, an 80% market coverage before 2007, and by 2009 its 'roaming rights' will cease 
( Oftel, 1999a and b). 
2See "Consignia set to lose its postal monopoly", Financial Times, 31 January, 2002. 
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them strong examples of the issues our paper aims to address3 • 
Apart from the privately optimal level of coverage for an entrant to a differen-
tiated market, these examples raise another question: what is the socially optimal level 
of coverage? Perhaps the entrant (as we shall see) may opt for low coverage in order to 
relax downstream price cmnpetition, but this may not satisfy regulatory preferences. In the 
above examples, this question relates to the universal service obligations present in both 
telecommunications and postal services (see Cremer, Gasmi, Grimaud, and Laffont, 2001 
and Crew and Kleindorfer, 2002, part 1). The chapter therefore seeks to compare the social 
and private levels of coverage. 
A variety of authors have looked at issues relating to this work. Thus, Kreps 
and Scheinkman (1983) and Davidson and Deneckere (1986), look at existing duopolists' 
capacity decisions in advance of Bertrand pricing ga1nes. In each case, however, they deal 
with homogeneous products. Similarly, Valetti, Hoernig and Barros (2001) ask about the 
optimality of universal service obligations when output is homogeneous. Crew and Klein-
dorfer (1998) and De Dander, Cremer and Rodriguez {2001} consider the optimal scale of a 
reserved area for the incumbent firm as a means to fund universal service obligations in the 
postal sector. Dixit (1980) looks at an incumbent's capacity decision in advance of a poten-
tial entrant's arrival and the prospect of Cournot cmnpetition with homogeneous outputs. 
It is interesting in this chapter that the entrant has the ability (through its roll-out decision) 
to influence downstream retail price equilibrium (as Dixit's incumbent can). Other authors 
have looked at entry decisions with differentiated products, where the scale (and cost) of 
3 An example of facilities-based entry in an unregulated market is Wm Morrison the Bradford-based 
supermarket chain which planus to expand to the south-east by opening 7 new stores. 
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entry is fixed. These are summarized in Eaton and Lipsey (1992) and Beath and Varoufakis 
(1991). Prescott and Visscher (1977) and Mason and Weeds (2000) extend these 1nodels 
to look at the timing of entry (or of product introduction). Several authors have examined 
incentives for investment in telecommunications 1narkets with exogenous entry costs (see 
Wildman, 1997, Gans and Williams, 1999, Carter and Wright, 1999). As noted in Chapter 
2, Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) discuss the problem we consider below, but do not solve 
it. They indicate how market coverage may be modeled and describe the two-stage game 
we study, but they do not derive the variety of potential equilibria or compare this with a 
benevolent regulator's choice of coverage. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. We begin (Section 4.2) by exmnining a variant 
of a simple Hotelling model4 , in which consu1ners have unit demands. We choose to use 
unit demands as a limiting case of inelastic demands. Inelastic demands are empirically 
relevant. For example Oftel (2001a) refers to "a 'price elasticity' for [mobile-to-mobile] 
'evening calls' of -0.760, ... Similar results can be obtained for Daytime and Weekend calls". 
In a different document, "A number of respondents suggest that the demand for fixed-to-
mobile calls is relatively inelastic." According to the same document the market elasticity 
of demand for fixed-to-mobile calls has been estimated as -0.43 (Oftel, 2001b). Similar 
figures have been used for empirical studies of the postal sector. De Donder (2001), for 
example uses figures of -0.2 to -0.4. When demand is inelastic, because normal marginal 
conditions for monopoly profit maximization require the elasticity of demand to be greater 
40ther representations of horizontal differentiation are available. Another one dimentional model of 
spatial differentiation is Salop's (1979) model of a 'circular city' which is used to address the issue of the 
number of firms entering the merket when there are no 'barriers to entry' other than the fixed costs of entry. 
Economides (1986) considers the existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices in a two-dimentional space where 
products are differentiated with respect to two of their characteristics and are dispersed across a unit disk. 
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than one (otherwise the price tends to infinity), one has to restrict monopoly prices to be 
the maximum that consumers will pay (for an ･ｸ｡ｾｮｰｬ･＠ see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). This 
is what the limiting case of unit demands does. At the same time it is convenient because 
it leads to tractable analytical solutions. In order to address the question of roll-out, we 
imagine the total market as a unit square and assume that price competition takes place 
on that portion of the square the entrant chooses to cover. In this way we endogenize the 
entry cost and give entry a geographical interpretation. Here we identify three downstream 
equilibria: two in pure strategies (Bertrand competition and 'local monopoly?, where each 
firn1 behaves as a standard monopolist within its market area) and one in n1ixed strategies. 
Restricting ourselves to situations where a pure strategy equilibrium exists, we show that 
the entrant will never invest beyond that level which guaranties local monopoly, where both 
entrant and incumbent tacitly collude on market share. We show that this level of entry 
will never be socially optimal: the regulator will either wish for sufficient entry to stimulate 
price competition, or none at all (because entry costs are too great). 
In Section 4.3 we drop the assumption of unit (i.e. inelastic) de1nands and allow 
individual demands to vary elastically with prices. We do this for two reasons. First, like 
inelastic demands, elastic demands are also empirically relevant. For example Laffont and 
Th·ole (2001, p. 15) argue that in telecmnmunications the demand for multiple lines or 
secondary services is quite elastic. Second, it is possible that some of the results of the 
previous section are sensitive to the assumption of unit demands. For example, the result 
that the entrant never chooses to compete (in pure strategies) with the incumbent, but 
enters the market only to monopolize its share of the market, or the regulator's attitude 
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toward local monopolies. We find that there is no reason to rule out the possibility of the 
three retail equilibria: two in pure strategies (Bertrand competition and 'local monopoly', 
where each firm behaves as a standard monopolist within its market area) and one in mixed 
strategies. As with unit demands we restrict ourselves to the two pure strategy equilibria 
and show that our intuition that the type of consumer demand may influence the type 
of equilibriutn that will prevail. Indeed, with elastic demands we find that the entrant 
prefers to compete with the incumbent finn, since with elastic demands, the benefits from 
competition (and lower prices) are higher for both firms. Thus, given the complexity' of the 
analysis, in this section we do not aim to fully characterize the solutions to the entrant's or 
the regulator's problem of choosing market coverage. Rather we want to demonstrate that 
the type of consumer demand affects the type of equilibrium that will prevail was correct. 
We discuss the findings of Section 4.3 using simulations to illustrate the results. Section 
4.4 discusses some the implications of relaxing two basic assumptions of our model, the ban 
on geographical price discrimination and the use of linear pricing, and proposes areas for 
further work. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 A model of roll-out 
4.2.1 Market coverage 
The market consists of a unit square, corresponding to a geographical area (see 
Figure D .1). Consumers are uniformly distributed across the square. In particular, we 
assume that every horizontal line in the square is a Hotelling type sub-1narket and all these 
sub-markets form our square market. Consumers are uniformly distributed along each one 
--- ... · ··-------------------------; 
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of these sub-markets. This draws a direct analogy with the Hotelling model of horizontal 
product differentiation and allows us to determine market coverage in a similar way. Firm 
1 (the incumbent) is situated (exogenously) at point 0 in each of these sub-markets and, by 
assumption, already covers the whole geographical area. Firm 2 (the entrant) must decide 
whether to enter (and locate at point 1 in each sub-market) and what level of coverage f.L 
to choose (how "many" of the sub-markets to cover). If entry takes place, the two firms 
compete for market share in the sub-markets that are covered by both, with a fraction a 
of each sub-market going to the incumbent finn, while the incu1nbent retains a monopoly 
in the remaining (1- f.L) of the market5 . Thus, we envisage a two-stage process where 
Firm 2 chooses its level of coverage (f.L), then price competition takes place (determining 
a). Clearly, 1-L = 1 corresponds to universal competition. 
We derive market shares in each sub-market in the conventional way. In a rep-
resentative sub-market, consumers derive a gross surplus of s when consuming the service 
from either firm and have unit demands (they buy 'one or none'). As mentioned earlier, this 
can be thought as the limit when elasticities tend to zero (and consumers have maximum 
willingness to pay, s). Its advantage over other inelastic cases is that it has a tractable 
monopoly price so we can allow for a variety of possible market outcomes. 
Consider a consutner who is located at point x E [0, 1] on the horizontal axis. Then 
the net surplus when consuming from Finn 1 (located at point 0) at price p1 iss- p1 - tx, 
and s- P2- t(1- x) when consu1ning from Firm 2 (located at point 1); tis the transport 
(or 'utility') cost of consuming away from one's preferred point6 . Market shares in the 
5Saying that the incumbent retains a monopoly of the rest (1- p.) of the market does not necessarily 
mean that it will charge its monopoly price there; see Footnote 10. 
6Examples of models of nonlinear transport cost functions (e.g. quadratic) can be found in Beath and 
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contested sub-markets are determined by that consumer, located at point a, who is just 
indifferent between buying the service from one or the other firm: 
s- Pl- ta = s- P2- t(1- a) 
(4.1) 
Thus, Firm 1 's market share in each of the sub-markets of the contested region is a and 
Firm 2's is 1- a (assuming full coverage in this sub-market), as in Figure 1. Then, given 
Firm 2's initial coverage decision (f.L), the respective shares for Firm 1 (the incumbent) and 
Firm 2 (the entrant) become 
(4.2) 
We assume that investment is costly to the entrant, with the cost function oeing 
d(f.L) = rf.l-2 /2, 1 > 07 . Each unit produced has marginal cost of c8 '9 . 
4.2.2 Retail prices 
The firms play a two-stage game in which the entrant first sets JL, then price 
competition ensues in the retail market10 • We therefore solve by backwards induction, 
Kastoulacos (1991), and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992). The addition of nonlinear transport costs, however, 
does not alter the results of this analysis and thus we choose to keep things as simple as possible and assume 
that transport cost per unit of distance is equal to t. 
7More generally, any cost function d(.) such that d' > 0 (the cost of investment increases with coverage) 
and d" ｾ＠ 0 (at a decreasing rate) is sufficient. 
8 As with investment costs, any cost function csuch that c'(q) > 0 (costs increase in the quantity produced) 
and c" ｾ＠ 0 (at an increasing rate) is sufficient. Additionally, assuming different marginal costs, c1 =/= c2, for 
the two firms will not significantly alter the results. 
9Thus, our assumption that Firm 1 will cover the whole market in the absence of competition is equivalent 
to s 2:: c + 2t. To see this, note that an incumbent monopolist would choose market share {3 to solve 
max.a 1r1 = (s- t{3- c) {3. The solution {3 = (s- c) /2t ｾ＠ 1 if the above inequality holds. 
10We restrict attention to linear pricing, with no third-degree price discrimination (either along a given 
sub-market or across the incumbent's monopoly and non-monopoly markets). In this respect, our analysis 
departs from common practice in the telecommunications sector, although it is representative of many other 
. . · - ···· --··· -------; 
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beginning with prices conditional on p,. Profit functions (post-invest1nent) are 
1r1 = (Pl- c) [1- p,(1- a)] (4.3) 
1r2 = (P2- c) p, (1- a) (4.4) 
It is straightforward to show that the reaction functions are (see Appendix E) 
(4.5) 
and 
(4.6) 
Solving these (see Appendix E) yields the Bertrand equilibrium prices 
B t (4- /-£) P1 = 3 -/-£- +c (4.7) 
and 
B t (2 + /-£) P2 = 3 -/-£- +c (4.8) 
Notice that, when the entrant chooses to cover the whole market p, = 1, in which case the 
two firms are symmetric, we have pf = ｰｾ＠ = t + c, i.e. marginal cost pricing with the firms 
also able to exploit the transport cost that provides an element of market power. In this 
case the two firms share the market whole equally. Also ｰｾ＠ < pf 'V p, < 1; i.e. the entrant 
undercuts the incumbent 11 . Finally, 
8pf-- 4t 0 
8p, - 3p,2 < ' 
settings, incuding domestic postal services in the UK. Extensions towa1·ds price disrcimination are discussed 
in Section 4. See also Gabszewicz and Thisse {1992), Laffont, Rey and Th·ole (1998a) and Laffont, Rey and 
Th·ole (1998b) for examples relaxing these assumptions on a conventional 'Hotelling line'. 
11The undercutting result can also be found in Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) . 
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Thus, a larger entrant generates more price competition and pushes down retail prices. 
Note however, that the above profit functions ( 4.3) and ( 4.4) hold whenever there 
exists a positive contested fraction of the market or, in other words, for a > 0. However, 
the entrant's choice of coverage may be such that this does not hold. Recall (4.1) and the 
fact that a> 0 when 
P2- Pl 1 
2t > -2 (4.9) 
This condition may not hold because the entrant undercuts the incu1nbent in Bertrand 
equilibrium. Using (4.7) and (4.8) we have 
pf- pf It - 1 
2t = s;- (4.10) 
so that (4.9) holds when J..L > 0.4. Fron1 (4.10) a can be expressed as a function of fL 
1 J..L-1 
a=-+--
2 3J..L 
(4.11) 
and thus a E (0, !J for fL E (0.4, 1}. 
Given this, for investment levels fL E [0, 0.4] the firms have the prospect of behaving 
as local monopolies, able to charge their 1nonopoly prices (assuming full coverage of their 
own market segments) and extract the whole consumer surplus: 
M - t P1 = s- , M - t P2 = s- (4.12) 
In fact, the prospect of a local monopoly equilibrium needs closer examination. 
Given a choice of coverage fL E [0, 0.4] by Firm 2 which 1nakes monopoly pricing optimal 
for the entrant, it may be profitable for Firm 1 to deviate from pf1, set a price along its 
reaction function, make inroads into 2's territory and steal some of its market share. In 
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this case, Bertrand equilibrium should be the result but with f..L S 0.4 we know that we 
have no Bertrand equilibrium. Accordingly, we need to establish two things. First, what is 
the retail equilibrium if a profitable deviation away from p-fl is available to the incumbent? 
And second, what condition(s) characterize which of the possible equilibria will prevail? 
Below, we show that the alternative equilibrium to local monopoly prices involves mixed 
strategies. We then give the condition for which of local monopoly or mixed strategy 
competition prevails. 
As we have no Bertrand equilibriutn for f..L S 0.4, when Firm 1 deviates from p-fl, 
the entrant needs to find a lower price (than pr) to maintain its local 1nonopoly over f..L· 
This is the entrant's 'limit price', ｰｾＺ＠ the lowest price that makes the consu1ners who have 
the choice of buying from either of the two firms and who are located furthest from the 
entrant, indifferent between buying from the incumbent or the entrant; i.e. 
- B(pL) - t L s - P1 2 = s - - P2 
Substituting this into ( 4.6), tells us that 
L 2-3J..L 
P2 =--t+c 
f..L 
Notice that this is unique. Firm 1 's price in this case is 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
We now ask whether this is the best price that Firm 2 can charge. Clearly it is 
not because, given a local monopoly, it would rather charge its full monopoly. price pr. 
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However, it can only do this if Firm 1 is prepared to set pf:1. When will this happen? A 
convenient way to approach this is to compare pf:1 with pf (pr). If we have pfl :::; pf ＨｰｾＩ＠
then, Firn1 1 will set pf1 by definition of its monopoly price (given J.L). Alternatively, if 
we have pf1 > pf (pr1) then by definition of Firm 1 's best response function, it must gain 
by deviating from pf1 (after all, pf1 is one possible response to ｰｾＩＮ＠ The lemma below 
compares the relevant prices. 
Lemma 5 pf:1 :::; Pl ＨｰｾＩ＠ iff 
2t 
J.L:::;-_-=Jl 
s-c 
( 4.15) 
Proof. Substitute ｰｾ Ｑ＠ into ( 4.5) to give Pl ＨｰｾＩ＠ and compare this with pf:1. Next, 
note that if the inequality holds for J.L = 0.4 (the level of coverage at which local monopoly 
becomes a possibility) it also holds for lesser coverage levels. • 
Thus, when J.L :::; 7l a local monopoly pure strategy equilibrium {pfl, ｰｾｽ＠ exists. 
Note that Jl > 0 if s > c, which is ensured by our assumption that s ｾ＠ c + 2t. Further 
7l < 0.4 if s > c + 5t, which is stronger than our assumption. 
The condition that sustains monopoly pricing (see ( 4.15)). requires the entrant's 
coverage to be below ]l = -l.!.c. What this says is that deviation by the incumbent is less 
likely for high values of the transport cost t and a low surplus s- c. If transport costs 
are high, products are more differentiated and small price reductions are not enough to 
attract significant numbers of consumers. Thus, if the incumbent wants to · capture some 
of the consumers from the entrant's territory is has to lower its price substantially which 
makes deviation from monopoly pricing less attractive; recall that, absent geographical 
price discrimination, a price-cut in the contested market would also mean lost revenue in 
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the uncontested market. Similarly, deviation frmn the monopoly price is less attractive if 
there is less gain from attracting extra subscribers. 
We can now state our first result: 
Proposition 6 For J1t E [0, 0.4], when (4.15} holds (i.e. J1t ::; Jl}, the retail equilibrium 
(conditional on J.L) is {pfl,pr}. For J1t E (0.4, 1], the retail equilibrium is ｻｰｦＬｰｾｽﾷ＠
We now consider what happens when J.L E (71, 0.4], should this range exist. Recall 
that in this range the inctunbent deviates from Pt'" to steal some of the entrant's market. 
The entrant can stop this by setting its limit price, pf (see Equation (4.13)) If the entrant 
limit prices, it gets to retain its monopoly control over J1t and the incu1nbent monopolizes 
1- J.L· Given this, the best price the incumbent can charge its consumers is its monopoly 
price Pt'", which would make the entrant regret having resorted to its lhnit price in the first 
place. Thus, {Pl (pr), pf} cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium. One possibility might be 
a 'commitment equilibrium' where the entrant commits to charging pf, so the incumbent 
sets Pt'". However, in the absence of any credible com1nit1nent mechanism for the entrant, it 
would wish to respond to this by setting pr. Yet Firm 1 's best response to this is Pl (Pt-t)-
given J.L ::; 0.4-and Firm 2 then regrets setting pr. Thus, the commitlnent equilibrium 
breaks down. We can, however, demonstrate the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium 
for this case, as the following result proves. 
Proposition 7 For J.L E (71, 0.4], should this range exist, there exists a mixed strategy equi-
librium in retail prices, consisting of strategies: Firm 1 plays pfl with probability x* E (0, 1) 
and Pl (Pr) with probability (1- x*); Firm 2 plays pr with probability y* E (0, 1) and ｰｾ＠
with probability 1 - y*. 
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Proof. See Appendix H. • 
Figures D.2 and D.3 illustrate these results. The relationships depicted are readily 
derived from (4.11) and (4.15). 
Hence, in the case where two firms assume full coverage of their own market 
segments, they will choose either local monopoly pricing or, if a profitable deviation from 
this is available to Firm 1, price competition will be 'too severe' to produce a pure strategy 
equilibrium. Lemma 7 tells us that the incumbent will be happy to charge its monopoly 
price provided the entrant is sufficiently small-there is not much market share to attract 
from the entrant. As we have already seen 'smallness' here is .determined by t and s- c. 
When t is high, so that the two firms' products are not very substitutable, there is little to 
be gained from price competition to attract custmn and the incumbent is prepared to set 
pfl. Similarly, when the net surplus from attracting another customer (s- c) is low, this 
also deters competitive behavior by the incumbent. 
4.2.3 Investment 
To focus on the entrant's choice of coverage, and the factors that affect this choice, 
we avoid the complexities of determining a retail equilibrium in 1nixed strategies and restrict 
attention to cases where the range (71, 0.4) does not exist, i.e. to cases where 71 ｾ＠ 0.4. For 
the remainder of this chapter we restrict attention to c + 2t < 8 < c + 5t or, in other words, 
situations like the one depicted in Figure E.3. 
We first ask the question of whether the entrant will want to compete with the 
incumbent finn12 • To consider this, we begin by calculating the entrant's reduced-form 
12The entrant behaves in analogous fashion to the incumbent in Dixit (1980): investment in the current 
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profit function in the case where Bertrand competition prevails. This is given by 
1rf = Ｈｰｾ＠ - c]JL[1- a(pf ,pf)] - d(JL) 
= (4.16) 
Using this, we can derive our next result: 
Proposition 8 The entrant never invests beyond J1. = 0.4. 
Proof. From ( 4.16) we have 
Thus, the entrant prefers as little investment as possible in the presence of price competition. 
In particular, it does not want to invest past the local monopoly level. • 
We now need to know whether the entrant chooses to invest as far as J1. = 0.4. 
Under monopoly pricing the entrant's. profit net of investment is 
(4.17) 
Maximizing Ｗｦｾ＠ with respect to J1. we have the first-order condition for optimal investment 
ｦｨｲｾ＠ * 8J.L = s- t- c- 'YJ.L ;::: 0 
s-e-t 
===> J.L* :::; ---
' 
(4.18) 
where the inequality holds at the boundary J.L* = 0.4. 
paper takes place in anticipation on its effect on the subsequent market game. 
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We can now state our fourth result characterizing the entrant's choice of coverage 
and the type of retail equilibrium that will prevail in the market: 
Proposition 9 The entrant will choose 
l 0.4 when /.1-*- E (0, 0.4] when Ｘ ＭｾＭｴ＠ < 0.4 8-c...:...t > 0.4 '"Y -
Proof. This follows first from (4.17). We must check that 1fr(J.J-*) > 0 when 
/.1-* < 0.4 and that 1rr (0.4) > 0 when /.1-* ｾ＠ 0.4. Substituting for /.1-* from ( 4.18) in ( 4.17) 
gives 1rr1 (J.J-*) = * > 0. Further, placing /.1- = 0.4 in (4.17) gives 1rr (0.4) = s-c-t-0.08')'. 
This is clearly positive when /.1-* ｾ＠ 0.4. • 
Proposition 9 tells us that the entrant may be willing to give up market share (i.e. 
restrict its local monopoly area) if the costs of investment are too high. Our assumption 
that s > c+2t implies that the entrant always chooses a positive level of investment. Factors 
that increase J.J-* are listed as follows: 
Proposition 10 Investment rises towards J-1-* = 0.4 ass rises and c, t and 1 fall, ceteris 
paribus. 
Proof. Differentiating ( 4.18) gives each of these. • 
Clearly, factors that increase the monopoly price or margin, ceteris paribus, make 
extra investment (and local market share) worthwhile, while an increase in the cost of 
investment has the opposite effect. For this reason, products with high consumer value 
(s) raise J.J-*. Similarly, projects that are highly capital-intensive or geographically difficult 
to build (both interpretations of high 'Y) reduce investment, as does significant product 
differentiation (high t), where there is less need for monopoly power. 
... ... - . · - ----------------- -------
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4.2.4 Regulator's investment choice 
Having examined private incentives to invest, we now turn to the social choice of 
investment. We imagine a utilitarian regulator who seeks to maximize the sum of consumers' 
expected surplus plus industry profit net of investlnent costs13 . In fact, the unit demands 
of the current framework mean that the regulator is not worried about price (there are 
no deadweight losses associated with price increases up to the point where consumers are 
not excluded from the market), but does care about the expected transport costs faced by 
consumers-see Tirole (1988). 
Once the regulator has chosen (and enforced) a level of investment, Proposition 
3 tells us the resulting price equilibrium, given 7l ｾ＠ 0.4. Thus, we must examine the 
regulator's welfare function across the local monopoly, and Bertrand equilibria. In the first 
of these cases we have 
wM =(s-c-i)- ＧｙｾＲ＠ ( 4.19) 
Clearly, this 1neans that the regulator will choose J./j{ = 0 whenever a monopoly equilibrium 
would arise from encouraging entry. The reasoning is straightforward: since (monopoly) 
prices are of no interest to the regulator, his problem under a local monopoly equilibrium 
collapses to minimizing investment costs, and this is done by allowing the incumbent to 
monopolize the whole market. 
Now assume that the regulator chooses J.LR > 0.4 (call this ｊＮｌｾＮＩ＠ so that a Bertrand 
13We assume that the regulator does not directly choose prices, an assumption consistent with the current 
plans for 3G mobile communications. Also note that we solve the regulator's problem without the firms' 
zero profit constraints; we check that these are satisfied in our subsequent simulations. 
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equilibrium would result. Welfare is now 
B ( t) t{ [ 2 )2]} 'YJ.L2 W = s- c- - + J.L- 1 - a + (1 - a - -2 2 2 (4.20) 
Why might the regulator choose such an investlnent level? Although investment costs are 
incurred, there is now the prospect that investment will push down prices and lower a, 
thereby reducing expected transport costs. This channel was not available under monopoly, 
where a = 0 by definition. 
In order to examine the regulator's decision more closely, consider 
(4.21) 
(where we have used J-Ltf = 0). Notice that maximizing ｾｗ＠ is equivalent to maximizing 
W B; hence we work with the former. Straightaway we see that since ｊＭｬｾ＠ -+ 0.4 * a -+ 0, we 
have ｬｩｭｊｊＮｾＭｴＰＮＴ＠ ｾｗ＠ (0.4) = -lf- < 0: the regulator will always choose ｊＮｌｾ＠ > 0.4. Further, 
it is easy to show that any positive choice of ｊＭｬｾ＠ will be unique since ｾ＠ W (J-L) is concave14 . 
Combining our observations so far with Proposition 9, we have 
Proposition 11 Whenever the regulator chooses positive investment, this will involve ｊＭｌｾ＠ > 
0.4 and Firm 2's independent choice of coverage will be too low (since it is never above 0.4). 
Whenever the regulator chooses zero coverage, Firm 2's choice of coverage will be too high. 
14We have the first order condition 
8AW t B 
- 8- = ta (1- a)+ ---n (1- 2a)- 'YJ.l.R = 0 J.1. 3J.1.R 
using ｾｾ＠ = ｾｾＩ＠ (from ( 4.11)). Notice that both of the first terms are positive here, the second as a result 
3 J.I.R 
of a :::; ｾＮ＠ The second order condition is 
82 /)..W t , (1 ) t , 3J.1.1i (-2a')- 3t(1- 2a) 2ta' 0 --=a -a- aa + -'Y=---'Y< 8jJ.2 ＹｊＮＱＮｾ＠ ＳｪＮｬＮｾ＠
where we have again used ｾｾ＠ = ( ｾＩ Ｒ＠ to get the last line. Thus, if (20) has an interior maximum, it is 
3 J.I.R 
unique. A corner solution (at ｊＮｬＮｾ＠ = 1) will obviously be unique. 
108 
From (4.21), note that ｾｗ＠ (1) = ! [£- 1] (since a= ｾ＠ when f-1, = 1). Hence, 
a sufficient condition to ensure that the regulator chooses J.t > 0.4 (so that the entrant's 
choice implies under-investment) is £ > ")'. Thus, the prospects of some coverage being 
socially optimal increase with transport costs (t) and decrease with investment costs (1)-
both of these are intuitive. When t is low the regulator is more concerned about the high 
cost of investment and chooses a lower level of coverage, while when t is higher consumers 
benefit from higher entrant coverage (since they have to 'travel' less to get to the service). 
The sole effect ")' has on welfare is a negative effect through d(.), as 1 increases the cost of 
investment increases and thus, all else equal, the regulator chooses to reduce the entrant's 
level of coverage. FUrther, we can say that full coverage (J.l = 1, i.e. 'universal service') is 
socially optimal if AW' (J.L) > 0, VJ.L E (0.4, 1]. 
Next, suppose that ｦＭＱＬｾ＠ is an interior solution to (4.20). Then we can use the 
implicit function theorem on (4.21) to perform comparative statics. In particular, because 
s and c do not feature in ( 4.21), we have 
Further, 
ｏｊＮｌｾ＠ a (1 -a) + 13!a 0 
7jt = - 2ta' > ( 4.22) ｾＫＢＩＧ＠
ｯｰＬｾ＠ -p, 
-= ｾＫＧＩＧ＠ <0 (4.23) 
0")' 3J.L 
the first inequality being due to a:::; ｾ＠ (recall (4.11)). Thus, the regulator prefers greater 
coverage as transport costs grow and as investment costs fall. 
According to Proposition 11 whenever the retail equilibrium is the Bertrand equi-
librium, the entrant under-invests relative to the social optimum, while whenever the retail 
109 
equilibrium is the local monopoly equilibrium the entrant over-invests. Figures D. 4 and 
D.5 illustrate this result by plotting the entrant's and the regulator's investment choices (p/ 
and J.iR respectively) for various values oft and 1 15 . Figtu·e D.4 shows that, for our parmn-
eter values, Firm 2 enters the market but at too low a level for the regulator, who prefers a 
Bertrand equilibrium: there is under-investment. As t rises, the effect of expected transport 
costs leads the regulator to prefer increasingly extensive roll-out (see (4.22)). Accordingly, 
Firm 2's roll-out is increasingly sub-optimal. 
Now consider Figure D.5. For very low values of the investment cost parameter 
('Y) the regulator chooses over 50% market coverage for Firm 2 (and Bertrand equilibrium), 
but the firm prefers a 40% coverage, which is the highest level of coverage that allows for 
local monopolies. As investment costs rise, however, the regulator prefers no entry (see 
(4.23)), and Firm 2's entry decision becomes one with over-investment. As 1 increases past 
8, the entrant gradually lowers its coverage level Ｈ Ｘ ＭｾＭｴ＠ = 0.38 < 0.4 when 1 = 9). As 
the investment cost parameter continues to rise, p,* falls and the level of over-investlnent 
decreases (in the limit, J.L* -+ p,rf = 0 as 'Y -+ oo ). 
Figures D.4 and D.5 confinn Proposition 11 and make an important point that is 
worth summarizing as follows: 
Proposition 12 It is possible for the entrant to engage in excessive roll.:. out (over-investment} 
or insufficient roll-out (under-investment) from a social perspective. Either case implies a 
role for regulation in entrants' roll-out decisions. 
The above analysis suggests that it may be inappropriate for regulators to leave 
150ur baseline parameters are s = 5, c = 0.5, t = 1, 'Y = 1; hence 8 > c + 2t and 7i > 0.4. For convenience, 
the figures denote the regulator's choice of investment by 1-tR regardless of whether a Bertrand or local 
monopoly equilibrium occurs. For the MATLAB programs see Appendix M. · 
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the market to determine investment levels by a new entrant (as is the case in the 3G 
mobile phone context). If ｣ｯｮｴｲ｡ｾｴｵ｡ｬ＠ clauses regarding roll-out are to be enforced, the 
regulator needs credible sanctions to encourage the entrant to abide by these. Further, to 
the extent that aspects of roll-out are non-verifiable/non-contractible, our results suggest 
that unregulated roll-out may not achieve first-best levels of these. 
4.3 Elastic demands 
The previous section suggests that it may be inappropriate to leave the market 
to detennine investment levels by a new entrant, because this can result to under- or over-
investlnent, relative to the social optimum. We have also shown that under the assumption 
of unit demands and pure strategies entry only occurs when the incumbent and the entrant 
can tacitly collude, share the market and behave as local monopolists in their respective 
segments of the market. 
The assumption of unit demands is a convenient simplification of the (empirically 
relevant) case where de1nand is inelastic; the convenience stemming from the tractability 
of the resulting equilibrium. However, it is important to extend the model to cover elastic 
demands for two reasons. First, like inelastic demands, elastic dmnands are empirically 
relevant in some settings (see the Introduction to this chapter). Second, it is possible 
that some of the results of the previous section may be sensitive to this assumption. In 
particular the result that the entrant never chooses to compete with the incumbent, but 
enters the market only when collusion is feasible may not be robust to elastic demands. 
This is because, with elastic demands the benefits from competition and lower prices are 
111 
higher for both firms. Also the regulator's attitude towards local monopoly may change 
when consumer surplus is socially important. 
With elastic demands, higher prices have two effects on consu1nption: on the one 
hand they may drive some consumers out of the market; on the other hand they may 
reduce consu1nption of those consumers who decide to buy the service. So even when 
firms make sure their prices do not drive consumers out of the n1arket, they also have an 
additional incentive (relative to the unit demands setting) to keep prices down, namely 
to increase consumption of their service. From the entrant's perspective, elastic demands 
provide 1nore benefits from competing with the incumbent as it is now possible to price 
away more significant portions of the incumbent's business. Now consider the regulator's 
position. Since higher prices now harm consumers, the regulator has to take the deadweight 
losses of a price increase into account when maximizing social welfare. Thus, it seems that 
both the entrant and the regulator will be 1nore likely to favor competition against monopoly 
in situations where they would not have done so before. 
In this section, with these insights in mind, we relax the assumption of unit de-
mands and study the problem of the previous section in an environment where demands 
are elastic. We follow the set-up of the preceding section. We find that the introduction 
of elastic demands complicates the solutions and we use simulations to illustrate that there 
may still exist cases of both under- and over-investment. These shnulations also appear 
to confirm our conjectures about the effects of elastic demands on the entrant's and the 
regulator's preferences for downstream price competition. 
·-· ·-··- --·-·- -----------------------: 
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4.3.1 A model of roll-out with elastic demands 
Market shares 
The market is as with unit demands (a square market with consumers uniformly 
distributed along every unit-line sub-market, the incumbent is located at point zero of every 
sub-market (full coverage) and the entrant has to decide what proportion of the sub-market 
to enter (locating at point 1 of every one of those). If entry takes place, the two firms 
compete for market share in the sub-markets that are covered by both, with a fraction a 
(to be determined) of each sub-1narket going to the incumbent firm, while the incumbent 
retains a monopoly in the remaining (1- J..t) of the market. 
We assume that (following Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a and b), in a represen-
tative sub-market, a consumer derives a net surplus 
( 4.24) 
when consuming qi units of firms i's service at price Pi for i = 1, 2, where 'lJi > 1 is the 
(constant) price elasticity of demand. We require 'lJi > 1 to allow for the possibility of 
monopoly prices16 . So 
(we assume that consumers value the service enough to ensure that all consumers buy from 
one or other of the networks). 
We derive shares in each sub-market in the conventional way. Thus, defining t and 
16The assumption of elasticities greater than one is consistent with the analysis of Laffont, Rey and Tirole 
(1998 a,b). 
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a as above, the indifferent consumer's location is determined by 
Rearranging then gives the analogous to expression ( 4.1) above 
(4.25) 
Thus, Finn 1's market share in each of the sub-markets of the contested region is a and 
Firm 2's is 1- a (assuming full coverage in this sub-market), as in Figure 1 above. Then, 
given Firm 2's initial coverage decision (J..£), the respective shares for Firm 1 (the incumbent) 
and Firm 2 (the entrant) are again 
a1 = 1- ,u(1- a), a2 = J..£(1- a) (4.26) 
We continue to assume that investment is costly to the entrant, with the cost 
function being d(J..£) = 'YJ..£2 /2, 'Y > 0. Producing each unit of the final service has marginal 
cost of c, common for both firms. 
Retail prices 
As in Section 4.2 the entrant first sets J.l in Stage 1 and then, in Stage 2, the two 
firms simultaneously choose their prices17 . As with unit demands, we distinguish between 
two cases. In the first case the entrant's choice of coverage is such (the entrant is large 
enough) that it is worthwhile for the incumbent to cmnpete with the entrant and obtain a 
positive share a of the contested segment of the market J..£· In the second case the entrant's 
coverage is such (the entrant is small enough) that the incumbent is willing to give up its 
17We continue to assume that the firms charge linear prices and the incumbent ｣｡ｭｾｯｴ＠ price-discriminate, 
either along a sub-market or across the incumbent1s monopoly territory and non-monopoly markets. 
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ｾｨ｡ｲ･＠ a of the contested market to enjoy the benefits of behaving as a monopolist in its 
own market share (1- p,), allowing the entrant to retain its local monopoly in its share J.L 
of the market. This is because, for small entrants, the consumers the incumbent loses to 
the entrant are few ｡ｾ､＠ thus it is not worth lowering its price (from its monopoly level) to 
get (a fraction of) them back18 . 
If p, is such that Bertrand competition prevails (a > 0), profit functions (post-
investment) for the two firms are 
(4.27) 
(4.28) 
Note now that the firms' profits are functions of how much of their service consumers choose 
to consume. Maximizing firms' profits with respect to prices yields (implicit) reaction 
functions (see Appendix E) 
Pl- c a1 
ｾ＠ = ｾｰＱｱＱ＠ +at'lh (4.29) 
and 
(4.30) 
In general, these reaction functions are highly non-linear with no closed-form solutions. 
As mentioned above (as in the previous section), it is possible that p, may be such 
that the incumbent is willing to avoid Bertrand competition by giving up its market share 
a in the contested part of the market. In this case, local monopolies (as opposed to price 
competition) will emerge. Competition prevails whenever a > 0. Recall ( 4.25) and the fact 
18 As discussed in the Introduction of the chapter, the aim of this section is to see how the elasticity of 
demand affects our earlier results. We do not seek to solve explicitly for the equilibria that emerge. 
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that a > 0 when 
and substituting the Bertrand prices, 
If we substitute net consumer surplus this becomes 
(4.31) 
If 771 = 772 = 77 this condition becomes 
Let us call fl the level coverage that satisfies (4.31) as an equality (if there exists such a 
value). If the left hand side of (4.31) is monotonic in J..L then if (4.31) is satisfied as an 
equality it will be satisfied by a single value of J-L· If however, it is not monotonic in J-L then 
/l may take multiple values, which will cause problems in characterizing the possible retail 
equilibria. We use simulations to check that, for a large nu1nber of combinations of the 
parameter values, the left hand side of (4.31) is 1nonotonic in 1-L· We also check that for 
the para1neter values we have chosen to illustrate our results ( 4.31) is satisfied which means 
that a > 0 (and thus Bertrand competition always prevails). 
Restricting attention to cases where the left hand side of (4.31) is monotonic, 
whenever ( 4.31) is not satisfied (for J-L E [0, /l]), the firms have the prospect of behaving as 
local1nonopolies, in which case they will maximize their monopoly profits 
(4.32) . 
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and charge their monopoly prices (assuming full coverage of their own market segn1ents-see 
Appendix F): 
1 
' . 
'T/1 
ｐｾ＠ -c 
--=---:--:-- = ｰｾ＠
1 
772 
(4.33) 
Thus, monopoly prices are now given by standard Ramsey formulae, with the relative mark-
up over marginal costs being higher the less elastic is demand for a service. 
Once again we must consider the prospect of a local monopoly equilibrium care-
fully. For levels of coverage J.L not satisfying ( 4.31) (p, E [0, /1]), for the same reasons as in 
Section 4.2, it may be profitable for the incumbent to deviate frmn pf1 and set a price along 
its reaction function. Because we have no Bertrand equilibrium for J-L:::; 'jl the entrant has 
to resort to its limit price to retail its local1nonopoly over J-L. The entrant's limit price, pf 
is now given by 
v (Pl ( ｐｾＩＩ＠ - PI ＨｐｾＩ＠ = v ＨｐｾＩ＠ - t - ｰｾ＠
=? ｰｾ＠ = v ＨｐｾＩ＠ - v (P1 ＨｐｾＩＩ＠ +PI ( ｐｾＩ＠ - t 
Clearly in the range J.L E [0, 'jl], the best price the entrant can charge is its monopoly 
price ｰｾ＠ but it can only charge this price whenever the incumbent is willing to charge its 
monopoly price as well. Following the reasoning of Section 4.2, the incumbent is prepared to 
charge its monopoly price whenever pf1:::; ｐｬＨｐｾＩ＠ while, whenever Pt1 > ｐｬＨｐｾＩ＠ it prefers 
to deviate from pf1. Call p; the value of J-L that satisfies pf1 = Pl ＨｐｾＩ＠ (if such a value 
exists). Note that, like 'jl, if pf1 -pl(pf1) is not monotonic in p,, ]1 may take multiple values, 
which complicates the analysis. However, for our simulations we check that pfl- Pl (P¥1) 
is monotonic in J-L. 
Thus, restricting ourselves again to cases where pf1- Pl(P¥1) is monotonic in p,, 
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we have 
Conjecture 13 For J.L E [0, ttL when pfl ｾ＠ Pl ＨｐｾＩ＠ (i.e. for J.L E (0, JZ]), the retail equilib-
rium (conditional on J.L) is { pf'1, ｰｾｽＮ＠ For J.L E (M, 1], the retail equilibrium is { pf, pf}. 
For coverages J.L E (P,, P,), should this range exist, in the absence of a commitment 
mechanism where the entrant commits to charging pf, and the incumbent sets pr com-
petition is 'too severe' to produce a pure strategy equilibriu1n and a 1nixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium prevails. 
Hence, in the case where the two firms assume full coverage of their own market 
segments, they will either choose local monopoly prices or, if a profitable deviation from 
this is available to Firm 1, price competition will be 'too severe' to produce a pure strategy 
equilibrium. 
4.3. 2 Investment 
For the remainder of this section, we restrict attention to cases where the range 
(Jl, Ji,) does not exist (i.e. p, ｾ＠ Ji,), and thus we rule out the complexities of a mixed strategy 
equilibrium (a situation similar to that depicted in Figure D.3). Note that, while in Section 
4.2 we could do this explicitly by choosing either a high value for the transport cost t or 
a high margin between consumer surplus sand marginal cost c (or both), here we have to 
use simulations to ensure that pr ｾ＠ ｐｬＨｐｾＩＮ＠
· In the previous section we illustrated that, in the presence of unit demands, the 
entrant prefers to stay out of the market rather than enter and compete with the incumbent. 
Let us try to demonstrate what happens when demand is elastic by asking first whether 
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the entrant will want to compete with the incumbent firm. To consider this, we calculate 
the entrant's reduced-form profit function in the case where Bertrand competition prevails. 
This is given by 
Maximizing Bertrand profit with respect to J.t yields the first order condition 
if an interior solution exists. Unlike in the previous section, a solution to this may exist: 
there may now exist a range of coverages where it is opthnal for the entrant to compete 
with the incumbent and price away some of its business. The outcome will depend on the 
values taken by the derivatives in the first order condition. We cannot, however, rule out 
corner solutions at full ｣ｯｶ･ｲ｡ｧ･Ｈｾ＠ > 0, VJJ, E [0, 1]) or zero ｣ｯｶ･ｲ｡ｧ･Ｈｾ＠ < 0, VJJ, E [0, 1]). 
However, if this is not the case (if the entrant still does not want to compete) we 
need to know whether the entrant chooses to invest as far as fl. To answer this question we 
need to examine the entrant's investment choices under 1nonopoly. 
Monopoly pricing Ｈｐｾ＠ ::; pf (P¥)) 
When the entrant chooses fJ, ｾ＠ f.l (recall that Jl ::; p; so that monopoly pricing is 
always sustained) the entrant's net-of-investlnent profit is 
( 4.34) 
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Maximizing the entrant's monopoly profit with respect to p, we have 
fhrM2 = c/'IJ 2 qM - rv 11.* > 0 
OJ.L 1 - l/7J2 2 I r-M -
ｾ＠
-->... * < 1-1/772 M 
----,.- 1-LM - -. -
1
-q2 (4.35) 
An increase in the cost of investment makes monopoly investment less' worthwhile, 
while an increase in the marginal cost of providing the service increases the monopoly level 
of coverage. 
Proposition 14 The entrant's choice of local monopoly coverage increases with marginal 
costs of production c, and decreases with the cost of investment 7. 
Proof. Differentiating profit with respect to c and'' yields the above result. • 
Conjecture 15 The entrant will choose 
(pf)-(711-1) - (pf) -(712-1) > -t f.L E Cfl, 1} when 711 _1 - 712 _1 and 1-LB > Jl 
p,* = Jl when pr < Pl (Pr) and p,jyi 2: Jl (4.36) 
J.L E (0, Jl] when pr < pf (Pr) and 1-LM < Jl 
Proof. This follows first from ( 4.18). We must check that 1rr (J-L*u) > 0 when 
1-LM < Jl and that 1rr (Jl) > 0 when 1-LM 2: IJ,. Substituting for J.L* from ( 4.35) in ( 4.34) gives 
1rr (J.L*) = ( Ｑ ｾ｜Ｏｾ ＱＲ＠ ) 2 ＨｱｾＩ Ｒ＠ > 0. We check that 1rr (Jl) > 0 for the parameter values chosen 
for the simulations. Note however, that we cannot rule out the possibility that 1rr (/l) s 0, 
in which case when 1-LM 2: Jl and pr < P1 (pff) the entrant chooses zero coverage. • 
Note now that Bertrand competition cannot be ruled out. It is not any more the 
case that only monopoly pricing results to a retail equilibrium. 
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4.3.3 Regulator's investment choice 
With elastic demands consumer surplus is a function of prices (it is not fixed any 
more as in the case of tmit demands), so the regulator has to take prices into account when 
setting optimal coverage. He seeks to maximize the sum of consumers' expected surplus 
plus industry profit net of investment costs. Once he chooses and imposes an optimal 
level of investment, the two firms set their prices according to Conjecture 12. Thus, we 
need to examine the regulator's welfare function across the local 1nonopoly and Bertrand 
competition equilibria. 
In the case where a local monopoly equilibrium prevails, the regulator's welfare 
function is given by 
( 4.37) 
Maximizing the regulator's welfare with respect to the choice of coverage we get: 
Proposition 16 There is a unique level of coverage 1i){, that maximizes the regulator's 
monopoly welfare, and that is given by 
Proof. Maximizing welfare with respect to J..L yields 
and solving for J..Lr/ we get ( 4.37). • 
awM 
-- = 0 {:::} 
8J.L 
(4.38) 
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Note that now ｴｾＱ･＠ regulator chooses a positive level of local monopoly coverage 
for the entrant whenever 
Finally, in the case of a Bertrand equilibrium the regulator's welfare is given by 
wB = a1 (J-L,pf,pf) v (Pf) + a1 (J-L,pf,pf) (Pf- c) qf 
+a2 (tt,pf,pf) v (Pf) + a2 (tt,pf,pf) (pf- c) qf 
Ｍｾ＠ [(1- ttl+ It [ ("' (pf ,pf)) 2 + ( 1-"' (pf ,pf)) 2]] - ＧＱｾ Ｒ＠
(4.39) 
Again the solution to the regulator's 1naximization problem in the case of Bertrand 
competition is highly non-linear and we have to resort to simulations to illustrate the results. 
If we call ｊｌｾ＠ the level of coverage that 1naximizes the regulator' welfare under a 
Bertrand equilibriu1n then the regulator's choice can be su1nmarized as follows: 
Conjecture 17 (i) If both J.Lrf. and ＱＭﾣｾ＠ lie in the interval [0, j:Z) then the regulator chooses 
1./fl. (ii) If J.Lr/ lies in [0, It] while ｊＭｌｾ＠ E (/t, 1] then the regulator chooses J.LIJ whenever 
WM (1-Lrf.) > WB ＨｴｴｾＩＬ＠ and ｊｌｾ＠ when WM (1-LN) < WB ＨＱＭｌｾＩＮ＠ (iii) If both J.Lrf. and ｊＮｌｾ＠ lie 
in the interval (/t, 1] then the regulator always chooses ＱＭﾣｾＮ＠
4.3.4 Discussion 
The introduction of elastic demands complicates the mathematics of the model, 
and unlike the case of unit demands, it is now difficult to find explicit solutions to the 
firms' and the regulator's problems. We cannot rule out the possibility of the same three 
equilibria in the firms' retail price game (monopoly, mixed strategies and Bertrand), but 
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which of these will prevail depends on the exact structure of prices and the choice of the 
entrant's level of coverage conditional on these prices. The sa1ne is true for the regulator, 
depending on the anticipated price equilibria he has to choose the equilibrium coverage of 
the game. 
As we move fr01n unit to elastic detnands, consu1ner de1nand is now sensitive to 
price changes and, therefore, both firms have an incentive to reduce their prices to gain 
market share and increase consumption of their service. Lower prices not only attract 1nore 
customers but at the smne time they increase consumption of existing customers. Thus, it 
may be optimal for the entrant to choose to compete with the incu1nbent, since benefits from 
doing so are higher with elastic demands. From the regulator's perspective, as dmnands 
become more elastic, consu1ners are harmed by price increases, so the regulator's target is 
to keep prices down. 
To characterize the equilibrium of the two-stage game and illustrate the results we 
resort to simulation techniques. For the simulations we maintain the baseline para1neters 
of the previous section with the addition that 171 = 172 = 1.5. We assume that demand is 
given by 
and set Ao = 3.5. 
The simulations show that, with elastic demands, it is no longer the case that 
the entrant enters the market only when it can collude with the incumbent firm to share 
the market and chm·ge their monopoly prices in their respective shares of the market. 
The entrant chooses to c01npete with the incumbent firm, and that is what the regulator 
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considers optimal as welL 
The first thing to note about all the figures is that, now, a > 0 in all cases: as 
suggested earlier, elastic demands 1nake price competition more attractive to the entrant 
because of the extra responsiveness to demand that they imply. This observation is illus-
trated (for changes in t) in Figure D.6. An interesting feature of Figure D.6 is that higher 
values oft cause the entrant and the regulator to lower a-i.e. to raise the entrant's 1narket 
share in those areas where it rolls out its service. This is achieved by lower retail prices 
which appears to contradict (4.29) and (4.30), which both suggest that less substitutable 
products should raise Bertrand prices (as one might expect). The reason is that elastic 
demands can cause higher transport costs to push down firms' sales even if they do not lose 
custmn (with unit demands, no custom is lost when t changes-see (4.10)-and neither are 
each consumer's purchases reduced, by definition). Thus, the firms now have an incentive 
to lower price even though they appear to have less need to compete with each other. 
Figure D.7 demonstrates the effects of changes in ton the entrant's roll-out decision 
and that of the regulator: both involve lower roll-out as t rises. Both are influenced here 
by the above argument that higher transport costs can (and in the current case do) push 
down retail prices and increase the entrant's market share. Thus, both have an incentive 
to economize on entry costs by lowering f.L· The regulator is also worried about the direct 
effect of transport costs, however, and this accounts for her lower curve in Figure D.7. In 
order to reduce expected transport costs, she needs to lower a. Under certain conditions, 
this can be achieved by lowering f.LR· From ( 4.25) we have 
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If we now assume that 8p1/8J.LR ｾ＠ 8p2/8J.LR = z, z > 0 and P1 > P2, then we have 
Although we cannot confirm that the above assumptions hold generally, numerical solutions 
confinn that they hold for the current range of parameter values. Thus, the regulator 
economizes on transport costs by reducing entrant roll-out and increasing its share in the 
contested market segment. The entrant does not internalize this externality19 . 
Figure D.8 shows that desired coverage falls for both regulator and firm as in-
vestment costs ('Y) rise. The only effect higher 1's have on both the entrant's profits and 
the regulator's welfare function is the direct negative effect of increasing overall investment 
costs. For small values of investment costs the entrant over-invests while for higher ')'S the 
entrant under-invests relative to the social optimum. What Figure D.8 shows, namely that 
for small values of 1 the entrant invests more than a regulator would choose, seems counter-
intuitive at first glance. However, the regulator chooses the level of coverage by balancing 
costs and benefits of higher coverage for both the firms and consumers. The entrant only 
balances its own costs with its benefits when choosing p. The result in Figure D .8 suggests 
that the benefits from increased competition are not so great for the regulator and the en-
trant firm has more incentives to roll-out infrastructure than the regulator. As the cost of 
investment increases, because the entrant cares only for its own benefits frmn investment, 
while for the regulator there are the benefits to consumers as well, the entrant's choice of 
coverage falls faster than the regulator's. There is thus a level of investment costs above 
which the entrant's coverage falls below the regulator's. 
19These arguments seem unlikely to hold in general. For instance, at some point, one would expect the 
regulator's concern for transport costs in the 1 - p, segment to dominate as p, falls. 
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Figure D.9 considers the effects of one of the elasticity parameters introduced 
in this section, 772• It shows that increases in the entrant's elasticity of demand reduce 
coverage for both itself and the regulator; with excessive roll-out occurring over the range 
we select. The negative slopes we observe reflect that fact that 1nore elastic demands 
sharpen price competition and, therefore, permit a reduction in investment costs while still 
allowing reasonable market share (for the entrant) and low prices (for the regulator). 
It is evident now that the regulator is less likely to favor monopoly by the incum-
bent firm, since the benefits of competition and lower prices outweigh the higher investment 
costs. But at the same time the entrant, if left to choose its coverage on its own, prefers to 
compete with the incumbent firm since the benefits of competition to itself are higher with 
elastic demands. 
We finish this section by stating its main finding: 
Proposition 18 When demands are elastic, the entrant may be prepared to invest in suf-
ficient roll-out to generate Bertrand price competition. There may still be cases of under-
or over-investment. 
4.4 Extensions 
There are many ways in which the model can be extended, several of which may 
be important for the above results. Our framework assumes price discrimination is banned 
and the incumbent cannot price its service differently in the part of the 1narket over which it 
has exclusive control. The framework also rules out any interconnection requirements from 
the side of the entrant (one-way) or both firms (two-way access). By adding interconnection 
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requirements our model can be amended to apply to network industries like the rail (one-
way access) or telecommunications (two-way interconnection). Further, the model can be 
extended to consider invest1nent speed by adding one or more periods of investment. So 
far, we have ruled out the above amendments in order to improve analytical tractability. 
4.4.1 Geographical price discrimination by the incumbent 
The analysis of this chapter assumes that the incumbent cannot price discriminate 
between its captive market and the market that can be served by the entrant as well. This 
implies that, whenever the incumbent chooses to compete with the entrant, it trades off a 
higher market share with lower prices for existing customers. With price discrimination the 
incumbent would extract the entire surplus from consumers in its captive market and charge 
lower prices only in that part of the market where it would compete with the entrant. This 
would make competition always profitable for the incumbent. So for example with unit 
demands profits for the two firms would be 
?rt = (1- J-L)(s- t- c)+ J.La(pt -c) (4.40) 
for the incumbent and 
?r2 = J-L(l- a)(P2- c) ( 4.41) 
for the entrant. Maximizing these yields Bertrand prices 
pf=pf=t+c ( 4.42) 
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Recall that without geographical price discrimination Bertrand prices are given by ( 4.37) 
only if the entrant installs full coverage. Thus, with Bertrand prices given by ( 4.37), 
B B 1 P2 - P1 = O > __ 
2t 2 
which says that: 
Proposition 19 When the incumbent is allowed to price discriminate between its captive 
market and the contested market, a is always positive and the two firms always compete for 
consumers. 
With prices given by ( 4.41), the entrant's profit net of investment costs is 
B - t 'YI-£2 
7r2 - J.L- - --2 2 
Maximizing this with respect to J.L yields the following result 
Proposition 20 The entrant chooses to install full coverage whenever t > 21, while it 
chooses not to enter the market otheTwise. 
Intuitively, if it is viable for Firm 2 to enter the 1narket then there is no reason to 
let the incumbent monopolize a part of it. 
4.4.2 Non-linear pricing 
Throughout the analysis, both with unit and elastic demands, we assume the two 
firms charge linear prices. If the two firms are allowed to offer non-linear prices then because 
demand functions are known and the same for all customers of a given firm, networks cannot 
do better than offering two-part tariffs20 • 
20Because of the existence of the fixed fee, two-part tariffs are more relevant to cases where consumers pay 
a subscription fee which allowes them to get "connected" to the firm that offers the product and a variable 
price for every unit of the product that they consume (like in the case of telecommunications). 
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Allowing the firms to charge two-part tariffs Pi= Piqi + Ai does not add anything 
to the model when consumers have unit demands ( qi = 1). This is because those consumers 
who consume the service buy one unit anyway and thus breaking the firms' price into two 
parts changes. The two firms set the variable part of the tariff Pi equal to the marginal cost 
of production and the fixed parts of the tariffs are set according to 
and thus the prices consumers pay for the consumption of one unit of the service are as in 
(4.7) and (4.8). 
With elastic demands, however, if each firm charges a price Pi = Piqi + Ai then 
consumer surplus is given by 
(4.43) 
and thus market shares are given by 
where 
(4.44) 
The firms' profits are 
( 4.45) 
for the incumbent and 
( 4.46) 
for the entrant. Maximizing profits with respect to prices and fixed fees yields 
Pl=P2=C 
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which ilnplies that consumers who are willing to buy the firms' product buy q( c) units of 
it, and 
Af = ! 4 - It, ａｾ＠ = ! 2 + It 
3 jt 3 jt 
In this case 
( 4.47) 
and 
jt-1 1 
a > 0 # -- > -- # Jt > 0.4 3p, 2 (4.48) 
which is the satne as the condition for a positive a under unit demands. Thus, the as-
sumption of non-linear prices does not alter the range of entrant coverages where Bertrand 
competition prevails even though we are now assuming elastic detnands. The firms' profits 
are given by 
(4.49) 
for the incumbent, and 
(4.50) 
for the entrant. The condition that sustains local monopoly (the equivalent of Lemma 1) is 
(4.51) 
(4.50) is similar to (4.15). Here the range of coverages that sustains a local monopoly 
equilibrium is smaller. Welfare under local monopoly and Bertrand competition is 
and 
W lvl ( ) ( )AM AM t !tt
2 
=v c- 1-tt 1 -Jt 2 ----2 2 (4.52) 
(4.53) 
130 
The derivative of the first with respect to J..L is -"'( JL and thus the regulator chooses zero 
coverage. The second is exactly as ( 4.20) without marginal costs (these are covered through 
the variable part of the tariff). 
So given that optimal variable prices equal to marginal cost, in which case con-
sumer buy either q(c) or no units of the firm's product, non-linear pricing reduces the firms' 
problem to setting the subscription fee consumers will have to pay to get connected to a 
network. This is equivalent to a unit demands case where the each consumer buys one or 
no unit of subscription where the two firms compete over custmners. 
Proposition 21 When the firms are allowed to use two-part tariffs, they set their variable 
prices equal tt? marginal cost and used their fixed fees to compete for subscription. 
4.4.3 Dynamics 
Again having mobile telecom1nunications in mind, where the new 3G entrant is 
faced with exogenously set coverage targets (see Footnote 1), one could extend the model 
by assuming more than one period of investment. For example imagine a situation where 
the entrant invests in two periods and it must cover the whole market by the end of period 
2, i.e. f..Ll + J..L2 = 1. Each period consists of an investment stage followed by retail price 
competition (assume again that the incu1nbent is not allowed to price discriminate between 
consumers of its captive 1narket and those of the contested market). Hence, second period 
investment will be 1- J..L1. Further, we know from (4.7) and (4.8) that first period prices are 
PlB = ! Ｔ ｾｾ Ｑ＠ + c for the incumbent and ｰｾｂ＠ = i Ｒ ［ｾ Ｑ＠ + c and second period prices (given full 
entrant coverage) are PtB = ｰｾｂ＠ = t + c and we can easily confirm that the entrant's second 
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period profit is {the Hotelling profit) given by Ｑｲｾ＠ = t/2. Note that this is independent of 
J.l.l· As a result, total profit for the entrant when in competition with the incumbent is 
(assuming a discount rate of 8) 
( 4.54) 
When the entrant enjoys a local monopoly, its profit is 
{4.55) 
Further, we can define intertemporal welfare for the regulator depending on whether a local 
monopoly is preferred in Period 1. In this case, welfare is 
WM = {1 + 8) (s- c- ! ) - 1(J..t1)2 + 8 [! -1{1 - J.1.1)2] 
2 2 4 2 
(4.56) 
The case of Bertrand c01npetition requires further analysis. However, whenever both the 
regulator and the firm prefer a local monopoly equilibrium in the first period then they 
choose 
* s - t - c + 10 * 10 
Jl.E = 1(1 + 8) ' Jl.R = 1(1 + 8) {4.57) 
Thus, the entrant chooses less coverage than it chooses when there is only one period of 
investment, while the regulator chooses a higher coverage than with a single period of 
investment. Thus, the entrant invests 'faster' than the regulator would wish (J..tM > J.t'R). 
4.5 Conclusions and further work 
We have amended the standard Hotelling 1nodel of spatial differentiation to allow 
an interpretation of geographical coverage and to endogenize a firm's entry costs into our 
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market, dependent on its chosen level of coverage. We find that entry can result in several 
possible pricing equilibria. Which of these equilibria emerges depends on the structure of 
consumer demand. With unit demands (or, perhaps more generally, relatively inelastic 
demands) entry will only take place when the incumbent and the entrant tacitly collude to 
produce a local monopoly, with both firms charging normal monopoly prices, or (possibly· 
with a 1nixed strategy equilibrium involving local monopoly and limit pricing). With unit 
demands the benefits frmn competition are not very high since by reducing their prices 
they can only attract additional consumers but they cannot increase the consumption of 
existing consumers (they only buy one unit of the service) and thus the two firms have 
higher incentives to collude to a high monopoly price. If a benevolent regulator chooses 
coverage then there will either be no entry, because the cost of entry is high and offsets 
the benefits arising from a second firm in the market, or enough entry to induce Bertrand 
competition. 
Feeling however that the assumption of unit demands may drive some of our results 
we have extended the analysis to include elastic demands. Immediately this causes problems 
because we cannot replicate the closed-form results from the unit demands case. We are also 
unable to determine precisely when (if at all) a mixed strategies retail price equilibrium may 
arise. While these problems are unfortunate, they have not prevented us from examining 
the main question of the analysis: do more elastic demands strengthen the entrant's and 
the regulator's preferences for competition? Can over- and under-investment continue to 
occur in this framework? Based on our simulation analysis the answer to both questions is 
"yes". It is now more likely that the entrant will install enough coverage to compete with 
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the incmnbent firm. However, the entrant may still not choose the socially optimal level of 
coverage. 
In both cases, the entrant's scale of entry may be too large or too small from a 
social perspective. Two general, opposing, effects govern this result. Investment involves 
duplication of facilities which suggests that over-investment may occur. However, it also 
increases competition and can lower prices (and expected transport costs), which is ben-
eficial for consumers/regulators but not fir firms; this may induce under-investment. The 
total impact of these effects on actual private invest1nent depends, as we have shown on the 
nature of demands and the costs of investment. 
Our analysis suggests that it may be inappropriate to let the market determine 
investment levels by a new entrant. In the case of unit demands, if the choice of coverage is 
left to the entrant finn social and private incentives do not coincide; there is either under-
or over-investment. Similarly, under- or over-investment may occm· with elastic demands 
and in that case social and private incentives coincide only by luck. Thus, again there is a 
role for the regulator to determine a new entrant's level of market coverage. 
It is interesting that none of our numerical examples lead to universal coverage by 
the entrant being socially optimal (or even close to being so). This has been true for a large 
variety of parameter settings and suggests that the model may need modification to make 
gains from such provision worthwhile. Thus, for example within a model of homogeneous 
consumer demands, the introduction of network externalities may help encourage this. 
The analysis also assumes that there is no uncertainty about whether entry will 
or will not take place, as well as that the incumbent does not act to foreclose entry. How-
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ever, these two assumptions are supported by practice, since in 1narkets like the mobile 
telecommunications and the postal sector entry is already licensed and will take place, and 
incumbents are not allowed to foreclose it. 
We extend our analysis to account for geographical price discrimination by the 
incumbent firm, non-liner pricing and dynamics. We find that each of these extensions has 
an influence on our results. With unit demands and geographical price discrimination, for 
example, we find that, depending on transport costs and the cost of invest1nent, the entrant 
will either choose to compete with the incumbent firm over the whole market (J.t = 1) or 
not enter the market at all. Non-linear pricing simplifies the analysis as it reduces the 
firms' choice of price to choosing a fixed fee and competing over subscription. Finally, 
the introduction of dynamics cmnplicates the analysis even with unit de1nands. We show 
that with two periods of investment, where at the end of Period 2 the entrant has to have 
installed full coverage, the entrant chooses to invest faster than the regulator. 
One important extension that we have not considered in this chapter is the addi-
tion of interconnection requirements. We consider interconnection require1nents (two-way 
access) in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Interconnection 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we studied an entrant's scale of entry decision in a mar-
ket dominated by a full coverage incumbent. The entrant chose its level of coverage and 
competed with the incumbent firm for customers. We found that the type of retail equilib-
rium and the entrant's choice of coverage depended on the type of consumer demand, the 
cost of entry and the degree of substitutability between horizontally differentiated products. 
We also found that the entrant's decision entailed under- or over-investment from a social 
perspective. In this chapter we extend the analysis to include interconnection requirements. 
This extension is natural in many network settings ( telecmns, airlines, banking, 
post) and especially in the context of recent UK policy in telecommunications. In the latter 
case, as we saw in the Introduction, the new 3G entrant firm will have to interconnect with 
existing incumbent firms to allow its subscribers to call the incun1bents' subscribers and 
attract market share while it rolls out its network. Otherwise, subscribers will be unwilling 
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to join the entrant's network if they cannot reach the large number of existing subscribers of 
the incumbent firms. If access to the incumbents' networks is not guaranteed, then roll-out 
targets and the potential benefits of increased competition may be lost1. 
In this chapter we ask how access prices affect the entrant's decision to invest in 
market coverage. The basic framework follows the previous chapter. So, in a unit-square 
market an entrant builds its full or partial coverage network to compete with a full coverage 
incumbent. Additionally, we assume that each network operator requires access to its rival's 
network to allow its subscribers to call the rival network's subscribers. We add an extra 
stage to the model of the previous chapter in which firms choose the price they will charge 
their rival for granting access to their network. Thus, we model a three-stage game with 
the following sequence of moves. In Stage 1 the entrant decides whether to enter or not and 
if it decides to enter it chooses its level of coverage J.L. Then in Stage 2 the two firms choose 
their access prices cooperatively. We assume that the firms choose a reciprocal access price 
to maximize total profits (a "team solution,). In Stage 3 the two firms set their retail 
prices non-cooperatively to maximize their own profits and compete for subscribers (as in 
I 
Chapter 4)2 • Note that although in Stage 1 the entrant still chooses its level of coverage, the 
decision is very different from that in Chapter 4 because the entrant now takes into account 
the effect of interconnection on its profits when choosing its subgame perfect coverage level. 
Within this framework, the chapter considers both unit demand and elastic de-
mand and makes several comparisons. Our first comparisons ask how allowing interconnec-
1Indeed, Laffont, Rey and Th·ole (1998a) argue that if interconnection prices are left to private nego-
tiations between firms then the entrant may have to alter investment strategies to strenghten its weak 
bargaining position. 
2 An alternative sequence of moves would see access prices negotiated before roll-out begins. In practice, 
there may be commitment problems with this approach, though, as we shall see, our model envisages some 
pre-coverage interaction between the firms-as would surely take place. 
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tion affects the coverage decisions of the entrant, and the regulator, in Chapter 4-for both 
unit and elastic demands. An interesting finding here is that with unit demands intercon-
nection has no effect on either the entrant's or the regulator's preferred levels of coverage, 
because both profits and social welfare are "independent of the access price3 • Given this 
result, we then compare the interconnection results under elastic demands with those when 
the regulator regulates both coverage and access prices. 
Given these comparisons, the chapter makes two principal contributions. The first 
is to study the choice of access prices by asymmetric firms. While other authors (Laffont, 
Rey and Tirole 1998a, Armstrong, 1998) assume two equal coverage firms, a natural question 
(particularly in the light of recent 3G developments) relates to how differently sized firms 
might tackle this problem: Stages 2 and 3 above (taking Jl as given) consider this. We 
find that our asymmetry matters. For example, while Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) and 
Armstrong (1998) find that symmetric firms will set access charges above call termination 
cost, the prospect of local monopoly in our model (brought about by low entrant coverage) 
removes this: access is set at termination cost in the local monopoly setting. Interestingly, 
however, in contrast to some suggestions, our analysis of the regulator indicates that this 
(cooperatively set, reciprocal) access charge is still too high from a social perspective: the 
regulator is concerned to lower retail prices by reducing the access charge. As others 
have found, it is hard to derive closed fonn solutions for the Bertrand case so we rely on 
simulations to examine the choice of access prices here. Our simulations here support the 
above authors' results: finns and regulator choose an access charge above termination cost, 
30f course, this result holds for our assumption of cooperative, reciprocal access prices and balanced 
calling patterns (see below). 
- - - -- - ----- -- - -----------------------; 
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with the regulator choosing a lower one than the firms. 
Our second contribution is to examine the coverage decision in a model of inter-
connection; something that has only received speculation in the past (see Footnote 1 above). 
In the case of unit demands, as we have seen, we have a general result here. With elastic 
demands, despite the complexity added by this extra stage, we can show that when the firms 
are allowed to set their own access prices, and would reach a local monopoly retail equilib-
rium, then the presence of interconnection does not affect the entrant's coverage level: it 
will be the same as in Chapter 4. Results for other settings (Bertrand equilibrium in retail; 
regulated access prices) are harder to derive and so, again, we rely on simulation. For the 
parameters we consider we find that the entrant's choice of coverage entails over-investment 
relative to the regulator's choice both with a regulated and an unregulated access price. 
We also find that, allowing the firms to choose the access price enables them to collude and 
earn monopoly profits in the retail sector. Under the current setup, we find that regulating 
coverage only yields higher welfare than regulating the access price only. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses our choice of the 
access pricing regime. Then Section 5.3 analyzes the addition of interconnection require-
ments to the model of Section 4.2 where consumers have unit demands. Section 5.4 considers 
the case of elastic demands. Here, we distinguish between two cases, one where the access 
price is unregulated and a second where the access price is chosen by the regulator. We 
demonstrate our result using numerical examples in Section 5.5; Section 5.6 discusses ways 
to extend our model and finally Section 5.7 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2 Access prices 
Before proceeding, it is worth saying a little more about the access prices modelled 
in this chapter. In particular, we assume that the firms choose a reciprocal access price that 
maximizes total industry profits. This assumes that the two network operators cooperate 
in setting their access prices. Bearing in 1nind the variety of alternatives that could be 
considered here (see Section 5.6), these assumptions can be justified as follows. 
Beginning with the cooperative setting of access prices, a number of authors have 
argued in favor of this approach, as opposed to non-cooperative alternatives. The view 
here is that non-cooperative access pricing 1nay lead to inefficiently high interconnection 
charges because each operator has a unilateral incentive to increase the price of access and 
ignore the effect this has on its rival's profits (see Laffont, Rey and Til·ole, 1997, 1998a and 
b, Carter and Wright, 1999a and 2001, Armstrong, 1998 and 2001a). Implicitly, policy 
1nakers' encouragement of reciprocal access pricing (below) also suggests a willingness to 
accept cooperatively determined access prices. Whilst a wider analysis of the problem (to 
test these arguments) would be desirable, these are beyond the scope of the current attempt 
to compare the links between access pricing and investment. 
Having accepted the cooperative modeling of access prices, it is necessary to con-
sider how this might be done. Again, the literature offers a number of possibilities. Laffont, 
Rey and Tirole (1998a), for example, consider the case where two (symmetric) network op-
erators collude over a reciprocal access price that implements monopoly pricing in the retail 
sector. In the context of symmetric network operator with fixed market shares (interna-
tional call termination), Armstrong (2001a) discusses bargaining with side payments where 
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one country makes a transfer to the other according to the net flow of calls from one network 
to the other. He ｡ｬｾｯ＠ considers the case where each country maximizes its welfare gains from 
interconnection over some (exogenously detennined) reservation welfare. Carter and Wright 
(1999a and b) consider the Nash bargaining solution where the two network operators max-
imize the product of their gains from interconnection over no-interconnection profits. They 
also consider the choice of reciprocal access prices that maximize total industry profits and 
a "bill and keep" agreement where both operators set their access prices equal to zero (in 
practice no operator pays for interconnection). The present analysis assumes (following 
Carter and Wright) that the operators choose the access price to maximize total industry 
profits ("team solution"). This provides convenient results for programming purposes but, 
of course, unlike other cooperative solutions (e.g. Nash bargaining) may not be individually 
rational (a point ignored by Carter and Wright). For this reason, we assume that, prior to 
any roll-out taking place, the operators discuss future arrangements and effect a lump-sum 
transfer to ensure that both will be willing to participate under the access prices chosen. 
The idea of such initial meetings is surely realistic, while the need for roaming agreements 
while the entrant rolls out its network may provide opportunities for the side-payments we 
have in mind. 
Next, consider the assumption of reciprocal access charges. This is an assumption 
widely imposed in the literature. As Laffont and Tirole (2000, p. 189) argue "The policy de-
bate and the theoretical analysis have by and large focused on particular approaches, namely, 
those of regulated or privately negotiated determination of reciprocal access charges." So, 
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1997, 1998a and b) Carter and Wright (1999a, and 2001) and 
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Armstrong (1998) impose the requirement of reciprocal access prices when they analyze 
two-way access frameworks. 
With symmetric (in terms of coverage and costs) networks the assumption of 
reciprocity is natural (networks would choose a reciprocal access price even if they were 
setting their access prices non-cooperatively-see Laffont, Rey and Til·ole, 1998a). In the 
case of asymmetric operators reciprocity of access prices has been advocated as a means 
to limit the incumbent's power to impose favorable access terms or in extreme cases deny 
interconnection. As Laffont, Rey and Th·ole (1997, p. 710) note "imposing reciprocity in 
the setting of access charges may be a particularly good idea when entry or coverage is at 
stake, that is, when the industry is still in an immature phase of network competition." 
Moreover, reciprocal access prices are often favored by regulatory bodies. For ex-
ample, the US 1996 Telecom1nunications Act states that "access prices are also meant to be 
reciprocal between carriers" (Laffont, Rey and Th·ole, 1998a, p. 181). Similarly, OFTEL, 
the UK regulator of telecommunications, "favors the principle of reciprocal payments" (OF-
TEL, 1996). A final ･ｸ｡ｾｮｰｬ･＠ of reciprocal access prices is that of the agreement between 
Telstra (the incumbent operator in Australian ｴ･ｬ･｣ｯｾｭｵｮｩ｣｡ｴｩｯｮｳ＠ market) with Optus (an 
entrant firm) signed in April 1995 which also specifies reciprocal access pricing (Laffont, 
Rey and Th·ole 1998a, p. 3). Thus, it appears reasonable to focus on reciprocal access 
pricing, while recognizing the need for future work to relax this assumption. 
- -------------------------------
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5.3 Unit demands 
5.3.1 Market coverage 
The market is as in Chapter 4, a unit square consisting of horizontal unit-line 
sub-markets (see F_'igure D.l). Consumers are uniformly distributed along each one of these 
sub-markets. Firm 1 (the incumbent) is situated (exogenously) at point 0 in each of these 
sub-markets and, by assumption, already covers the whole geographical area. Firm 2 (the 
entrant) must decide whether to enter (and locate at point 1 in each sub-market) and what 
level of coverage 1-L to choose (how "many" of the sub-markets to cover). If entry takes place, 
the two firms choose a reciprocal access price (each one pays its rival an interconnection 
price a for termination of calls on the rival network) and then, given the access price, 
the two firms compete for market share in the sub-markets that are covered by both, with 
a fraction a of each of the contested sub-markets going to the incumbent firm, while the 
incumbent retains a monopoly in the remaining (1- f-L) of the market. As before, f-L = 1 
corresponds to universal competition. 
First, following Section 4.2, we assume that consumers have unit demands (again, 
perhaps proxying for relatively inelastic demands). They derive a gross surplus of s when 
consuming the service from either finn. Defining t and a as in Chapter 4, the indifferent 
consumer's location is given by 
1 P2- Pl 
a(pl,P2) =a= 2 + 2t (5.1) 
and market shares are determined as in Chapter 4. Firm 1 gets a of every sub-1narkets in 
the contested region and Firm 2 gets the rest 1- a. Then, given Firm 2's initial coverage 
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decision (p,), the respective shares for Firm 1 (the incumbent) and Firm 2 (the entrant) 
become a1 = 1- p,(l- a) and a2 = p,(l- a)·. We assume that investment is costly to 
the entrant, with the cost function being d(J..L) = 'YJ.L2 /2, 'Y > 0. Each network incurs a 
marginal cost c0 for originating a call and a marginal cost cT for terminating a call so the 
total marginal cost of an on-net call (a call originating and terminating within a network) 
is G = c0 + cT while the total cost of an off-net call is Ci = c0 + aj, where aj = ai = a is 
the reciprocal access price4 • 
5.3.2 Retail prices 
We solve the finns' problem by backwards induction, beginning with retail prices 
conditional on p, and the access price a. Note that Stage 3 here is similar to Stage 2 of the 
analysis of Chapter 4, the two networks set their retail prices given their choices in previous 
stages5 • 
Whenever the entrant's coverage is such that there is a positive contested fraction 
of the market (a> 0) profit functions (post-investment), taking the reciprocal access price 
a and the entrant's market coverage p, as given, are 
4Here, we assume that the networks do not incur any fixed costs (connection or billing costs) per customer. 
We expect that the addition of such costs will not substantially change our results. Laffont, Rey and Tirole 
(1998a and b) consider the choice of access prices in a framework with symmetric networks where networks 
incur a fixed cost of serving a customer. 
5We continue to assume linear retail prices and absence of geographical price discrimination until exten-
sions are dealt in Section 5.6. 
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Profits for each firm consist of retail revenues from on-net calls ( af (Pi - c0 - cT)), retail 
revenues from off-net calls (aiaj(pi- c0 - a)), and access revenues from terminating the 
rival's off-net calls (ajai(a- cT))6. Equations (5.2) and (5.3) tell us that 
Proposition 22 With unit demands, balanced calling patterns and a reciprocal. access price, 
the firms' profits are independent of the access price. 
The intuition for this result is that with balanced calling patterns and unit demands 
both networks' fraction of off-net calls is a1a2 and, thus, the monetary flows of off-net calls 
balance. The firms' profits are the same as in Chapter 4 and thus retail prices are as in 
( 4. 7) and ( 4.8) 
B t (4- f.J.) P1 = 3 -1-L- + C, 
if a Bertrand equilibrium prevails. 
B- t (2 + ｾＭＢＩ＠ C P2-- -- + 3 f.1. (5.4) 
As a result, the analysis of the retail equilibrium of Chapter 4 follows through: 
Bertrand pricing prevails for J1. E (0.4, 1) and monopoly prices (Ptr = s- t, ｰｾ＠ = s- t) hold 
for smaller coverage (assuming -l!.c ｾ＠ 0.4)7 . 
6 We are asuming here "balanced call patterns" (see Laffont, Rey and th·ole, 1998a and b; Armstrong 
(1998); i.e. a subscriber is equally likely to call another subscriber of its own network or the rival network. 
This implies that the fraction of calls originating on one of the networks and terminating on the rival network 
(off-net calls) is equal to the rival network's market share. Footnote 23 in Chapter 2 provides examples of 
alternative call patterns. 
7If 'i2_!c < 0.4 then there may exist a mixed strategy equilibrium-see Chapter 4 for more details. To focus 
on the effect of onterconnection requirments and to facilitate comparison with the results of the previous 
chapter, we restrict attention to the two pure strategy equilibria: Bertrand competition and local monopoly. 
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5.3.3 The choice of the access price 
Given retail prices, in Stage 2 the finns choose a reciprocal access price to maximize 
total profits. However, because profits are independent of the access price, the firms are 
indifferent as to the level of the access price. The same is true for the regulator, because, 
like profits, social welfare is independent of the access price-see ( 4.19). Thus, in principle, 
firms and regulator would agree to pricing access at marginal cost of termination. 
5.3.4 Investment 
In Stage 1 the entrant chooses its level of coverage given retail prices to maximize 
its profits net of investment costs. With a Bertrand equilibrium this is 
1rf = JL[1- a(pf,pf)] (Pf- c) - ｾｾ＠ 2 
t (2 + JL)2 1'JL2 
18 JL 2 (5.5) 
which 'is the same as equation (4.16) of the previous chapter. Thus, as in Chapter 4, the 
entrant never installs coverage above 0.4. It chooses the level of coverage that maximizes 
its local monopoly profits 
s-e-t 
::::} JL* :::; ---
/ 
and the two firms monopolize their shares of the market. Thus 
(5.6) 
Proposition 23 The addition of interconnection requirements does not alter the entrant's 
equilibrium level of coverage when consumers have unit demands. 
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Regulator's investment choice 
With access terms disappearing, the regulator's choice of coverage is the same as 
in Chapter 4 as well. He chooses the entrant's level of coverage to maximize social welfare 
which in the case of unit demands reduces to minhnizing investment costs8 
(5.7) 
Thus, as in Chapter 4, the regulator chooses 11/rl = 0 (allowing the incu1nbent to monopolize 
the whole market) whenever a monopoly equilibrium would arise from encouraging entry. 
Whenever the regulator prefers Bertrand competition to allowing the incumbent 
to monopolize the market welfare is given by 
B (- t) t{ 2 2]} /J-L2 W = s- c-- + J-L- 1- [a + (1- a) -2 2 2 (5.8) 
In this case, Proposition 11 frmn Chapter 4 applies. Thus, 
Proposition 24 The addition of interconnection requirements does not alter the regulator's 
equilibrium level of coverage when consumers have unit demands. 
Bringing Propositions (23) and (24) together, we can complete our first comparison 
of this chapter: 
Proposition 25 The addition of interconnection with balanced calling patterns does not 
change the private or social incentives for roll-out under unit demands: when the entrant 
enters it over-invests; when it stays out, it under-invests. 
8 As in Chapter 4 we use simualtions to check that 7r i ;,::: 0. 
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5.4 Elastic demands 
With unit demands the addition of interconnection does not change the entrant's 
equilibrium level of coverage. This is because with unit demands and balanced calling 
patterns monetary flows of off-net calls balance and thus access terms disappear from the 
firms' profit functions. What happens when demand is elastic? When Firm 1 supplies q1 
units and Firm 2 supplies q2 units of the service Firm 1's fraction of off-net calls is a1a2q1 
and Firm 2's fraction of off-net calls is a1a2q2. Thus, access tenns will disappear from the 
firms' profit functions only if the two firms supply equal units of the service (see (5.10) and 
(5.11) below). Thus, it seems reasonable to expect changes in coverage (in general) ｷｨｾｮ＠
interconnection and elastic demands are combined. 
5.4.1 Market coverage 
Here we allow consumer demand to vary with price. Following Section 4.3, we 
assume that, in a representative sub-market, a consumer derives a net surplus 
when consuming qi units of Firms i's service at price Pi for i = 1, 2, where ?Ji > 1 is the 
(constant) price elasticity of demand9. Defining t and a as in Chapter 4, the indifferent 
consumer's location again is given by 
(5.9) 
9 Again we assume that consumers value the service enough to ensure that all consumers are connected 
to one or other of the networks 
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Market shares are again a1 = I- J.t(I- a) and a2 = J.t(I- a). Investment and marginal 
costs are as above. 
5.4.2 Retail prices 
Restricting our analysis to pure strategy equilibria again we distinguish between 
Bertrand competition (whenever a> 0) and local monopoly (whenever a> 0 is not satis-
fied). 
Whenever the entrant's coverage is such that there is a positive contested fraction 
of the market (a> 0) profit functions (post-investment), taking the reciprocal access price 
a and the entrant's mru·ket coverage J.l as given, are 
'lfl = a1a1 (PI - c0 - cT) ql (5.IO) 
+a1 a2 (P1 - c0 - a) q1 + a2a1 (a - cT) q2 
= [I- J.t (I- a)] (Pl -C) ql 
+ [I - J.t (I - a)] J.t (I - a) (a - cT) ( q2 - ql) 
1f2 = a2a2 (P2 - c0 - cT) q2 (5.II) 
+a2a1 (P2- c0 - a) q2 +a1a2 (a-cT) q1 
= J.t (I - a) (P2 - C) q2 
+[I- J.t (I- ｡Ｉ｝ｾ＠ (I -a) (a-cT) (q1 - q2) 
Compared to (4.27) and (4.28) of the previous chapter, these two profit function include the 
additional term Zi = aiaj(a- cT)(qj- qi), i = I, 2. This term is the "net interconnection 
revenue" of each firm. Because what Firm i pays for interconnection is what Firm j receives 
ｾ＠ -----·-. - ¥- --------! 
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for interconnection, whenever (a-cT) (q2- q1) > 0 Firm 1 (the incumbent) gains from 
interco.nnection while Firm 2 (the entrant) loses. 
It is straightforward to show (see Appendix I) that (implicit) reaction functions 
are 
Pl - 0 - a2 (a - cT) _ a1 + ( a1 - a2) ｾ＠ (a - cT) q2 - a1 ｾ＠ (a - cT) q1 
Pl - ｾｰＱｱＱ＠ + a1'1J1 (5.12) 
and 
P2 - 0 - a1 (a - cT) _ a2 + ｾ＠ ( a2 - a1) (a - cT) q1 - -ft a2 (a - cT) q2 
P2 - ftp2q2 + a2'1J2 (5.13) 
Comparing these with ( 4.29) and ( 4.30) we see that the left hand side is now the relative 
mark-up of prices over perceived marginal costs where the perceived marginal costs account 
for the firms' cost of terminating their calls off-net. As before, the reaction functions are 
highly non-linear, with no closed form solutions. Note that, if, for some reason, the access 
price is set equal to the marginal cost of termination, the above reduce to the (implicit) 
reaction functions obtained in Section 4.3. 
Whenever J.L is such that a > 0 does not hold, the firms have the prospect of 
behaving as local monopolies in their respective market shares, in which case they will 
maximize their monopoly profits 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
and charge their monopoly prices (assuming full coverage of their own market segments): 
pr -0-(1-J.L) (a - cT) 
pr 1 =- (5.16) 
-----·· ·--·-·- --------- ------; 
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Then monopoly prices are given by Ramsey formulae, as in Chapter 4. However, now the 
firms' perceived marginal costs include the net cost of off-net calls aj(a- cT). 
5.4.3 The choice of access prices 
Given retail prices, in this stage the two firms choose the reciprocal access price 
cooperatively to maximize total profits10 . We need to examine the finns' choice of access 
price for the two possible pure strategy retail equilibria. 
Bertrand competition 
Whenever Bertrand competition prevails in Stage 3, profits (post-investment) for 
the two firms are 
1rf = [ 1 - jj ( 1 - a(pf, pf))] (pf - 0) qf 
+ [ 1 - jj ( 1 - a(pf, pf))] 11- ( 1 - a(pf, pf)) (a - cT) ( qf - qf) 
+ [ 1 - 11- ( 1- a(pf ,pf))] 11- ( 1- a(pf ,pf)) (a-cT) (qf - qf) 
and thus total profits are 
ITB = [1- Jl-(1- a(pf,pf))](pf- C)qf + jj(1- a(pf,pf))(pf- C)qf (5 .17) 
Note that, because one firm's access revenue is paid by the other, the access terms disappear 
in ( 5 .17). However, given that retail prices are (non-linear) functions of the access prices, 
10Recall that before the entrant chooses its level of coverage the firms agree on a lump-sum transfer that 
guarantees their participation after the access price has been chosen-see Section 5.2. 
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total profit is a {non-linear) function of the access price (indirectly). Given the non-linearity 
of retail prices, maximizing total profit with respect to the access price yields a highly non-
linear first-order condition (see Appendix J) and analytical solutions are difficult to find. 
Local monopoly 
Whenever local monopoly prevails in Stage 1, profits (post-investment) for the two 
firms are 
and thus, total profits are 
(5.20) 
Again, access terms disappear. However, total profit is a function of the access price (indi-
rectly). Maximizing II M with respect to the access price yields 
(5.21) 
which yields the following result: 
Proposition 26 Under a local monopoly equilibrium, the firms choose an access price equal 
to the marginal cost of termination. 
Proof. Note first that {5.16) can be written as 
(5.22) 
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Substituting these into (5.19), rearranging and defining the firms' reciprocal choice of access 
price as a"W, we have 
Given that the terms in the square brackets are positive, this reduces to aW =cT. • 
The intuition behind this is as follows. With a reciprocal access price the effect 
an increase in the access price has above cost is the same for both firms; a higher access 
price increases both firms' monopoly price (as we have seen)11 . With a local monopoly 
equilibrium each firm retains its market share and, thus, an increase in the retail price 
results in lowering call volumes. Thus, both firms prefer an access price equal to the marginal 
cost of termination which makes profits independent of access revenues and allows them to 
exploit their power in the retail sector12 • This result provides an interesting contrast to 
that in Laffont, Rey and Til·ole (1998a), where symmetric firms choose a reciprocal access 
price above termination cost. By allowing for asymmetric firms, the possibility of our local 
monopoly result arises. 
5.4.4 Regulated access prices 
In this section we assume that the regulator chooses the reciprocal access price to 
maximize social welfare. 
11To see this: 
8ptr= /.L >O 
8a 1-l/'f/1 - ' 
Ｘｰｾ＠ 1-I.L >O 
8a = 1-l/'f/2 -
Thus, each network's monopoly price increases in the access price because an increase in the access prices 
increases the network's perceived marginal cost of a call and because, in the case of a local monopoly 
equilibrium, both firms retain control of their market shares this increases the firm's retail price. 
12Monopoly prices are as in ( 4.12). 
If Bertrand competition prevails the reg;ulator chooses a to maximize 
+ p, (1 - a(pf, pf)) v (pf) + p, ( 1 - a(pf, pf)) ( pf - 0) qf 
Ｍｾ＠ [(1- J.t) + f.J, ((a(pf,pf))2 + (1- a(pf,pf)n l 
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If local monopoly is the outcome of Stage 3 then the regulator chooses a to maxi-
mize13 
(5.23) 
These again yield (highly non-linear) first order conditions (see Appendix I). 
Note, however, that 
(5.24) 
This observation leads us to the following result 
Proposition 27 Under a local monopoly equilibrium, when the regulator's choice of access 
price is globally unique and interior, this will be a lower access price than that chosen by 
the firms. 
Proof. Differentiating (22) with respect to a we get 
awM av (Pfl) av ＨｐｾＩ＠ anM 
a;;:- = (1 - p,) aa + p, aa + ｾ＠
130nce again, we check 11"i ｾ＠ 0 during simulations. Initially, it might be objected that this is inappropriate: 
the regulator is choosing an access price once investment costs have been sunk and, in "Ramsey-fashion, 
may need to take explicit account of, at least, the entrant's individual rationality constraint. However, it 
does not follow that, without this, losses will be made because the retail stage may provide sufficient revenue 
for the firms to break even. This, in fact, is what happens in our simulations. 
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which by substituting the derivatives of v(ptt"), v(pf) with respect to a becmnes 
----1- 1 + 2 +--awM [ qM qM ] arrM 8a - ( f.L) f.L 1 - 1/771 1 - 1/772 8a 
By substituting frmn (19), the first order condition for the regulator's choice of a becomes 
(5.25) 
which gives a unique maximum (at alf) for concave WM14 • Now note that 
and thus we have arf ＼｡ｾ＠ by the concavity of wM. • 
The reason why the regulator chooses an access price below the marginal cost of 
termination is to reduce the firms' ability to charge inefficiently high retail prices. Thus, 
even though the firms choose and access price equal to the 1narginal cost of termination 
they are still making a sub-optimal choice of access price since the socially optimal level 
(conditional on f.L) is below marginal cost. This again illustrates the effects of the potential 
local monopoly equilibrium allowed by our asy1nmetry in market coverage: Laffont, Rey 
and Tirole (1998a) find a= cT to be socially optimal but our monopoly equilibrium pushes 
retail prices too high for this to remain optimal. 
5.4.5 Investment 
Finally, in the first stage of the game the entrant chooses its level of market 
coverage to maximize its profit net of investment costs, given the choice of retail and access 
14 A sufficient condition for this is 
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prices under the two retail equilibria. Following the previous section, we distinguish between 
two cases, one where the access price is unregulated and one where the regulator chooses 
this price. 
Bertrand competition 
Under a Bertrand competition retail equilibrium the entrant and the regulator 
choose coverage to maximize 
(5.26) 
and 
(5.27) 
respectively. Note that in the above aB will take one of two values-either ｡ｾ＠ or ｡ｾＭ
depending on whether the access price is chosen by the firms or the ｲ･ｧｵｬｾｴｯｲ＠ (for the first 
order conditions of the entrant and the regulator see Appendices K and L). 
Local monopoly 
Under a local monopoly equilibriu1n the entrant and the regulator choose coverage 
to maximize 
(5.28) 
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and 
wM = (1- J-L) v (pf1 (aM))+ J-LV Ｈｐｾ＠ (aM))+ (1- J-L) [pf1 (aM)- C]qf4 (aM) 
ＫｊＭｌ｛ｰｾ＠ (aM)- C]qr (al\t1)- ｾＭ d(J-L) (5.29) 
respectively. Again, depending on who chooses the access charge, the finns or the regulator, 
aM will be either at/ or at{. 
Unregulated access and local monopoly retail When the firms choose the access 
price, because at/ = cT, access revenues disappear from both the entrant's profits and 
social welfare. Thus, in this case, the entrant and the regulator are faced with the smne 
problem as in Section 4.3. 
Proposition 28 With a local monopoly retail equilibrium and an unregulated access price, 
the addition of interconnection does not alter the entrant's or the regulator's equilibrium 
choice of coverage: under- or over-investment may still arise. 
5.5 Discussion 
In Section 5.3, unit demands and balanced calling patterns resulted in a balanced 
(monetary) flow of off-net calls from one network to the other and as a result the firms' 
profits were independent from the access price. As a result the firms were indifferent as to 
the level of the access price. Similarly, with welfare being independent of the access price, 
the regulator was indifferent as well. With access terms disappearing from both profits 
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and welfare the entrant's and the regulator's problem of choosing market coverage was the 
same as in Chapter 4, resulting to the same equilibriu1n levels of coverage. With elastic 
demands the flows of off-net calls is balanced only if the two firms supply equal amounts of 
their service. Thus, profits and welfare are functions of the access price and both the firms 
and the regulator have interests in setting this price. Unfortunately, as in Chapter 4, the 
non-linearity of the (elastic) demand function means that it is helpful to use simulations to 
analyze the link between the stages of the game we have analyzed in this case. 
The current section perfonns this simulation analysis to illustrate our results and 
compare the unregulated access price with the regulated access price equilibrium and the 
case (analyzed in Chapter 4) where there is no interconnection between the two firms. We 
assume again that demand is given by qi = Aop{i and choose the following set for the values 
of the baseline parameters: Ao = 35, 1]1 = 1]2 = 1. 75, C = 10, cT = 5,1 = 115 . In each case, 
we allow t to vary between 1 and 1.4. We find that, for these parameter values, Bertrand 
competition always prevails. 
To begin, consider the choices of coverage made by the entrant and the regulator, 
depending on how access prices are set (i.e. privately or, again, by the regulator}. Figure 
H.l shows coverage for these four cases. These can be compared with the "no access'' 
case of Chapter 4 in Figure H.6. We use the following notation (here and, with suitable 
amendments, throughout this section): 
• J.LE: Entrant's private choice of coverage; no access. 
15These values differ from those used in Chapter 4 because the added non-linearity of Stage 1 meant that 
the programmes were more efficient with alternative starting values. Our results below re-run the Chapter 
4 model with these new values to enable a comparison to be made. 
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• JtR: Regulator's private choice of coverage; no access. 
• f..LE ( aF): Entrant's private choice of coverage; firms' cooperative choice of access price. 
• f..LR(ap ): Regulator's private choice of coverage; firms' cooperative choice of access 
price. 
• f..LE(aR): Entrant's private choice of coverage; regulator's welfare maximizing choice 
of access price. 
• f..LR( aR): Regulator's private choice of coverage; regulator's welfare maxhnizing choice 
of access price. 
Immediately it can be seen that, regardless of how access prices are chosen, the entrant 
chooses full coverage . ("universal service") once access is an option: by doing so, it maxi-
mizes its access revenue. This decision represents over-investment since, in contrast, the 
regulator chooses coverage levels of about 25% in both access settings. This is higher than 
his preference in the absence of access because he wishes to keep retail prices down, given 
the upward pressure they receive frmn access prices. His choice of coverage is lower than the 
entrant's when access is available. The reason here is interesting and stems from a negative 
externality (for these parameter values) imposed on the incu1nbent by the entrant's pres-
ence: it can be confirmed that the former's profit is lower when facing a "large" entrant, 
something the latter-but not the regulator-fails to internalize when making its coverage 
decision. 
Figure H.2 presents the access prices chosen by the regulator and the firn1s, de-
pending on who makes the initial choice of coverage16 . Interestingly, when the firms choose 
16Given our qualification in Proposition 24, we confirm that welfare is concave in a for the current 
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ｴｨｾ＠ access price, the resulting retail price is the price a single firm would charge if it were 
monopolizing the whole market17 . First, we note that all four prices rise with t. When the 
firms choose the access price this reflects their intention to inflate their perceived marginal 
costs and sustain the monopoly price pM. A higher t increases consumers' average transport 
costs. As a result the regulator has an incentive to require higher coverage from the entrant 
firm. Thus, the regulator chooses a higher access price as t increases. This puts an upward 
pressure on the entrant's retail price and enables it to finance the cost of higher coverage. 
Next, note that in all cases, the access price is above termination cost ( cT), in contrast 
to our earlier results for a local monopoly equilibrium. For the case of unregulated access 
prices, this is consistent with Laffont, Rey and Tir·ole's (1998a) findings, and Armstrong 
(1998): the firms cooperatively raise access prices and push up retail prices accordingly. In 
the case of regulated access, the difference in our results stems frmn these authors' choice 
of regulated access price as that which sets industry profits to zero. Our results suggest 
that this need not be the access charge that maximizes social welfare. The third feature of 
Figure H.2 is that the regulator's choice of access price is always below that of the firms, 
regardless of who 1nakes the coverage decision. This, of course, if because he is keen to keep 
retail prices down. 
Next, we consider the interesting question of welfare under the different regilnes: 
what are the gains from regulatory intervention in the coverage and access decisions? Fig-
parameters. 
17Note that the highest industry profit the firms can achieve is the profit a single firm would get if it were 
monopolizing the whole market, (pM - G)qM. Thus, choosing the access price to maximize total profits is 
the same as choosing a to set 
[1- ｾｴＨｬＭ o:)](pf - G)qf + JL(l- cx)(p¥ - G)q: = (pM - G)qM 
With the two firms being symmetric in terms of costs and demand, one obvious way to do this is to set 
pf =pf =pM 
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ures H.3, H.4 and H.5 address this question: the first plots welfare, the second plots equi-
librium profits (net of investment costs) for our four cases, and the third plots consumer 
surplus (net of transport costs). Taking welfare first, it is clear from Figure I.3 that regula-
tion is beneficial at both Stages 1 and 2 of the game. Thus, the highest welfare stems from 
the regulation of both coverage and access whereas the lowest stems from private decisions 
about both of these. For the current parameters, regulated coverage see1ns to be "better" 
than regulated access if only one instrument is available. 
When we analyze the components of welfare, we can see first that it is the negative 
effects of transport costs on net consumer surplus that leads welfare to fall in t. Not surpris-
ingly, consu1ners prefer private coverage levels (universal coverage helps the1n to econmnize 
on transport costs) and regulated access (which pushes down retail prices). Interestingly, 
the firms are better off (in aggregate) under regulated coverage. Of course, the entrant 
cannot be made better off than under its own choice of p, but, as we have already seen, this 
imposes a negative externality on the incumbent which means that the latter prefers the 
restricted competition imposed by the regulator. Figure H.5 shows that the net result of 
these two effects is in favor of the incumbent. It is also clear from these figures that, under 
the current parameter values, it is the profit effects that dominate total welfare. 
5.6 Extensions 
There is a variety of ways to extend the analysis of this chapter. Here, we sketch 
two possibilities: alternative retail pricing (geographical price discrimination and non-linear 
pricing) and alternative ways of choosing the access price. 
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5.6.1 Different retail pricing 
Unit Demands 
With unit demands we showed in Section 5.3 that the firms' profits are independent 
of the access price. It is thus, trial to show that allowing the firms to charge two-part tariffs 
does not add anything to the model of Section 5.3. The two firms set the variable part of 
the tariff Pi equal to the 1narginal cost of production and the fixed parts of the tariffs are 
set as in (5.4) and thus the prices consumers pay for the consumption of one unit of the 
service are as in (4.7) and (4.8). 
Turning to geographical price discrimination, if the incu1nbent is allowed to charge 
different prices to the consumers of its captive market and to those in the contested market, 
with unit demands the incumbent's profits will be 
1r1 = [1- J.£(1 - a)][(1- J.t)(s- t- G) + J-La(pl -G)] 
+J.£(1- a)[(1- J.£)(8- t- c0 -a)+ J-La(pl- c0 - a)J 
+J.£(1- a)[(1- J.t)(a- cT) + J.ta(a- cT)J 
which reduces to Equation (4.40), and the entrant's profit is as in (4.41). These two obser-
vations lead us to the following result: 
Proposition 29 Extending the model of Section 5.3 to account for (i) two-part pricing and 
(ii) geographical price discrimination yields the same results as Section 4.4 where there were 
no interconnection requirements. Allowing the firms to use two-part tariffs yields the same 
prices as in (5.4). When the incumbent is allowed to price discriminate between its captive 
market and the contested market, a is always positive and the two firms always compete for 
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consumers. As a result, the entrant chooses to install full coverage whenever t 2:: 2')', while 
it chooses not to enter the market otherwise. 
Elastic demands 
With elastic demands, if each firm is charging a two-part tariff Pi = Piqi + Ai then 
consumer surplus is as in() and thus market shares are at= 1-p,(1-a) and a2 = p,(1-a) 
where 
(5.30) 
The firms' profits are 
1ft= [1- p,(1- a)][At + (Pl- G)qt] + [1- p,(1- a)];.t(1- a)(a- cT)(q2- qt) 
for the incumbent, and 
for the entrant. Maximizing profits with respect to prices and fixed fees yields 
pf = G + p,(1- a)( a-cT), pf = C + [1- p,(l- a)](a- cT) (5.31) 
and 
(5.32) 
(5.33) 
Note that, unlike in the previous chapter, now the variable prices are functions of the access 
price (because the firms' marginal cost is a function of the access price), and analytical 
solutions are again difficult to find. However, if for some reason (e.g. regulation) the access 
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price is set at marginal cost, in which case pf = pf = C, then the analysis reduces to that 
of the previous chapter where the firms compete over subscription through their fixed fees. 
5.6.2 Different ways of choosing access prices 
In Section 5.5 (see Footnote 17), we found that the firms were able to use the 
reciprocal "team" access price as a method of achieving monopoly pricing (at least, with 
identical demands). The fact that the firms can collude over the access price and act as 
a single monopolist is due to the assumption that they choose a reciprocal access price to 
maximize total industry profit. Because of this assumption, the two firms appropriate the 
effect of the choice of access price on their rival's behavior and thus the best they can do 
is act as a single monopolist and split (post-invest1nent) profits according to their market 
share. However, this result may not hold if access prices are chosen to maximize a different · 
objective function. This, and the broader observation that there may be a number of ways 
to set access prices in principle, leads us to illustrate how else the access price(s) may be 
arrived at. 
The non-cooperative solution 
An alternative would be to assume that firms choose their access prices non-
cooperatively to 1naximize their own profits, i.e. we look for Nash equilibrium access prices. 
In this case, Firm 1 would choose a1 to 1naximize 
1rf = [ 1 - J.L ( 1 - a(pf, pf))] (pf - C) qf 
+ [ 1 - J.L ( 1 - a(pf, pf))] J.L ( 1 - a(pf, pf)) [ (a 1 - cT) qf - ( a2 - cT) qf] 
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and Firm 2 would choose a2 to maximize 
+ [ 1 - Jl ( 1 - a(pf, ｰｾＩＩ｝＠ J-L ( 1 - a(pf, pf)) [ ( a2 - cT) qf - ( a1 - cT) qf] 
Note that maximizing total profits is simpler because access terms cancel out. As a result, it 
remains difficult to solve for Nash access prices. While Carter and Wright (1999a and b) use 
numerical techniques to illustrate the outcome in a two-stage 1nodel, our third (investment) 
stage adds complexity here and it has proved difficult to find parameter values that allow 
comparison across all of the settings in this chapter. 
The Nash bargaining solution 
Alternatively the firms in Stage 2 could bargain over access prices. Whilst non-
cooperative possibilities exist here (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990), a commonly used 
approach is the Nash bargaining solution18 . This, of course, would explicitly guarantee the 
individual rationality discussed in Section 5.2. Assume that in the absence of interconnec-
tion the two firms operate as in Chapter 4 (they sell their service to their customers who 
cannot call customers of the other network). In the absence of interconnection a customer 
who joins network i can call only a fraction of the market equal to network i's market share. 
Thus, in the contested market, the indifferent consumer is determined by 
18In fact, the Nash bargaining solution can be shown to have connections with several non-cooperative 
bargaining equilibria and, as such, provides a degree of generality (see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 
1986). 
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and given entrant coverage equal to fL, the networks' 1narket shares are 
In this case their profits are given by 
and the gains from interconnecting will be 
for Firm 1 and Firm 2 respectively. The Nash bargaining solution is then the outcome of 
maximizing 
(5.34) 
where the pair (7rf""O, Ｑｲｾ Ｐ Ｉ＠ is the disagreement point19 . 
As. above, complexity quickly arises, even in the apparently more tractable local 
monopoly situation. To see this, the local monopoly profits without interconnection are 
and 
19The generalized Nash Bargaining Product would be 
(1r1- 1rfl0 ) 6 (1r2 ＭＷｲｾｏＩＨ＠
where o, (are the incumbent's and the entrant's bargaining powers. Equation XXXXXXX is a special case 
of this with bargaining powers for both firms equal to 1. 
and local monopoly prices are given by 
1 pf!NO _ C 
pf!NO = "ll' 
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When the firms agree on the terms of interconnection, profits and prices are as in Section 
5.4. Thus, the Nash Bargaining Product is given by 
NBP = {(1- J.L)[(pfd"- c) qfl- (prNo- C)qflNO] 
+(1- J.L)J.L (a-cT) (qt1- qfl)} x 
ｻＬｵ｛ＨｐｾＭ c) qr- (prrNo- C)qrNo] 
+(1- ,U),U (a-cT) (qfl- qr)} 
Maximization with respect to the access prices yields 
= (1- ｰＬＩｰＬｱｾ＠ [ 1- (a-cT) :r 1 ｾ＠ ｾｾｊ＠ ｛ＨＱｲｾ＠ _ ＧｬｲｾｎｏＩ＠ + (11"f'/ -'ll"f"NO)j 
+p,1 ｾ＠ ｾｾＲ＠ ｱｾ＠ [1- (pr- C) :r] (11"f_'f -1rf1NO) = 0 
o = [1- (a_ c!):? 1 ｾ＠ ｾｾｊ＠ [(11"r -'ll"rNa) + (11"fd -11"f1Na)J 
+ 1 [1 - (PM - C) .'!12.] (7rM - 7fM N 0) 
1 - 1 I "l2 2 ｐｾ＠ 1 1 
and similarly for a2 
= (1- p,) ＱＭｾ［ＧＯＩＱ＠ qf'I [1- (pff- c) ;r] [(11"r ＭＧｉｉＢｾ＠ NO)+ (11"f1-11"rNa)J 
-(1- p,)p,qf'/ [ 1- (a2- cT) ;r 1 ＭｾＯＧｉＩｊ＠ ＨＱＱＢｾ＠ -'ll"rNO) = 0 
0 = 
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Once again (as Carter and Wright, 1999a, discover), numerical techniques are necessary to 
solve the model. 
5. 7 Conclusions 
We have amended the model of the previous chapter to add interconnection re-
quirements and consider the effect of access prices on choices of coverage. We analyze a 
three-period game where, after the entrant has installed its coverage, the two firms choose a 
reciprocal access price that they will pay each other for termination of off-net calls and then 
they compete for subscribers. We find that whether access prices affect the entrant's or the 
regulator's choice of coverage depends on the structure of demands. With unit demands the 
coverage is not affected by the addition of interconnection require1nents. On ｴｨｾ＠ contrary, 
when demand is there is a link between the level of the reciprocal access price and the choice 
of coverage. 
More specifically, we find that with unit demands and balanced calling patterns 
the firms' monetary flows of off-net calls balance and thus their profits are independent of 
the access price. In stage 2 the firms are indifferent as to the choice of the access price 
and in stage 1 the entrant bases its coverage decision of retail prices and investment costs 
only. As a result the entrant chooses the same level of coverage as in Section 2 of Chapter 
4. Similarly, social welfare is independent of the access price and the regulator also chooses 
the same level of coverage as in Section 4.2. 
With elastic demands things are very different. Profits as well as social welfare 
are functions of the access price and thus both the firms and the regulator have preferences 
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over the access price. We find that is the firms' are left to choose the access price then they 
set this price at the level that allows them to charge the price a single monopolist would 
charge. This equilibrium is stable because it does not require any kind of precmnmitment 
on the level of the access price. In equilibrium there is no competition for subscribers and 
the firms split the market (and profits) according to the entrant's choice of coverage. 
We find that with unregulated access prices the entrant over-invests relative to 
the regulator's choice-in our examples the entrant chooses to install full coverage. The 
regulator's choice has no effect on retail prices-they both equal pM -thus, by making this 
choice his only aims to minimizing investment and transport costs. 
When the regulator chooses the access price he is using its choice to push retail 
prices down. Because the firms earn sufficiently lower profits with a regulated access price, 
both the entrant's and the regulator's choice of coverage is lower in this case-this allows 
them both to avoid investment costs. As with unregulated access prices, the entrant over-
invests relative to the regulator's choice. 
Our results suggest that levels of coverage are largely determined by the choice of 
access prices. They also suggest that it may be inappropriate to let the fi.rms' choose their 
access price because this may result in excessively high retail prices and profits for them. 
The entrant may still engage in sub-optimal investment-over-investment in our examples. 
Interestingly, this result holds for both regulated and um·egulated access prices. 
Finally, it is interesting that the addition of interconnection requirements leads 
to the entrant choosing universal coverage. Interconnection makes higher coverage even 
more valuable for the entrant because attracting additional subscribers may increase the 
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volume of both off-net and on-net calls. Additionally, higher entrant coverage does not harm 
the incumbent which may benefit from terminating the entrant's off-net calls. However, 
· universal coverage is still not optimal from a social perspective, as in Chapter 4. 
An obvious way to extend the analysis of this chapter is to assume different ways 
of choosing the access price. Given the inefficiency of non-cooperative setting of this price, 
the natural assumption would be that the firms engage into some kind of bargaining-Nash 
bargaining is a good example. Also another extension not considered at all by our analysis 
is to relax the assumption of reciprocity of the access prices. 
I 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
The focus of this thesis has been the link between the choice of the price of access to a 
facility essential for the supply of services such as the network in utility industries, and 
incentives to invest in network infrastructure. The questions covered are motivated by 
issues in telecoms, post and rail (while some of them could-to varying extents-arise in 
others like gas, electricity and water). 
Utility industries can traditionally be thought of as requiring a network for their 
operation; e.g. gas, rail telecommunications, electricity, water, post. Today, a large number 
of firms supply these services. These firms use the existing networks owned by incumbent 
monopoly operators or build their own networks, or parts of them, to enter the market and 
offer services to consumers. Economically, we have argued that such networks raise two 
types of questions relating to investment in, and access to, the network. Investment can 
be costly and access revenue is a natural way to fund it. However, . the terms of access 
may be set uncompetitively (especially, perhaps, with an incumbent monopoly network) 
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which may harm the competitive benefits from allowing access. These factors lead to a 
need for regulation and we have argued as a result of our literature review that, despite 
the importance and profile of these questions, their interaction has received only limited 
attention from econmnists-an observation confirmed by Armstrong (2001a). 
We have sought to address this gap in a one-way and a two-way access framework. 
In the former case, recognizing that one-way access implies a 1nonopoly network owner (in 
turn, perhaps the result of sunk network costs), Chapter 3 examined the choice of regulatory 
mechanism for reimbursing costs (including investment cost) incurred by the network. The 
mechanisms considered were transfers and access revenue. This question is of interest 
given the mixed use of transfers in practice (quite often in the context of networks) and the 
theoretical argument concerning whether transfers are a valuable tool for regulation. 
Chapters 4 and 5 then considered a two-firm setting where, once introduced, in-
terconnection is two-way. We examined a horizontal product differentiation setting where 
the entrant invests in geographical coverage. Before introducing ｩｮｴ･ｲ｣ｯｮｾ･｣ｴｩｯｮＬ＠ we fo-
cused on the relationship between coverage investment ('roll-out') and retail pricing under 
different consumer demand settings. This enabled us to identify three potential retail 
price equilibria. Chapter 5 then allowed the entrant and incumbent to access each other's 
networks. This allowed us, for the first time, to analyze the setting of access prices by 
asymmetric firms and to see how this links with the entrant's roll-out decision. As with 
Chapter 3, this model has interesting policy motivations: in particular, the planned roll-out 
of 3G telecommunications networks. 
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6.1 Some lessons 
Each of the chapters has provided a summary of their findings but it is helpful to 
l 
draw some broad themes. First, it is apparent that there is a definite linlc between access 
prices and network investment: we only have to compare the roll-out decisions in Chapters 
4 and 5. However, the nature of this link is complicated by a variety of factors and it is 
likely to need regulation. For example, in Chapter 3, both asymmetric information and 
the choice of regulatory mechanis1n influenced it. In the model of Chapters 4 and 5, it 
was affected by the structure of elasticity of consumer demands, the retail pricing strategy 
(linear or non-linear) and the ability of the incumbent to price discriminate across regions. 
Clearly, regulators need to be aware of each of these and it is interesting that policies and 
lack of information may affect things here. For example, universal service obligations in 
postal service (which have prohibited geographical price discrimination by the incumbent) 
are likely to influence the roll-out of competitors' facilities. Alternatively, information about 
elasticity of demand is typically hard to come by for new technologies so the regulator may 
not know what retail equilibrium is likely to emerge as a result of roll-out1. 
It is worth noting at this point that the design of industry structure under asym-
metric information has been shown elsewhere to be a challenging task (e.g. see Auriol and 
Laffont,1993; Dana, 1993). Given the complexity of the three-stage complete infonnation 
model in Chapters 4 and 5, the addition of such asymmetric information as mentioned 
above, will significantly increase the difficulty of the tasks faced by telecommunications 
and postal regulators in the near future. Yet our results suggest that it is unlikely to be 
1To the extent that evidence suggests new technology demand to be elastic, we would predict a Bertrand 
retail equilibrium but, as seen in Chapter 5, this may still generate uncompetitive outcomes (i.e. monopoly 
prices). 
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enough to leave structural decisions to the market: new entrants are very likely to engage 
in sub-optimal choices of coverage. 
Having said this, another interesting thmne to emerge is that both our models 
(i.e. Chapter 3 and Chapters 4/5) provide some support for aspects of policy that we 
observe. Thus, in rail (in some respects a close analogy for Chapter 3), the use of transfers 
is consistent with our findings. Similarly, the specification of roll-out targets for the new 
3G entrant is consistent with our finding that under-investment may result in a roll-out 
model. Of course, when we introduced access, over-investment occurred, and it is important 
to recognize that this would not be prevented by the minimum targets of the Wireless 
Telegraphy Act 1998. 
Apart from the fact that entrant's are unlikely to invest in optimal coverage, 
another hnportant lesson emerging-especially frmn Chapter 4-is the link between the 
coverage decision and the resulting retail equilibrium. While we should not be surprised 
that downstream pricing is affected by upstream capacity decisions, the variety of potential 
equilibria, and especially the local monopoly one, is perhaps harder to predict. The implica-
tion is that it may not be enough for regulators to monitor investment levels while assuming 
that, once entry is achieved, competition will be effective. The extensions in Chapters 4 
and 5 showed that the outcome here may depend on the pricing strategies that firms choose 
(or are allowed) the use; indeed, these may provide regulators with information about how 
competitive the downstream market will be. 
Besides the regulation of coverage, as the al'l:alysis of Chapter 5 suggested, there 
may be a need for regulation of access prices as well. If the finns are allowed to cooperate 
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over access prices then it is likely that they will set these prices very high to push retail 
prices up and increase their profits. In the context of Chapter 5, we showed that this 
collusion between the firms resulted in a Bertrand equilibrium that was hardly competitive. 
It is, however, interesting that collusion over a reciprocal access price, which increases retail 
prices, gives the entrant an incentive to install higher coverage. 
6.2 Future research 
Inevitably, there are many gaps in the material preceding this chapter. We finally 
indicate several which appear to be important, as a result of our work, for a developing 
research agenda in 'access and network investment'. 
In the context of one-way access, the question of how should investment be funded 
is likely to remain important into the future. As such, building on Chapter 3 would be 
a useful way to inform this debate. Although we have shown transfers to be superior to 
price regulation in Laffont and Th·ole's (1994) framework, we have also noted the hnportant 
counter-argument that allowing for capture is important here. The whole question of the 
political economy of regulation (within the Laffont and Th·ole, 1993, frmnework) has arisen 
in the literature of recent years (see the books by Laffont, 2000, and Grossman and Helpman, 
2001, as illustrations) and it seems important to adapt Chapter 3's model to take account 
of these. Our results suggest that the welfare losses from such problems (if they are 
more severe under transfers than prices) 1nay sometimes need to be large before transfers 
underperform price regulation. Accordingly, it seems likely that occasions will remain where 
, transfers would be adopted. 
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Thrning to two-way access, there are many ways in which access prices can be set. 
They can be negotiated cooperatively, non-cooperatively or strategically. Similarly, they can 
be set reciprocally, or determined individually by firms. In order to examine (for the first 
time) the link between access and coverage, Chapter 5 adopted a straightforward means 
for setting access prices: the cooperative team solution. This is convenient technically and 
ignores many strategic issues. It seems certain, however, that firms will not always act in 
such ways (indeed, we know this frmn experience in New Zealand) and, thus, our model 
should be amended to allow for alternatives. The links that may emerge between access and 
coverage could include an incumbent's choice of access charge to keep an entrant out, or an 
entrant's choice of coverage to influence access negotiations. In turn, these raise questions 
of timing (within the game) and commitment: in a manner similar to Dixit (1980), once the 
entrant has sunk capacity, it may be able to negotiate access terms that differ from those 
it could gain ex ante. 
Continuing with two-way access, the dyna1nics of market roll-out are important in 
practice. For example, it is impractical to roll-out all one's base stations before beginning 
to send and receive calls. Thus, the speed of roll-out, and the location, will be important-
indeed, current 3G policy specifies coverage targets over time and locations. Assuming 
that a uniform market is to be covered, the speed of roll-out can be handled in a dynamic 
programming model which 'repeats' the static game presented in Chapters 4 and 5. If 
location is also an issue, then one could assume roll-out across two markets (with different 
demands, investment costs, etc.) against a total budget for the entrant2• Access pricing 
2In the telecommunications context, we might also note another locatinal aspect to coverage: interference 
and sognal power from base stations. It would be interesting to combine our models with engineering ones 
that capture these technical issues. 
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would surely play a role here: perhaps the incumbent could negotiate to influence the speed 
of entrant if not its fact (as in models of dynamic limit pricing: see Gaskins, 1971). 
Finally, and this is true of Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we have made frequent use of 
simulation because of the complexities that have arisen within the models. This is a · 
common characteristic of the access literature (as we saw Armstrong note in Chapter 1). 
It is also a useful tool for proving results (as with our over-junder-invest1nent results under 
elastic demands in Chapter 4), for providing insight into potential results (as with out 
suggestion that equal elasticities might generate monopoly pricing in Chapter 5) or for 
illustrating effects and providing intuition (as with our simulations in Chapter 3). However, 
this approach should not be seen a substitute for analytical work and results and it must be 
expected that more general results may be available the longer these problems are studied. 
We end by repeating Armstrong's (2001a, p. 67) remarks, quoted in Chapter 2: 
there is a need for research into providing "long-run, stable incentives for the incumbent 
(and other firms) to invest efficiently in infrastructure and innovation" . It is hoped that 
this thesis has gone a s1nall way towards meeting this need and that it has mapped out a 
research agenda that will continue to do so in the future. 
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Appendix B 
Solutions under Transfer 
Regulation 
B.l F'ull information 
Under full information the regulator will solve 
max W _ max{[S(q) + .Xpq- (1 + .-\) (0 +I+ cq + 'ljJ (eo))]- .XU} (B.1) 
s.t. U t- ｾ｛ｭ｡ｸ＠ (0, eo)] 2 2:: 0 (B.2) 
Given rents are costly the regulator will set U = 0. 
Note that under full information the regulator requires non-negative supply of 
effort eo ;::: 0. 
Substituting the incumbent ,s costs and disutility in the welfare function we get 
W = S(q) + Apq- (1 ＫＮｘＩｻＨｾＭ f(I)- eo) q + cq + ｾ＠ (eo) 2} (B.3) 
Maximizing (B.3) with respect top we get 
. aw =O=> 
8p 
0 = p- + A.p- + A.q - (1 + A.) ({3 - f(I) - eo) - + c- => aq oq [ aq aq] {)p {)p {)p 8p 
oq aq aq 
0 = p {)p (1 + A.) + A.q - (1 + A.) co {)p - ( 1 + A.) c Bp => 
which can be written as 
Solving for p we get 
oq (p- co -c) (1 +A.)- = -A.q {)p 
p-co-c A. 1 
=---
p 
p (1 - _A._ I.) = co + c => 
1+A.1J 
co +c 
p = 1- [{A./ {1 +A.)) {1/77)] 
The access price is given by 
a = p-c 
co +c 
= 1- [(A./ (1 +A.)) (1/'lJ)] - c 
= 
co+ c- c{1- [(A./ (1 +A.)) (1/'lJ)]} 
1- [(A./ (1 +A.)) (1/77)] 
= 
co+ ((A./ (1 +A.)) (c/77)] 
1 - [(A./ (1 +A.)) (1/77)] 
8 
(B.4) 
(B.5) 
Maximizing full information welfare with respect to effort eo we get 
which solving for eo yields 
aw =O =* 
8eo 
- (1 + A) { -q + ｾ＠ (2eo)} = 0 :9 
')'eo= q 
1 
eo= -q 
'Y 
Recall that 'if; (eo) = ｾ＠ (eo )2 . Thus, the above can be written as 'if; eo (eo) = q. 
B.2 Incomplete information 
9 
(B.6) 
Under incomplete inforamtion teh regulator has to make sure that the two types 
of incumbent will prefer to reveal their true type rather than mimic the other type. The 
incentive cmnpatibility constraints for the two types of incumbent are 
ｾ＠ - ｾ＠ [max ( 0, ｾ Ｐ Ｉ｝＠ 2 2:: t - ｾ＠ [max ( 0, /!_ - co)] 2 => 
i- ｾ＠ [max (0, ｾ Ｐ Ｉ｝ Ｒ＠ 2:: t- ｾ＠ [max (0, eo - .6.,6)]2 
for the efficient type of firm, ?-nd 
(B.7) 
for the inefficient. 
t - ｾ＠ [max (0, eo) f ｾ＠ 1 - ｾ＠ [max ( 0, 73 - Qo) J 2 => 
t- ｾ｛ｭ｡ｸ＠ (0, eo)]2 ｾ＠ 1- ｾ｛ｭ｡ｸ＠ ＨＰＬｾ Ｐ＠ + .6./3)]2 
10 
(B.8) 
He also has to make sure that both types of incumbent will be willing to participate. 
The individual rationality constraints are 
for the efficient incumbent, and 
for the inefficient incumbent. 
The regulator's objective is to maxhnize expected social welfare 
EW Vl{[S(q) + Apq- (1 +A) (C +I+ CQ + '1/J ｣ｾｯＩＩ｝Ｍ A1[} 
+ (1 - v1) {[S(q) + Apq- (1 +A) ( C +I+ cq + 'ljJ (eo))] - X?f} 
Substituting efforts and the disutility the regulator's problem becomes: maximize 
W = v1 {S(q) + Apq- (1 ＫａＩ｛ＨｾＭ f(I)- ｾ Ｐ Ｉ＠ !1. 
+c!l. Ｋｾ｛ｭ｡ｸ＠ ＨＰＬｾ Ｐ Ｉｦ｝Ｍ .XU} 
+ (1 - v1) {[S(q) + Apq- (1 +.X) [[(,B- f(I) -eo) q 
(B.9) 
(B.10) 
(B.11) 
subject to the four constraints. 
In equilibrium we have 
and thus we have 
So the incentive compatibility constraints can be written as 
t.- ｾ＠ ＨｾｯＩ Ｒ＠ ｾ＠ t- ｾＨｭ｡ｸ＠ (O,f!.- co)] 2 
- I (- )2 I ra ) 2 t - 2 eo 2: t. - 2 \(3 - Qo 
The incentive compatibility constraint for the efficient finn can be written as 
where 
I 2 - I(- )2 I ( ( - )]2 I [ ( )]2 t. - 2 ＨｾｯＩ＠ 2: t - 2 (3 - co + 2 max 0, (3 -co__ - 2 max 0, f!.- c0 
t_ - ｾ＠ (eo) 2 > U + ｾ＠ [max ( 0, /3 - co)] 2 - ｾ＠ [max ( 0, f!. - co) J 2 
= U + q> (eo) 2: o 
11 
(B.l2) 
(B.l3) 
(B.14) 
(B.15) 
Rents are costly for society so the regulator leaves no rent to the inefficient type 
of firm and to the efficient firm exactly U = q> (eo). 
12 
So the binding constraints are the IR of the inefficient firm and the IC of the 
efficient firm. 
The regulator wants to maximize 
W = v1 {S(q) + Apq- (1 +A) [(Q- !(I)- ｾｯＩ＠ 9. 
+cg_ + ｾ＠ Ｈｾ Ｐ Ｉ Ｒ ｝Ｍ A<I> (eo)} 
+ (1- v1) {[S(q) + Apq- (1 +A) [[(73- f(I)- eo) q 
+cq + ｾ＠ (eo)2]} s.t. 
U = 0 and U = <I> (eo) 
(B.16) 
Maximizing expected welfare yields the following first order conditions for the 
retail prices: 
aw 
-=0=> 8p_ 
8q 8q {)q 8q 
0 = v1{p 8- + Aq+ Ap8-- (1 + A)Q00-- (1 +A) c0-} => -p_ ｾ＠ -p_ p_ p_ 
8q (1 + A) (p - Qo - c) -= = - Aq 
- 8p_ -2 
which can be written as 
p_-Qo-C A 1 
=---
l!. 
and 
_Oq - _Oq - Oq Oq 0 = (1 - VI){p &p + Aq + Ap 8p - (1 +A) co 8p - (1 +A) c 8p} => 
(B.17) 
which can be written as 
a-( I+ .X) (p- co- c) _!1. = -Xij ap 
The access price is given by 
g = 'J!.-C 
Qo+c 
= -c 
1- [c.x; (1 +.X)) (1hz)] 
Qo + c (1 -1 +((.X/ (1 +.X)) (1/17)]) 
= 1- [(.X/ (1 +.X)) ＨＱＯｾ｝＠
= 
Qo +[(.X/ (1 +.X)) (c/n)] 
1- [c.x; (1 +.X)) (Ihz)J 
for the efficient type and 
a = p-c 
co +c 
= 1 - ((.X/ (1 +.X)) (1/rj)] - c 
= 
co+ c (1 - 1 + ((.X/ (1 +.X)) (1/rj)]) 
1 - [(.X/ (1 +.X)) (1/7])] 
= 
'C{} +[(.X/ (1 +.X)) (c/ry)] 
1- [(.X/ (1 +.X)) (1/17)] 
for the inefficient type. 
13 
(B.l8) 
(B.l9) 
(B.20) 
Maximizing social welfare with respect to efficient and inefficient efforts we get 
and finally 
and 
and finally 
(1 + A) ｾ＠ - Ｑｾ Ｐ ｝＠ = 0 
1 
ｾＰ＠ = -q 
ｾＭ
-VtA<I>e0 + (1- v1) {- (1 +A) [-q + J"eo]} = 0 =?-
1 1 Vl A 
eo = -7j- -----<I>eo 
'Y I 1- Vll +A 
14 
(B.21) 
(B.22) 
Depending on whether /}_ - co is positive or not we can distinguish between two 
cases: 
0 
max (0, /}_-co) =!}_-co 
In this case 
and so 
= '1 (eo)2 - 1 (eo -il{3)2 2 2 
= ｾ＠ (eo)2 - ｾ＠ [Ceo) 2 + il{32 - 2eollf3] 
= 'Y [ ･ｯｾｦＳ＠ - .6.{32] 
The derivative ｯｦｾ＠ (eo) then with respect to eo is 
So in this case 
0 
max ＨｯＬｾＭ co)= 0 
In this case 
[max ＨｯＬｾＭ ea)] 2 = 0 
and so 
Then the derivative of <J? (eo) with respect to eo is 
So in this case 
which is 
and finally 
- 1_ 1 Vl A -
eo= -q- -----1eo 
I 11- v11 +.A 
1_ 
-q =?-
I eo ( 1+ 1 ｾ Ｑ ｶＱ＠ 1 ｾ＠ A) = 
_ (1 - v1) (1 +.A) + v1.A 
eo (1 -vi) (1 +.A) 
1 
= -q 
I 
_ (1 - Vl) (1 +A) 1_ 
eo= q (1 -VI) (1 +A) + V1A I 
15 
(B.23) 
(B.24) 
16 
Appendix C 
Solutions under Price Regulation 
C.l Full information 
The regulator's problem is 
maxW s.t. U = 0 
The Lagrangian is 
£ = S ( q) - pq + ( 1 + 11-) fpq - cq - I - ({3 - f (I) - eo) q ( C .1) 
+t - '1 ( eo)2J 2 
Differentiating with respect top we get 
8£ 
-=0=> 8p 
0 = p aq -11-q- J..tP Bq + (1 + J..t) [q + (p- c) Bq- co Bql * 
8p 8p 8p 8p 
oq 
- j..[,q + (1 + j..£) q + (1 + ll) (p - co - c) 8p = 0 =} 
which yields 
8q (1 + p,) (p- co -c)- = -p,q op 
p-eo-c p, 1 
=---
p 1 + P,'l] 
Differentiating with respect to eo yields 
and finally sovling for eo yields 
(1 + p,) (q- ')'eo) = 0 =} 
1 
eo= -q 
')' 
C.2 Incomplete information 
17 
(C.2) 
(C.3) 
As with transfer regulation, here the regulator ahs to make sure that firms have 
no incentives to mimic. The incentive compatibility constraints for the two types are 
(p_- c)!J.- (§.- f(I)- ｾｯＩＡｊＮ＠ + t.- ｾ＠ [1nax ＨＰＬｾ Ｐ Ｉ｝ Ｒ＠
> (p- c)q- (fj- f(I)- eo)7J. + t- ｾ＠ [1nax (0,§_- c0)] 2 * 
(p_- c)!J.- (§.- f(I) - ｾ Ｐ ＩＹ｟＠ + t.- ｾ｛ｭ｡ｸ＠ (0, ｾ Ｐ ＩＩ Ｒ＠
ｾ＠ (p- c)q- (jj- f(I)- eo)q + t- ｾＨｭ｡ｸ＠ (0, e0 - L.\8)] 2 
for the efficient type, and 
(C.4) 
(p- c)q- (13- f(I)- eo)7i- I+ t- ｾ＠ [1nax (0, eo)f 
ｾ＠ (E- c)q_- ([i- f(I)- ｾｯＩｧ｟Ｍ I+ t.- ｾＨｭ｡ｸ＠ (0, 73- g0)] 2 => 
(p- c)q- (fj- f(I)- eo)7i- I+ t- i [max (0, eo)]2 
ｾ＠ (E- c)q_- (fi- f(I)- ｾ Ｐ Ｉｱ｟Ｍ I+ t.- ｾ｛ｭ｡ｸ＠ ＨＰＬｾ Ｐ＠ + .6.,B)f 
for the inefficient type of firm. 
18 
(0.5) 
He also has to make sure they are willing to participate. The firms' individual 
rationality constraints are 
0:::; (E- c)g_- (fi- f(I)- ｾ Ｐ Ｉｱ｟Ｍ I+ t.- ｾ｛ｭ｡ｸ＠ ＨＰＬｾ Ｐ Ｉ｝ Ｒ＠ (0.6) 
for the efficient type of incumbent, and 
0:::; (p- c)q- (fj- eo)q- I+ t- ｾ＠ [max(O, e0 )]2 (0.7) 
for the inefficient type of incumbent. 
The regulator maximizes 
W = v1 {S(g_) - pq + U} + (1 - v1) {S(q) - pq + U} (0.8) 
subject to the four constraints. 
In equilibriu1n we have 
and thus 
73-fo =7J-f!_+!}_o ｾ＠ 0 
So the incentive compatibility constraints can be written as 
(p- c)q- ((3- f(I) - !}_o)q- I+ i- 1 (!}_o)2 
- - - - 2 
> (p- c)q- (/3- j(I)- eo)q- I+ t- ｾＨｭ｡ｸ＠ (0;1}_- eo)] 2 
for the efficient type and 
(15- c)q- ({3- f(I) - eo)7i- I+ t- 1 (e0) 2 2 
> (p_- c)g_- ({}_- f(I)- !}_0)g_- I+ i- ｾ＠ (7J- Q0) 2 
for the inefficient type. 
19 
The incentive compatibility constraint for the ･ｦｦｩ｣ｩｾｮｴ＠ firm can be written as 
(p - c )q - ((3 - f (I) - ｾｯＩｱ＠ - I + i - 1 ＨｾｯＩ Ｒ＠
- - - - 2 
> (15 - c )q - (7J - f (I) - eo )q - I + t - ｾ＠ (13 - c0) 2 
+ ｾ＠ [max ( 0, 7J - co)] 2 - i [max ( 0, !}_ - co)] 2 
(p- c)q- ((3- f(I) - !}_0 )q- I+ t- '1 (!}_0 ) 2 
- - - - 2 
ｾ＠ U + ｾ＠ [max ( 0, /3 - co)] 2 - ｾ＠ [max ( 0, !}_ - co)] 2 
= U + <I> (eo) ｾ＠ 0 (C.9) 
. 20 
where 
(0.10) 
Rents are costly for society so the regulator leaves no rent to the inefficient type 
of firm and exactly U = ｾ＠ (eo) to the efficient firm. 
Since the efficient type can always mimic the inefficient if (BlO) holds then (B14) 
must hold as well, so we can ignore (B15). 
The welfare function can now be written as 
W = v1 {B(g)- pq+ ｾＨ･ｯＩｽＫ＠ (1- v1) {S(q) -pq} 
The regulator wants to maximize social welfare subject to 1f = 0 and.![= <1.> (eo) 
The Lagrangian for this proble1n is 
£ = v1 { B(g:)- pq + <1.> (eo)} 
+vt (1 + 1!:_) HE- c)g- ({!.- j(I)- ｾ Ｐ ＩｧＭ I+ 1- ｾ＠ ＨｾＩ Ｒ Ｍ ｾＨ･ｯＩｽ＠
+ (1- Vt) {S(q)- pq} 
+ (1- v1) (1 + Ti) {(p- c)q- ({j- f(I)- eo)q- I+ t- ｾＨ･ｯ＿ｽ＠
(0.11) 
(0.12) 
where 1!:. is the multiplier of the budget constraint of the efficient firm and Ti the multiplier 
of the budget constraint of the inefficient firm. 
The first order conditions. for this problem are 
8£ 
-=0=> 
8E 
{ 
8q 8q} 8q 8q 0 = Vt p-=- q- p-= + Vt (1 + tt) {q + (p- c)-=- Qo-=} => 
-8E - -BE - - - BE 8'!!.. 
8q 
o = -g2 + (1 + H) g + ( 1 + 1!:_) (E - Qo - c) aE_ => 
21 
(1 + ｾＩ＠ { (p - Qo - c) aQ} = - ｾｱ＠
- ap_ - (0.13) 
which yields 
(0.14) 
Similarly for p 
p-co-c 7J, 1 
p = 1 + jlij (0.15) 
And for the efforts: 
which yields 
(0.16) 
and 
which yields 
- 1_ 1.11 /.L 1 
eo= -q--- - _-lf>eo 
'Y 1 - 1.11 1 + /.L 1 
(0_.17) 
Again we distinguish between two cases: 
0 
in which case 
and so 
max ( 0, ｾ＠ -co) = ｾ＠ -co 
ｾＨ･ｯＩ＠ = ｾ＠ (eo)2 - ｾ｛ｭ｡ｸ＠ ＨｯＬｾＭ c0)] 2 
= 1 (eo)2- 1 (eo- D..f3)2 
2 2 
= ｾ＠ (eo)2 - ｾ＠ ((eo)2 + A.{32 - 2eoA.f3] 
= ')' [ eoA..B - ｾ＠ A..B2] 
Then the derivative ｯｦｾ＠ (eo) with respect to e0 is 
So 
0 
max ＨＰＬｾＭ co)= 0 
in which case 
22 
(C.18) 
23 
Then the derivative of f;[> (eo) with respect to. e0 and is 
So 
[(1- vi) (1 +X) + v1.d] reo= (1- vi) (1 +"X) q => 
/'eo = (1 -vi) (1 +"X) q => 
[(1- VI) (1 +A) + v1,d] 
_ (1-v1)(1+X) 1_ 
eo= [(1- VI) (1 + .-\) + vu\] 1 q (C.lg) 
24 
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Appendix D 
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Appendix E 
Reaction Functions and Bertrand 
Prices 
E.l Unit Demands 
With unit demands 
Profit functions are 
for the incumbent, and 
for the entrant. 
1 P2- Pl 
a= 2 + 2t 
1r1 = [1 - ｾＭｴＨｬ＠ - a)](p1 -c) 
1r2 = J.l(l - a)(p2 -c) 
Maxhnizing ?Tl with respect to Pl we get 
8a 
J.L-0 (Pt -c) + [1 - J.L(1 -a)] = 0 Pt 
Substituting a and its derivative with respect to Pl we get 
Rearanging we get 
which can be written as 
--(Pt - c) + 1 - J.L - - = 0 J.L [ ( 1 P2 - Pl ) l 2t 2 2t 
J.L J.L J.L J.L J.L 
--p1 + -c+ 1-- + -p2- -pl = 0 2t 2t 2 2t 2t 
2t 
c + - - t + P2 = 2pt 
J.L 
Solving for Pl as a function of P2 we get Firm 1 's reaction function 
1[2-J.L l Pt(P2) = 2 t--;;- + c + P2 
Similarly, maximizing ?T2 with respect to P2 we get 
8a 
-J.L-(P2- c)+ J.L(1- a)= 0 8p2 
Substituting a and its derivative with respect to pz wew get 
--(pz-c)+J.L -- =0 J.L ( 1 P2 - Pl ) 2t 2 2t 
Rearangint we get 
32 
which can be written as 
Solving for P2 as a function on Pl we get Firm 2's reaction function 
Substituting this into Firm 1 's reaction function we get 
1[2-JJ. 1 l Pl = 2 t-J-1.- + c + 2 [t + c +PI] 
Rearanging we get 
which can be written as 
3 t4-JJ. 3 
-p1 = ---+-c 4 2 2jJ. 4 
and, finally, solving for pf we get 
B t4-J-L 
P1 =---+c 3 J-1. 
Substituting this into Firm 2's reaction function we get 
B P2 = 
33 
E.2 Elastic Demands 
With elastic de1nands 
Profit functions are 
1r1 = [1- J-L(1- a)] (Pl- c) ql 
for the incumbent, and 
for the entrant. 
Maximizing 1r1 with respect to Pl we get 
07rl = 0 =} 
8p1 
[1- J.L (1 -a)] q1 + (Pl -c) q1J.L 0°a + (1- J.L (1- a)] (Pl -c) 0°q
1 
= 0 
Pl Pl 
and rearanging we get 
Tllis can be written as 
34 
35 
and thus Firm 1 's reaction function is given by 
Pl- c C¥1 
= -:-:-----
Pl TtPl q1 + C¥1 'lh 
(E.l) 
Shnilarly for Firm 2 
and rearanging we get 
This can be written as 
and Firm 2's reaction function is given by 
P2- c _ a2 
P2 - [tp2q2 + C¥2'172 (E.2) 
Appendix F 
Monopoly Prices with Elastic 
Demands 
Monopoly profits are given by 
M ( M ) M 1f 1 = P1 - c ql , 
Maximizing 1rfl w.r.t. Pl we get 
which can be written as 
and finally 
a1fr = o => 
8p1 
M ( M ) oqfl ql + Pl - c 8 M = 0 => 
P1 
( M )oqfl M Pl - c opfl = -ql 
M Mopfl P1 -c= -ql --
oqfl 
pfl -c 1 
M =-
Pl fJ1 
36 
Solving for pt-£ we get 
Similarly for Frim 2 
which can be written as 
and finally 
Solving for pt-£ we get 
M 'TJ1C P1 =--
'T/1 -1 
M ｍｯｰｾ＠P2 -c= -q2 --Ｘｱｾ＠
37 
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Appendix G 
Proof of Proposition 7 
Consider the following mixed strategy: Firm 1 plays pf1 with probability x and 
fh = Pl (pr) with probability 1 - x; Firm 2 plays pr with probability y and pf with 
probability 1- y. The following four situations can be distinguished. 
• If both firms set local monopoly prices then profits will be 
7Tl (pfl,pr) = (1- J-L) (pfl- c)= (1- J-L) (s- t- c) 
• If the entrant set a limit price and the incumbent sets the local monopoly price then 
profits will be 
1r1 (pfl,pf) = (1- J-L) (pfl- c) = (1- J-L) (s- t- c) 
11"2 (pf'l ＬｰｾＩ＠ = p, (pf- c) = p, [2 ｾ＠ 3"' t + c- c] = (2- 3p,) t 
Note that 
(G.1) 
39 
and 
(G.2) 
where (H 1) comes from ｰｾ＠ > ｰｾＮ＠
• If the entrant sets a limit price and the incumbent sets ih (defined in the Appendix) 
then profits will be 
Note that 
1rr{jh,pf) = (1- p.)(jli- c)= (1- p.) [1 : JLt+ 8 ; c- c] 
= (1- JL) [t 1: JL + 8; c l 
1r2 (Pi,pf) = JL (pf- c) = JL [ 2 ｾ＠ Ｓ ｾＧ＠ t+ c- c] = (2- ＳｾｴＩ＠ t 
(G.3) 
because pf1 is the best price Firm 1 can charge when Firm 2 charges its limit price. 
Further it is clear that 
(G.4) 
• If the entrant sets the local monopoly price and the incumbent sets ih then the 
incumbent will enter the entrant's territory and gain market share of a. This defined 
by 
- M (1 ｾＩ＠ t - ｾ＠ ｾｴ＠8 - p2 - - a = 8 - Pl - a =?-
40 
and thus 
Thus 
Note that 
(G.5) 
by revealed preference (Firm 1 could always choose to set pfd). Further, 
(G.6) 
because Firm 2 cannot respond to Pl from its own reaction function as there is no 
Bertrand equilibrium when t.t < 0.4. 
From equations (H 1)-(H 6), we have 
(G.7) 
41 
(0.8) 
In a mixed strategy Nash equilibriu1n Firms 1 and 2 maximize the following re-
spectively: 
E1r2 = y { ｘＱｦｾ＠ ＨｰｦＧｬＬｰｾＢＩ＠ + (1- x) 1r2 ＨｐｉＬｐｾＩｽ＠
+ (1- y) { ｘＱｲｾｌ＠ ＨｰｦＧｬＬｰｾＩ＠ + (1- x) 1rf (pf,pf)} 
= y { ｘＱｦｾ＠ (pf'l ＬｰｾＩ＠ + (1- x) 1f2 (Pl,Pr)} + (1- y)1f2(Pti,pf) 
Hence, Firm 1 chooses x = 0 or x = 1 according to 
i.e. according to 
Similarly for Firm 2, y = 0 or y = 1 acccording to 
From (H 7) and (H 8) x* andy* E (0, 1): The Nash equilibrium is at (x*, y*). 
42 
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Appendix I 
Reaction Functions: Elastic 
Demands 
I.l Bertrand competition 
Profits functions with elastic demands are 
for Finn 1, and 
11"1 = a1 a1 (P1 - c0 - cT) q1 
+a1a2 (Pl- c0 - a) ql + a2a1 (a-cT) q2 
= [1 - J.t (1- a)] (Pl -C) q1 
+ [1 - fb ( 1 - a)] fb ( 1 - a) (a - cT) ( q2 - q1) 
11"2 = a2a2 (P2 - c0 - cT) q2 
+a2a1 (P2- c0 - a) q2 + a1a2 (a-cT) q1 
48 
(I.1) 
(I.2) 
+ [1- J.L (1- a)] J.L (1- a) (a-cT) (ql- q2) 
for Firm 2. 
Maximizing 1r1 with respect to Pl we get 
8a 
= J.L-8 (Pl- G) q1 + [1- J.L (1- a)] q1 P1 
+ [1 - J.L (1 -a)] (Pl -G) Bq1 
8pl 
ＫｾＭｴ Ｐ ﾰ｡＠ J.L (1- a) (a-cT) (q2- q1) PI 
- [1- J.L (1- a)] J.L Ba (a-cT) (q2- q1) 
8pl 
- [1- J.L (1 -a)] J.L (1- a) (a-cT) oq1 
8pl 
Substituting the derivative of a with respect to Pl this becomes 
0 = 
which after substituting the derivative of v(p1) with respect to Pl the above reduces to 
J.L 8ql 0 = - 2t ql (Pl - G) q1 + a1 q1 + a1 (Pl - C) Bp1 
- ｾｱＱ｡Ｒ＠ (a-cT) (q2- q1) 
+a1 E.ql (a-cT) (q2- q1)- a1a2 (a-cT) Bq1 
2t 8pl 
49 
50 
or 
J.t 8ql 1 
0 = - 2t ql (PI - 0) + a1 + a1 (PI - 0) Bpl ql 
- ｾ｡Ｒ＠ (a-cT) (q2- q1) 
+a1./:!:_ (a-cT) (q2- q1)- a1a2 (a-cT) Bql..!._ 
2t 8pl ql 
Rearranging we get 
0 = - ./:!:_q1 (Pl - 0 - a2 (a - cT)) + a1 + a1 (Pl - 0 - a2 (a - cT)) Bq1 ..!._ 
u ｾｬｩｄ＠
- ｾ｡Ｒ＠ (a-cT) q2 + ｡Ｑｾ＠ (a-cT) (q2- q!) => 
0 = [p1- 0- a2 (a-cT)] [-./:!:_q1 + a1 Bql..!_l + a1 
2t 8pl ql 
- ｾ＠ a2 (a - cT) q2 + a1 ｾ＠ (a - cT) ( q2 - q1) => 
[p1- 0- a2 (a- cT)l [./:!:_ql- a1 aq1 ..!_] = 
2t 8pl ql 
+a1 ｾＨ｡Ｍ｣ｔＩ＠ (q2- q1) => 
Pl - 0 - a2 (a - cT) [ J.t ] 
PI 2t q1P1 + O!I'lh = 
+a1 ｾ＠ (a-cT) (q2- q1) => 
and finally 
Pl- 0- a2 (a-cT) _ a1 + ｡Ｑｾ＠ (a-cT) (q2- q1)- ｾ｡Ｒ＠ (a-cT) q2 
Pl - ｾｱｬｐｬ＠ + 0!17]1 (1.3) 
Similarly, maximizing 1r2 we get 
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Substituting the derivative of a with respect to P2 this becomes 
0 = 
which after substituting the derivative of v(p2) with respect to P2 the above reduces to 
1-L {)q2 
0 = - 2t q2 (P2 - C) q2 + a2q2 + a2 (P2 - G) ap2 
+ ｾ＠ q2a2 (a-cT) (qr- q2) 
-arl!:..q2 (a-cT) (ql- q2)- a1a2 (a-cT) {)q2 
2t {)p2 
or 
1-L {)q2 1 
0 = - 2t q2 (P2 - C) + a2 + a2 (P2 - C) {)p2 q2 
+ ｾ｡Ｒ＠ (a-cT) (ql- q2) 
-all!:... (a-cT) (qt- q2)- a1a2 (a-cT) oq2 _!._ 
2t 8p2 q2 
Rearranging we get 
0 = - l!:..q2 (P2 - G - a1 (a - cT)) + a2 + a2 (P2 - C - a1 (a - cT)) {)q2 _!._ 
u ｾｾ＠
+ ｾ＠ a2 (a - cT) ( q1 - q2) - a1 ｾ＠ (a - cT) q1 =} 
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(p2- 0- a1 (a-cT)] [}!_q2- a 2 {)q2 ｾ｝＠2t 8p2 q2 
= a2 + ｾ＠ a2 (a - cT) ( q1 - q2) - 0:1 ｾ＠ (a - cT) q1 =* 
P2 - 0 - 0:1 (a - cT) ( p, ] 
p
2 2t q2P2 + a2'TJ2 
= a2 + ｾ＠ a2 (a - cT) ( q1 - q2) - 0:1 ｾ＠ (a - cT) q1 =* 
and finally 
P2 - C - 0:1 (a - cT) _ 0:2 + ｾ｡Ｒ＠ (a - cT) ( q1 - q2) - 0:1 ｾ＠ (a - cT) q1 
P2 - ｾｱＲｐＲ＠ + a2'TJ2 (1.4) 
1.2 Monopoly prices 
Under a local monopoly equilibrium the firms' profits are given by 
(1.5) 
for Firn1 1 and 
(1.6) 
for Firm 2. 
Maximizing with respect retail prices yields 
o1r1 = (1 - p,)q1 + (1 - p,) (Pl -C) {)ql - (1 - p,)p, (a- cT) {)q1 =} 
8pl 8pl 8pl 
0 = ql + (Pl - C) oq1 - J.L (a - cT) Bqt =? 
8pl 8pl 
and finally 
and similarly for Firm 2 
[pl- C- J.t (a-cT)] 8qt = -ql * 
8pl 
Pl - 0 - p, (a - cT) 8q1 q1 
Pt 8p1 =-Pl 
0 = q2 + (P2 - 0) Bq2 - ( 1 - J.L) (a - cT) Bq2 =} 
8p2 8p2 
and finally 
(p2- C- (1- J.L) (a-cT)] Bq2 = -q2 ==> 8p2 
P2 - C - ( 1 - J.t) (a - cT) 8q2 q2 
P2 8p2 =-P2 
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Appendix J 
The Choice of Access Prices· (First 
Order Conditions) 
J .1 U nreguleted Access Prices 
Total profits under Bertrand competition are given by 
nB = (1- p,(l- a(pf,pf))](pf- C)qf + J-L(l- a(pf,pf))(pf- C)qf (J.l) 
Maximizing with respect to the reciprocal access price a yields 
Substituting the derivative of a with respect to a and using partial derivatives this becomes 
0 = fl [8v(pf) 8v(pf)] ( B C) B 8pf B ( B C) oqf opf 
- - P1- Q1 +a1-q1 +a1 P1- --2t 8a aa 8a 8pf 8a 
fl [8v(pf) 8v(pf)] ( B C) B 8pf B ( B C) 8qf opf 
-- - P2 - Q2 + a2-q2 + a2 P2 - -- * 2t 8a 8a 8a Ｘｰｾ＠ 8a 
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which reduces to 
and finally 
0 = fL [ B 8pf B opf] ( B C) B 8pf B [ ( B C) 1J1 ] - -ql - + q2 - P1 - ql + a1-q1 1- P1 - -2t 8a 8a oa pf 
fL [ B opf B opf] ( B C) B 8pf B [ ( B C) 1J2 ] 
-- -ql - + q2 - P2 - q2 + a2-q2 1 - P2 - -2t 8a 8a 8a pf 
J .2 Regulated Access Price 
Here the regulator chooses the reciprocal access price to maximize socail welfare 
W = [1- JL (1- a(pf,pf))] v (pf) +. [1- JL (1- a(pf,pf))] (pf- C) qf 
+JL (1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｾＩＩ＠ v ＨｐｾＩ＠ + fL (1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｾＩＩ＠ (pf- C) qf 
Ｍｾ＠ [(1- JL) + fL ((a(pf,pf)? + (1- a(pf,pf)) 2)] 
This yields a first order condition 
aw 
8a 
8a(pf, pf) ( B) + 8v (pf) 
= fL 8a v Pl al 8a 
8a(pB pB) opB [)qB 
+JL 1 ' 2 (pf - C) qf + a1-1 qf + a1 (pf - C) - 1 oa aa 8a 
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Substituting the derivative of a with respect to a and using partial derivative this becomes 
aw 
a a 
::::: jJ, [ov(pf) 8v(pf) l ( B) OV (pf) 8pf 
2t 8a - oa v p1 + a 1 8pf 8a 
aw 
a a 
aw 
a a 
P, [8v(pf) ｯｶＨｰｾＩ｝＠ ( B C) B 8pf B ( B C) 8qf 8pf 
+- - P1- Q1 +a1-q1 +a1 P1- --2t aa aa aa 8pf aa 
J-L [8v(pf) ＸｶＨｰｾＩ｝＠ ( B) 8v (pf) 8pf 
- 2t 8a - 8a v p2 + a 2 8pf 8a 
P, [8v(pf) 8v(pf)] ( B C) B 8pf B ( B C) 8qf 8pf 
-- - P2- Q2 +a2-q2 +a2 P2- --2t aa aa aa 8pf aa 
-t(2a(pB' pB) - 1) J!:.. [8v(pf) - ov(pf)] ==? 1 2 2t aa 8a 
J-L [ B8pf Bopf] ( ( B) ( B)] 
- -q1 - + q2 - v P1 - v P2 2t aa aa (J.2) 
J-L [ B8pf ｂｯｰｾ｝＠ [( B C) B ( B C) B] +- -q1 - + q2 - P1 - ql - P2 - q2 2t 8a aa 
( B C) ( B)-71 -1 8pf ( B C) ( B)-.., -1 Ｘｰｾ＠-a1 P1 - 771 P1 1 - - 0:2 P2 - 772 P2 ''2 -
aa aa 
( ( B B) ) J-L [ Bopf B8pf] -t 2a P1 , P2 - 1 - -ql - + Q2 -2t aa 8a 
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Appendix K 
The Coice of Coverage: 
Unregulated Access (First Order 
Conditions) 
K.l The firm's choice of coverage 
Under Bertrand competition the first order condition for the entrant's investment 
choice is 
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8a(pB PB aB) 
+J-L 1 81-"2 ' F J-L (1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ＠ Ｈ｡ｾＭ cT) ＨｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＭ ｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＩ＠
+ [1- J-L (1- a(pf,pf, ｡ｾＩＩ｝＠ (1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ＠ Ｈ｡ｾＭ cT) ＨｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＭ ｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＩ＠
8a(pB PB aB) Ｍ｛ＱＭｊＭﾣＨＱＭ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ｝ｊＭｌ＠ 1 81-"2 ' F Ｈ｡ｾＭ｣ｔＩＨｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＭｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＩ＠
+ (1- Jt (1- a(pf,pf, ｡ｾＩＩ｝＠ Jt (1- a(pf,pf, ｡ｾＩＩ＠ 8;! ｛ｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＭ ｱｦＨ｡ｾＩ｝＠
+ (1- J-L (1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ｝＠ J-£(1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ＠ x 
x (aB _ cT) ｛ＸｱｦＨ｡ｾＩ＠ _ ＸｱｦＨ｡ｾＩ｝ＭＡｊＭｌ＠
F 8{£ 8{£ 
Under local monopoly the first order condition is 
87r2M 8pM(aM) 
81-" = [pr (aW)- ｃＩｱｾ＠ (aW) + J-L 281-" F ｱｾ＠ (aW) 
Ｋｴｴ｛ｰｾＨ｡ｗＩＭ ｃｊ Ｘ ｱｾｾｗｬ＠
-J-L (aW- cT) [qr (aW)- qr (aW)J 
+(1- J-L) Ｈ｡ｾＭ cT) [qf1 (aW)- ｱｾ＠ (a¥)J 
8a¥ M M M M +(1- J-L)J-L 81-" {q1 (ap) - q2 (ap )] 
+(1-f.L)J-L(a¥ -cT) [8qr(aW)- 8q¥I(a}!)]-IJ-L 
8{£ 8{£ 
K.2 The regulator's choice of coverage 
With Bertrand competition the first order condition is 
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while with local monopoly it is 
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Appendix L 
The Choice of Coverage: Regulated 
Access {First Order Conditions) 
L.l The firm's choice of coverage 
Under Bertrand competition the first order condition for the entrant's investment 
choice is 
01rf --0/J- (1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ＠ ＨｰｦＨ｡ｾＩＭ C) ｱｦＨ｡ｾＩ＠
-M ｡｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩ＠ (pf(a]D- C) ｱｦＨ｡ｾＩ＠
OIJ-
opB(aB) 
+11- (1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ＠ ｾｊＮｌ＠ R ｱｦＨ｡ｾＩ＠
()qB(aB) 
+11- (1- a(pf,pf, ｡ｾＩＩ＠ ＨｰｦＨ｡ｾＩＭ C) 20 J.L R 
- ( 1 - a(pf, pf, ｡ｾＩＩ＠ J.L ( 1 - a(pf, ｰｾＬ＠ ｡ｾＩＩ＠ Ｈ｡ｾ＠ - cT) ( qf Ｈ｡ｾＩ＠ - ｱｾ＠ Ｈ｡ｾＩＩ＠
oa(pB PB aB) 
+J.L 1 /yJ.L2 ' R ｊＮｌＨＱＭ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ＠ Ｈ｡ｾＭ｣ｔＩＨｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＭｱｾＨ｡ｾＩＩ＠
+ [1- J.L (1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ｝＠ (1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ＠ Ｈ｡ｾＭ cT) ＨｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＭ ｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＩ＠
8a.(pB PB aB) 
- [1- p, (1- a(pf,pf, ｡ｾＩＩ｝＠ p, 1 iJJ-L2 ' R Ｈ｡ｾＭ cT) ＨｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＭ ｱｦＨ｡ｾＩＩ＠
+ (1- JL (1- a{pf ,pf, a:!())] JL (1- a(pf ,pf, a:!()) a;: (qf(a:i() - qf(a:i()] 
+ ( 1 - p, ( 1 - a(pf, pf, ｡ｾＩＩ｝＠ p, ( 1 - a(pf, pf, ｡ｾＩＩ＠ x 
x (aB _ cT) ｛ＸｱｦＨ｡ｾＩ＠ _ ＸｱｦＨ｡ｾＩ｝＠ _ 1/-L R 8p, op, 
Under local monopoly the first order condition is 
01rMz [)nM(aM) 
ap, = [pr(af{)- C]qf'(af{) + J-L yzap, R qr(af{) 
Ｋｊｌｾ＠ ( al£) - C] ｩＩｱｾｾｬﾣＩ＠
-p, (aN- cT) [qr (aft)- qf' (aft)] 
+(1- p,) (art- cT) [qr(af{)- ｱｲＨ｡ｾｦＩ｝＠
oaf{ M M M M 
+(1- p,)p, {)p, [ql (aR)- qz (aR )] 
+(1- p,)p, (aft- cT) [8qf!(af{)- ＸｱｾＨ｡ｬｪｻＩ｝Ｍ 1/-L 
8p, 8p, 
L.2 The regulator's choice of coverage 
With Bertrand competition the first order condition is 
Ｘ｡ｬＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩ＠ ( B( B))+ ( s B s)8v ＨｰｦＨ｡ｾＩＩ＠
= {)p, v P1 aR a.1 P1 ,pz, aR OJ.l-
+ 
8
"'
1 Ｈｰｾ＠ :f' a:!() [pf (a:!() - G]qf Ｈ｡ｾＩ＠ + <>1 (pf, pf, ｡ｾＩ＠ ｏｰｾ＠ ｾＺＡＨＩ＠ qf (a:!() 
[)qB(aB) 
+a.1 (pf, pf, ｡ｾＩ＠ (pf Ｈ｡ｾＩ＠ - C] 10/-L R 
Ｋ Ｘ｡ｺＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩ＠ ( B( B))+ ( B B B)8v ＨｰｦＨ｡ｾＩＩ＠{)p, v P2 aR a.z P1 ,p2, aR OJ.l-
+ Ｘ ＢＧ Ｒ ＨｰｾＺｦＧ＠ a:!() ｛ｰｦＨ｡ｾＩ＠ - G]qf(a:i() + <>2(pf ,pf, a:!() ｩＩｰｾｾＺｩＨＩ＠ qf(a:i() 
+<>2 (pf, pf, a:!() [pf (a:!() - C] ｏｱｾｾＺｩＨＩ＠
61 
62 
ＫｾＭ ｾ＠ (Ca(pf,pf,a1D? + (1- ｡ＨｰｦＬｰｦＬ｡ｾＩＩ Ｒ Ｉ＠
Ｍｾ＠ [JL ( -2 (1 - 2a(pf ,pf) ｡ｾＩＩ＠ aa(pf a1) ｡ｾＩＩ｝＠ - 'YJL 
while with local monopoly it is 
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Appendix M 
MATLAB Programmes 
----------------------- --
ｐｲｯｧｲｾ･ｳＺ＠ Chapter 3 
%derivaphi 
%The derivative of phi(eh) = (g/2) (eA2) - (g/2)*(max(O,eh-(B-b))) 
(see chapter 3 equation (16)) 
%04/04/02 
function f=derivphi(e) 
global g b B Ip chO clO ph pl ehO elO Ll Lh ql qh 
%see chapter 3 equations (23) and (25) for the values of the 
derivative of phi 
if b-chO>O 
f=-g*{(exp{-Ip))/((exp(-Ip))A2))*(Ll/(l+Lh))*{{B-b)A2) 
else 
f=g*ehO*(exp{-Ip))*((-(l+Lh)*Ll)/(((l+(l-exp(-Ip)))*(l+Lh)+(l-
exp(-Ip))*Ll)A2)}*(gA(-l}}*qh 
end 
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%derivapsi 
%The derivative of psi{e) 
%26/10/00 
function f=derivpsi{e) 
global g 
if e >= le-8 
f=g*e 
else 
f=O 
end 
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{ g I 2 ) ( (max ( 0 , e ) ) -" 2 ) 
%focfbhp 
%First-order conditions for the high-beta firm under price 
regulation with complete information 
%15/04/02 
function f = focfbhp(x) 
global AO g I K s Ilfb Ihfb n b c B L Llfb Lhfb phfb plfb ehOfb 
elOfb chOfb clOfb qhfb qlfb ahfb alfb LAGhfb 
f = zeros(3,1); 
phfb = x(l); 
ehOfb = x(2); 
Ihfb = x(3); 
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%first best price regulation quantity for the high-beta type of firm 
qhfb = AO * phfbA(-n); 
%first best price regulation access price for the high-beta type of 
firm 
ahfb=(phfb-c); 
%first best price regulation cost 
chOfb = (B- K*(IhfbAs) - ehOfb); 
%first best Lagrange multiplier on IR; solved from the first order 
condition for the high-beta type's price phfb 
Lhfb = -((phfb- (B-K*(IhfbAs)-ehOfb) - c)/(phfb*(l-(1/(n)))-(B-
K*(IhfbAs)-ehQfb)-c)); 
%Lagranigain 
%LAGhfb=surplus(phfb,AO,n) - phfb*qhfb + (l+Lhfb)*(phfb*qhfb-c*qhfb-
(B-K*(IhfbAs)-ehOfb)*qhfb-Ihfb-psi(ehOfb)); 
%The system of equations for the high-beta type's first best retail 
price, effort and investment: one binding IR (for the price) and two 
first order conditions (for effort and investment) 
f(l) = (phfb-c)*qhfb- Ihfb'- (B-K*(IhfbAs)-ehOfb)*qhfb -
psi(ehOfb); 
f{2) = ehQfb- (gA(-l))*qhfb; 
f(3) = (S*K*(IhfbA(S-l))*qhfb) - 1; 
%focfbhtfr 
%First-order conditions for the high-beta firm under transfer 
regulation with complete information 
%03/04/02 
function f = focfbhtfr(x) 
67 
global AO g It K s L n b B c Ihfbt L phfbt ehOfbt chOfbt qhfbt ahfbt 
zeta beta 
f::: zeros(3,1); 
phfbt = x(l); 
ehOfbt = x(2); 
Ihfbt:::: x(3); 
%first best transfer regulation quantity for the high-beta type of 
firm 
qhfbt = AO * phfbtA(-n); 
%first best transfer regulation access price for the high-beta type 
of firm 
ahfbt=(phfbt-c); 
%first best transfer regulation cost 
chOfbt = (B- K*(IhfbtAs) - ehOfbt); 
%The system of equations for the high-beta type's price, effort and 
investment: three first order conditions 
f(l) :::: (phfbt- (B- K*(IhfbtAs) - ehOfbt) - c)/(phfbt) -
L/ ( (l+L) *n); 
f(2) = eh0fbt (gA(-l))*qhfbt; 
f(3) = (s*K*(IhfbtA(s-l))*qhfbt) - 1; 
%focfblp 
%First-order conditions for the high-beta firm under price 
regulation with complete information 
%19/04/02 
function f = focfblp(x) 
global AO K Ilfb s g n b B c Llfb plfb clOfb elOfb qlfb alfb 
f = ｺ･ｲｯｳＨＳｾＱＩ［＠
plfb=x(l); 
el0fb=x(2); 
ｉｬｦ｢ｾｸＨＳＩ［＠
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%first best price regulation quantity for the low-beta type of firm 
qlfb = AO * plfbA(-n); 
%first best price regulation access price for the low-beta type of 
firm 
alfb = (plfb- c); 
%first best price regulation cost 
clOfb = (b- ｋＪＨｉｬｦｾａｳＩ＠ - elOfb}; 
%first best Lagrange multiplier on IR; solved from teh first order 
condition for the low-beta type's price plfb 
Llfb = -((plfb- (b-K*(IlfbAs)-elOfb) - c)/(plfb*(l-(1/n)) - (b-
K*(IlfbAs)-elOfb) -c)); 
%The system of equation for the low-beta type's price effort and 
investment: one binding IR (for the price) and two first order 
conditions (for effort and investment) 
£(1) = (plfb-c)*qlfb- Ilfb- (b-K*(IlfbAs)-elOfb)*qlfb-
psi(elOfb); 
f(2) = elQfb- (gA(-1))*qlfb; 
£(3) = (s*K*(IlfbA(s-l))*qlfb) - 1; 
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%focfbltfr 
%First-order conditions for the low-beta type of firm under transfer 
regulation with complete information 
%13/07/01 . 
function f = focfbltfr(x) 
global AO g L I K s n b B c L Ilfbt plfbt elOfbt clOfbt qlfbt alfbt 
zeta beta 
f = zeros(3,1}; 
plfbt = x(l); 
elOfbt = x(2); 
Ilfbt = x(3); 
%first best transfer regulation quantity for the low-beta type of 
firm 
qlfbt = AO * plfbtA(-n}; 
%first best transfer regulation access price for the low-type of 
firm 
alfbt=(plfbt-c); 
%first best transfer regulation cost 
clOfbt = (b- K*(IlfbtAs) - elOfbt); 
%The system of equations for the low-beta type's price, effort and 
investment: three first order conditions 
f(l) = (plfbt- (b- K*(IlfbtAs) - elOfbt) - c}/(plfbt} -
L/ ( (l+L) *n); 
f(2) = el0fbt- (gA(-l))*qlfbt; 
f(3) = (s*K*(IlfbtA(s-l))*qlfbt) - 1; 
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%focfbsbmainB 
%Solves for the access pr1c1ng problem with both transfer and price 
regulation under both full and asymmetric information 
%computes expected welfare 
%03/04/02 
global AO g gl It n b B c K s ehOfbt elOfbt qhfbt qlfbt chOfbt 
clOfbt R phfbt plfbt L ahfbt alfbt Whfbt Wlfbt Whfbtl Wlfbtl ehOfb 
elOfb qhfb qlfb chOfb clOfb R phfb plfb L Lhfb Llfb ahfb alfb Whfb 
Wlfb Whfbl Wlfbl ehO ph pl qh ql chO clO ah al ehO elO pht plt qht 
qlt chOt clOt aht alt ehOt elOt Lh Ll Wl Wh Wlt Wht vlt v2t vlp v2p 
vltl v2tl vlpl v2p1 
%baseline values for the parameters 
AO=lOO; 
g=O.S; 
n=1.7; 
b=35; 
K=S; 
s=0.2; 
%s=2; 
%B=2 0; 
L=0.3; 
c=l; 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)===1e-6; 
%starting values for first best prices, efforts and investmentlevels 
under transfer regulation 
ff1=35; 
ff2=0.5 
ff3=10; 
%starting values for first best prices, efforts and investmentlevels 
under price regulation 
ff4=30; 
ff5=0.3; 
ff6=8; 
xaO = [ffl ff2 ff3]; 
xbO=xaO; 
xcO = [ff4 ffS ff6]; 
xdO=xcO; 
%to vary the value of high beta from 36 to 40 
for i=l:12, 
B(i)=(36)+(i-1)/3; 
B==B (i); 
xa=fsolve{'focfbhtfr•,xaO,options}; 
%to print the print the value of the function 'focfbhtfr' and check 
each argument is close to zero 
q = focfbhtfr(xa) 
%pause 
xaO=xa; 
%to call up the values of the arguments in 'focfbhtfr' 
phfbt=xa(1); 
eh0fbt=xa(2) 
Ihfbt=xa(3); 
chOfbt; 
qhfbt; 
ahfbt; 
\ 
Whfbt=surplus(phfbt,AO,n) + L*phfbt*qhfbt- (1+L)*((B-K*(IhfbtAs)-
eh0fbt)*qhfbt + c*qhfbt + Ihfbt + psi(ehOfbt)); 
NCShfbt=(((phfbtA(1-n))*(AO*n)/(n-1))-phfbt*qhfbt); 
xb=fsolve('focfbltfr',xbO,options); 
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%to print the print the value of the function 'focfbltfr' and check 
each argument is close to zero 
q = focfbltfr(xb) 
%pause 
xbO=xb; 
%to call up the values of the arguments in 'focfbltfr' 
plfbt=xb ( 1) ; 
el0fbt=xb(2); 
Ilfbt=xb(3); 
clOfbt; 
qlfbt; 
alfbt; 
Wlfbt=surplus(plfbt,AO,n) + L*plfbt*qlfbt- (1+L)*((b-K*(IlfbtAs)-
el0fbt)*qlfbt + c*qlfbt + Ilfbt + psi(elOfbt)); 
NCSlfbt=(((plfbtA(1-n))*(AO*n)/(n-1))-plfbt*qlfbt); 
xc=fsolve('focfbhp',xaO,options); 
%to print the print the value of the function •focfbhp' and check 
each argument is close to zero 
q = focfbhp(xc) 
%pause 
xcO=xc; 
%to call up the values of the arguments in 'focfbhp' 
phfb=xc(1); 
eh0fb=xc(2) 
Ihfb=xc(3); 
chOfb; 
qhfb; 
ahfb; 
Whfb=surplus(phfb,AO,n) - phfb*qhfb + (phfb-c)*qhfb- (B-K*(IhfbAs)-
ehOfb)*qhfb- Ihfb- psi(ehOfb); 
NCShfb=(((phfbA(1-n))*(AO*n)/(n-1))-phfb*qhfb); 
xd=fsolve('focfblp',xdO,options); 
I 
%to print the print the value of the function 'focfblp' and check 
each argument is close to zero 
q = focfblp(xd} 
%pause 
xdO=xd; 
%to call up the values of the arguments in 'focfblp' 
. plfb=xd(l}; 
e10fb=xd(2} 
Ilfb=xd(3); 
clOfb; 
qlfb; 
alfb; 
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Wlfb=surplus(plfb,AO,n} - plfb*qlfb + (plfb-c}*qlfb- Ｈ｢ＭｋＪＨｉｬｦ｢ｾｳＩﾭ
elOfb)*qlfb- Ilfb- psi(elOfb}; 
ｎｃｓｬｦ｢］ＨＨＨｰｬｦ｢ｾＨｬＭｮｽＩＪＨａｏＪｮｽＯＨｮＭＱＩＩＭｰｬｦ｢Ｊｱｬｦ｢Ｉ［＠
%difference between low first-best transfer and price regulation 
welfare 
RClfb=((Wlfbt-Wlfb)*lOO); 
%difference between high first-best transfer and price regulation 
welfare 
RChfb=((Whfbt-Whfb)*lOO); 
%to run the programme across all the values of the high beta, from 
i=l to i=12 
phfbtl(i')=phfbt; 
ehOfbtl(i)=ehOfbt; 
qhfbtl(i)=qhfbt; 
chOfbtl(i)=chOfbt; 
ahfbtl(i)=ahfbt; 
Whfbtl(i)=Whfbt; 
Ihfbtl(i)=Ihfbt; 
NCShfbtl(i)=NCShfbt 
plfbtl(i)=plfbt; 
elOfbtl(i)=elOfbt; 
qlfbtl(i)=qlfbt; 
clOfbtl(i)=clOfbt; 
alfbtl(i)=alfbt; 
Wlfbtl(i)=Wlfbt; 
Ilfbtl(i)=Ilfbt; 
NCSlfbtl(i)=NCSlfbt; 
phfbl(i)=phfb; 
ehOfbl(i)=ehOfb; 
qhfbl(i)=qhfb; 
chOfbl(i)=chOfb; 
ahfbl(i)=ahfb; 
Lhfbl(i)=Lhfb; 
Whfbl(i)=Whfb; 
Ihfbl(i)=Ihfb; 
NCShfbl(i)=NCShfb; 
plfbl(i)=plfb; 
elOfbl(i)=elOfb; 
qlfbl(i)=qlfb; 
clOfbl(i);clOfb; 
alfbl(i)=alfb; 
Llfbl(i}=Llfb; 
Wlfbl(i}=Wlfb; 
Ilfbl(i)=Ilfb; 
NCSlfbl(i};NCSlfb; 
RClfbl(i)=RClfb; 
RChfbl(i)=RChfb; 
Bl(i);B; 
end 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3}=1e-6; 
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%starting values for second best transfer regulation prices, efforts 
and investment (uses first best solutions) 
ffl=phfbt; 
ff2=plfbt; 
ff3=eh0fbt; 
ff4;el0fbt; 
%the starting value for investment is the low-beta firm's first best 
investment 
ff5=Ilfbt; 
%starting values for second best price regulation prices, efforts 
and investment (uses first best solutions) 
ff6=phfb; 
ff7=plfb; 
ff8=eh0fb; 
ff9=el0fb; 
%the starting value for investment is the low-beta firm's first best 
investment 
fflO=Ilfb; 
xtO [ffl ff2 ff3 ff4 ff5J; 
xpO [ff6 ff7 ff8 ff9 fflO]; 
%to vary the values of the high beta from 36 to 40 
for i=1:12, 
B(i};(36}+(i-1)/3; 
B=B(i); 
xt=fsolve('focsbtfr•,xtO,options); 
%to print the values of the function 'focsbtfr' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q=focsbtfr(xt) 
%pause 
xtO = xt 
%to call up the values of the arguments in 'focsbtfr' 
pht=xt(l); 
plt=xt (2}; 
eh0t=xt(3); 
el0t=xt(4); 
It=xt(5); 
qht; 
qlt; 
chOt; 
clOt; 
aht; 
alt; 
Wlt; 
Wht; 
Wt=(l-exp(-It))*Wlt + (exp(-It))*Wht; 
vlt; 
v2t; 
%RClt=((Wlfbt-Wt)/Wlfbt)*lOO; 
%RCht=(-(Whfbt-Wt)/Wt)*100; 
CSt=(l-exp(-It))*(pltA(l-n))*(AO*n)/(n-1) + (exp(-It))*(phtA(1-
n))*(A0*n)/(n-1); 
NCSt=(l-exp(-It))*(((pltA(l-n))*(AO*n)/(n-1))-plt*qlt) ·+ {exp(-
It})*(((phtA(1-n})*(AO*n)/(n-1))-pht*qht); 
Ult=psi(ehOt)-psi(ehOt+b-B); 
xp=fsolve('focsbp',xpO,options); 
%to print the values of · the function 'focsbtfr' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q=focsbp(xp} 
%pause 
xpO = xp 
%to call up the values of the arguments in 'focsbtfr' 
ph=xp (1); 
pl=xp(2); 
eh0=xp{3); 
el0=xp{4); 
Ip=xp(5); 
qh; 
ql; 
chO; 
clO; 
ah; 
al; 
Ll; 
Lh; 
Wl; 
Wh; 
W=(l-exp(-Ip))*Wl + (exp{-Ip))*Wh; 
%RCl=((Wlfb-W)/Wlfb)*100; 
%RCh=((W-Whfb)/W) *100; 
%difference between second-best transfer and price regulation 
welfares 
RC=((Wt-W)/Wt)*lOO; 
vlp; 
v2p; 
CSp=(l-exp(-Ip))*(plA(1-n))*(A0*n)/(n-1) + (exp(-Ip))*(phA(1-
n))*(AO*n)/(n-1); 
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NCSp=(l-exp(-Ip}}*(((plA(1-n}}*(A0*n)/(n-1})-pl*ql} + (exp(-
Ip})*(((phA(1-n})*(A0*n)/(n-1))-ph*qh); 
Ulp=psi(ehO)-psi(ehO+b-B); 
%to run the programne across all values of B, from i=l to i=12 
pht1(i)=pht; 
plt1(i)=plt; 
ehOtl(i)=ehOt; 
elOtl(i)=elOt; 
Itl(i)=It; 
qhtl(i}=qht; 
qlt1(i)=qlt; 
ch0t1(i}=ch0t; 
c10t1(i)=cl0t; 
aht1(i)==aht; 
alt1{i}=alt; 
Wlt1(i)=Wlt; 
Whtl(i)=Wht; 
Wt1(i)=Wt; 
vlt1(i}=v1t; 
v2t1(i)=v2t; 
CSt1(i)==CSt; 
NCStl(i)=NCSt; 
Ultl(i)=Ult; 
B1(i)=B; 
L1(i)=L; 
%to run the programme across all values of B, from i=l to i=l-2 
ph1(i)=ph; 
pll(i)=pl; 
eh01(i):;eh0; 
el01(i)=el0; 
Ip1(i)=Ip; 
qh1(i)=qh; 
qll(i)=ql; 
chOl(i)=chO; 
clOl(i}=clO; 
ah1(i)=ah; 
all(i)=al; 
Ll1(i)=Ll; 
Lh1(i)=Lh; 
Wll(i)=Wl; 
Whl(i)=Wh; 
Wl(i)=W; 
vlpl(i}=vlp; 
v2p1(i):;v2p; 
CSpl(i)=CSp; 
NCSpl(i)=NCSp; 
plp1(i)=Ulp 
RCl(i)=RC; 
B1(i}=B; 
Ll(i}=L; 
end 
figure 
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plot(Bl,Wlfbl, '*-', Bl,Whfbl, 'x-', Bl,Wlfbtl, '+-', Bl,Whfbtl, 'o-', 
Bl,Wl, '--', Bl,Wtl, 'square-'} 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
ylabel('Welfare', 'FontSize',l5) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text{39.6,12.3, 'W_lAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(38.8,11.36, 'W_hAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.6,12.6, 'Wt_lAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName•, 'Times') 
text(39.7,11.35, 'Wt_hAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.7,11.5, 'W', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,11.7, 'Wt', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,RCl, '*-' Bl,RClfbl, '+-', Bl,RChfbl, 'x-') 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Relative changes in welfare', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39,0.3, 'RC', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text{39,4.1, 'RC_lAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text{3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text{39,1.8, 'RC_hAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text{l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,RCl, '*-') 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
ylabel('Relative difference in welfare', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(38.5,0.65, 'RC', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,Wlfbl, '*-' Bl,Whfbl, 'x-', Bl,Wlfbtl, '+-', Bl,Whfbtl, 'o-') 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('First-best Welfare', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.7,12.3, 'W_lAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(38.5,11.4, 'W_hAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.7,12.6, 'Wt_lAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ｴ･ｸｴＨｾＵＬＰＮＱＳＵＬ＠ '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,11.6, 'Wt_hAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,Wl,' Bl,Wtl, 'square-'} 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Second-best Welfare', 'FontSize',l5) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
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text(38,11.7, 'W', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(37,12.2, 'Wt', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(3.0,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,CStl,' Bl,CSpl, 'square-') 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Consumer Surplus', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text ( 39. 5, 18. 56, 'CS"t', 'FontSize', 15, ·• FontName' , 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,20, 'CS"p', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
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plot(Bl,NCStl, '*-' Bl,NCSpl, 'x-', Bl,NCShfbtl, '+-', Bl,NCSlfbtl, 'o-
, , Bl, NCShfbl, ' Bl, NCSlfbl, ' square- ' ) 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('net consumer surplus', 'FontSize',l5} 
legend('NCStl', 'NCSpl', 'NCShfbtl', 'NCSlfbtl', 'NCShfbl', 'NCSlfbl') 
figure 
plot(Bl,Ultl,' Bl,Ulpl, 'square-') 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Efficient Incumbent Rent', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(36.5,0.03, 'U_lAt', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39,0.045, 'U_l"p', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName ' , 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,Llfbl, '*-' Bl,Lhfbl, 'x-', Bl,Lll, '+-', Bl,Lhl, 'o-', 
Bl, Ll, '--') 
xlabel( ' Values of B', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
ylabel('Values of \mu and \lambda', 'FontSize',l5} 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.07, 'L_l"f"b', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.025, 'L_hAf"b', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(36.7,0.1, 'L_l', 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(38.7,0.09, 'L_h', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(39.5,0.325, 'L', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,Llfbl, '*-' Bl,Lhfbl, 'x-', Bl,Lll, '+-', Bl,Lh1, 'o-', 
Bl, Ll, I -- ' ) 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('First- and Second-best values of \mu and 
\lambda', 'FontSize',12) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.07, 'L_l"f"b', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.025, 'L_hAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(36.7,0.1, 'L_l', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times•) 
text(38.7,0.09, 'L_h', 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.325, 'L', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,Ilfbl, •*-' Bl,Ihfbl, 'x-', Bl,Ilfbtl, '+-', Bl,Ihfbtl, 'o-', 
Bl,Ipl, '--', Bl,Itl, 'square-') 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize•,ls, 'FontName', •Times') 
ylabel('Investment', 'FontSize',l5) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.22, 'I_lAfAb', 'FontSize•,12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(38.4,0.165, 'I_hAfAb', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', •FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(38.5,0.13, 'It_lAfAb', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge•, 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.75,0.115, 'It_hAfAb', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName•, 'Times•) 
text(39.5,0.535, •rp•, 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', •Times•) 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, •FontName•, 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.43, 'It', •FontSize',12, 'FontName', •Times•) 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, •FontName•, 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,Ipl, '+-•, Bl,Itl, '*-•) 
xlabel('Values of B•, 'FontSize•,ls, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel(•second-best Investment', 'FontSize',l5) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39,0.5, 'Ip', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', •Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.35, 'It', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName•, •Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName•, 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,alfbl, '*-' Bl,ahfbl, 'x-', Bl,alfbtl, '+-', Bl,ahfbtl, 'o-', 
Bl,all, '--', Bl,ahl, 'v-', Bl,altl, 'square-', Bl,ahtl, 'diamond-') 
xlabel(•values of B', 'FontSize',15, •FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel(•Access Prices', 'FontSize',l5) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,31.4, 'a_lAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times•) 
text(15,0.135, •\wedge', •FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(37.6,33.6, 'a_hAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(38,36.65, 'at_lAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName•, 'Times') 
text(38.4,41.4, 'at_hAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,33, •a_l', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, 1 \wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,38.2, 'a_h', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
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text{39.5,34.8, 'at_l', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,40, 'at_h', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,all, '*-', Bl,ahl, 'x-', Bl,altl, '+-', Bl,ahtl, 'o-') 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Second-best access prices', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,33, 'a_l', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,38.1, 'a_h', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,35, 'at_l', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,40, 'at_h', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,plfbl, '*-', Bl,phfbl, 'x-', Bl,plfbtl, '+-', Bl,phfbtl, 'o-', 
Bl,pll, '--', Bl,phl, 'v-', Bl,pltl, 'square-', Bl,phtl, 'diamond-') 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Retail Prices', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.71,32.9, 'p_lAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(38,35.7, 'p_hAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(38,37.75, 'pt_lAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39,42.8, 'pt_hAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39,34, 'p_l', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,39, 'p_h', 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.71,35.9, 'pt_l', 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39,40.8, 'pt_h', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
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plot(Bl,chOfbl, '*-' Bl,clOfbl, 'x-', Bl,chOfbtl, '+-', Bl,clOfbtl, 'o-
', Bl,chOl, '--', Bl,clOl, 'v-•, Bl,chOtl, 'square-', 
Bl,clOtl, 'diamond-') 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('First-best and Second-best costs', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39,37.6, 'cO_hAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.3,33.7, 'cO_lAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.3,36.8, 'cOt_hAfAb', 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.7,33.2, 'cOt_lAfAb', 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.6,39.7, 'cO_h', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,34.8, 'cO_l', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,38.5, 'cOt_h', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.7,34, 'cOt_l', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'Fontsize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
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plot(Bl,ehOfbl, '*-' Bl,elOfbl, 'x-', Bl,ehOfbtl, '+-', Bl,elOfbtl, 'o-
' ) 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('First-best efforts', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.34, 'eO_hAfAb', 'FontSize',15 1 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12 1 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.42, 'eO_lAfAb', 'FontSize·',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge'r 'FontSize',12, 'FontName'r 'Times') 
text(39,0.31, 'eOt_hAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.39, .'e0t_lAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,ehOtl, '+-', Bl,elOtl, 'o-•, Bl,ehOl, '*-', Bl,elOl, 'x-') 
xlabel('Values of B', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('First-best and Second-best efforts', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5,0.25, 'eO_hAfAb', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15r0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(36.5,0.365, 'eO_lAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0r0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(39.5·,0.43, 'eOt_hAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l2 1 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(36.5,0.4, 'eOt_lAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(Bl,vltl, '*-' Bl,v2tl, •x-', Bl,vlpl, '+-', Bl,v2p1, •o-') 
xlabel('values of B') 
ylabel('probabilities') 
title('probabilities') 
legend('vltl', 'v2t1', 'vlpl', 'v2p1') 
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%focfbsbmainB 
%Solves for the access pricing problem with both transfer and price 
regulation under both full and asymmetric information 
%computes expected welfare 
%03/04/02 
global AO g gl It n b B c K s ehOfbt elOfbt qhfbt qlfbt chOfbt 
clOfbt R phfbt plfbt L ahfbt alfbt Whfbt Wlfbt Whfbtl Wlfbtl ehOfb 
elOfb qhfb qlfb chOfb clOfb R phfb plfb L Lhfb Llfb ahfb alfb Whfb 
Wlfb Whfbl Wlfbl ehO ph pl qh ql chO clO ah al ehO elO pht plt qht 
qlt chOt clOt aht alt ehOt elOt Lh Ll Wl Wh Wlt Wht vlt v2t v1p v2p 
vlpl v2p1 vltl v2t1 
%baseline values for the parameters 
A0=100; 
g=O.S; 
n=1.7; 
b=35; 
K=S; 
%s=2i 
B=36; 
L=0.3; 
c=l; 
options(1)=1; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for first-best prices, efforts and investment 
levels under transfer regulation 
ff1=35; 
ff2=0.5 
ff3=10; 
%starting values for first best prices, efforts and investmentlevels 
under price regulation 
ff4=30; 
ff5=0.3; 
ff6=8; 
xaO = [ffl ff2 ff3]; 
xbO=xaO; 
xcO = [ff4 ff5 ff6]; 
xdO=xcO; 
%to vary the value of \sigma from 36 to 40 
for i=1:10, 
s(i)=(O.OS)+(i-1)/15; 
s=s (i); 
xa=fsolve('focfbhtfr',xaO,options); 
%to print the print the value of the function 'focfbhtfr' and check 
each argument is close to zero 
q = focfbhtfr(xa) 
%pause 
xaO=xa; 
%to call up the values of the arguments in 'focfbhtfr' 
phfbt=xa(1); 
eh0fbt=xa(2) 
Ihfbt=xa(3); 
chOfbt; 
qhfbt; 
ahfbt; 
Whfbt=surplus(phfbt,AO,n) + L*phfbt*qhfbt- (l+L)*((B-K*(IhfbtAs)-
ehOfbt)*qhfbt + c*qhfbt + Ihfbt + psi(ehOfbt)); 
NCShfbt=(((phfbtA(l-n))*(AO*n)/(n-1))-phfbt*qhfbt); 
xb=fsolve('focfbltfr',xbO,options); 
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%to print the print the value of the function 'focfbltfr' and check 
each argument is close to zero 
q = focfbltfr(xb) 
%pause 
xbO=xb; 
%to call up the values of the arguments in 'focfbltfr' 
plfbt=xb(l); 
elOfbt=xb (2) ; 
Ilfbt=xb(3); 
clOfbt; 
qlfbt; 
alfbt; 
Wlfbt=surplus(plfbt,AO,n) + L*plfbt*qlfbt- {1+L)*((b-K*(IlfbtAs)-
el0fbt)*qlfbt + c*qlfbt + Ilfbt + psi(elOfbt)); 
NCSlfbt=(((plfbtA(l-n))*(AO*n)/(n-1))-plfbt*qlfbt); 
xc=fsolve('focfbhp',xaO,options); 
%to print the print the value of the function 'focfbhp' and check 
each argument is close to zero 
q = focfbhp(xc) 
%pause 
xcO=xc; 
%to call up the. values of the arguments in 'focfbhp' 
phfb=xc(1); 
eh0fb=xc(2) 
Ihfb:::xc(3); 
chOfb; 
qhfb; 
ahfb; 
Whfb=surplus(phfb,AO,n) - phfb*qhfb + (phfb-c)*qhfb - (B-K*(IhfbAs)-
ehOfb)*qhfb- Ihfb- psi(ehOfb}; 
NCShfb=(((phfbA(l-n))*(AO*n)/(n-1))-phfb*qhfb); 
xd=fsolve('focfblp',xdO,options); 
%to print the print the value of the function 'focfblp' and check 
each argument is close to zero 
q = focfblp(xd) 
%pause 
xdO=xd; 
%to call up the values of the arguments in •focfblp• 
plfb=xd ( 1) ; 
el0fb=xd(2) 
I 1 fb=xd ( 3 ) ; 
clOfb; 
qlfb; 
alfb; 
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Wlfb=surplus(plfb,AO,n) - plfb*qlfb + (plfb-c)*qlfb- (b-K*(IlfbAs)-
elOfb)*qlfb- Ilfb- psi(elOfb); 
NCSlfb=(((plfbA(1-n))*(A0*n)/(n-1))-plfb*qlfb); 
%difference between low first-best transfer and price regulation 
welfare 
RClfb=((Wlfbt-Wlfb)*100); 
%difference between high first-best transfer and price regulation 
welfare 
RChfb=((Whfbt-Whfb)*100); 
%to run the programme across all the values of the \sigma, from i=1 
to i=lO 
phfbt1(i)=phfbt; 
eh0fbt1(i)=eh0fbt; 
qhfbt1(i)=qhfbt; 
ch0fbt1(i)=ch0fbt; 
ahfbt1(i}=ahfbt; 
Whfbtl(i)=Whfbt; 
Ihfbt1(i)=Ihfbt; 
NCShfbt1(i)=NCShfbt 
plfbt1(i)=plfbt; 
el0fbt1(i)=el0fbt; 
qlfbt1(i)=qlfbt; 
c10fbt1(i)=cl0fbt; 
alfbt1(i)=alfbt; 
Wlfbtl(i)=Wlfbt; 
Ilfbt1{i)=Ilfbt; 
NCSlfbtl(i}=NCSlfbt; 
phfb1(i)=phfb; 
ehOfbl(i)=ehOfb; 
qhfbl(i)=qhfb; 
chOfbl(i)=chOfb; 
ahfbl(i)=ahfb; 
Lhfbl(i}=Lhfb; 
Whfbl(i)=Whfb; 
Ihfb1(i)=Ihfb; 
NCShfbl(i}=NCShfb; 
plfbl(i)=plfb; 
el0fb1(i)=el0fb; 
qlfbl(i)=qlfb; 
clOfbl(i}=clOfb; 
alfb1(i}=alfb; 
Llfbl(i)=Llfb; 
Wlfbl(i)=Wlfb; 
Ilfbl(i)=Ilfb; 
NCSlfbl(i}=NCSlfb; 
RClfbl(i)=RClfb; 
RChfbl(i)=RChfb; 
sl(i)=s; 
end 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
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%starting values for second best transfer regulation prices, efforts 
and investment {uses first best solutions) 
ffl=phfbt; 
ff2=plfbt; 
ff3=eh0fbt; 
ff4=e10fbt; 
%the starting value for investment is the low-beta firm's first best 
investment 
ff5=Ilfbt; 
%starting values for second best price regulation prices, efforts 
and investment (uses first best solutions) 
ff6=phfb; 
ff7=plfb; 
ff8=eh0fb; 
ff9=el0fb; 
%the starting value for investment is the low-beta firm's first best 
investment 
fflO=Ilfb; 
xtO [ffl ff2 f£3 f£4 ff5]; 
xpO = [ff6 f£7 f£8 ff9 fflO]; 
%to vary the values of \sigma from 36 to 40 
for i=l:lO, 
s(i)=(O.OS}+(i-1}/15; 
s=s(i); 
xt=fsolve('focsbtfr',xtO,options); 
%to print the values of the function 'focsbtfr' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q=focsbtfr(xt) 
%pause 
xtO = xt 
%to call up the values of the arguments in 'focsbtfr' 
pht=xt(l); 
plt=xt(2); 
eh0t=xt(3); 
e10t=xt(4); 
It=xt(5); 
qht; 
qlt; 
chOt; 
clOt; 
aht; 
alt; 
vlt; 
v2t; 
Wlt; 
Wht; 
Wt=(1-exp(-It))*Wlt + (exp(-It))*Wht; 
ｃｓｴ］ＨＱＭ･ｸｰＨＭｉｴＩＩＪＨｰｬｴｾＨｬＭｮＩＩＪＨａｏＪｮＩＯＨｮＭＱＩ＠ + Ｈ･ｸｰＨＭｉｴＩＩＪＨｰｨｴｾＨｬﾭ
n))*(AO*n)/(n-1); 
ｎｃｓｴ］ＨＱＭ･ｸｰＨＭｉｴＩＩＪＨＨＨｰｬｴｾＨｬＭｮＩＩＪＨａｏＪｮＩＯＨｮＭＱＩＩＭｰｬｴＪｱｬｴＩ＠ + (exp(-
It))*(((phtA(l-n))*(AO*n)/(n-1))-pht*qht); 
Ult=psi(ehOt)-psi(ehOt+b-B); 
xp=fsolve('focsbp',xpO,options); 
%to print the values of the function 'focsbtfr' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q:::focsbp(xp) 
%pause 
xpO = xp 
%to call up the values of the arguments in 'focsbtfr' 
ph=xp (1}; 
pl=xp (2) ; · 
ehO:::xp (3); 
el0=xp(4); 
Ip=xp ( 5); 
qh; 
ql; 
chO; 
clO; 
ah; 
al; 
Ll; 
Lh; 
Wl; 
Wh; 
W=(1-exp(-Ip))*Wl + (exp(-Ip}}*Wh; 
%RCl=((Wl£b-W)/Wlfb)*lOO; 
%RCh=((W-Whfb)/W)*100; 
%difference between second-best transfer and price regulation 
welfares 
RC=((Wt-W}/Wt}*100; 
v1p; 
v2p; 
CSp=(1-exp(-Ip))*(plA(1-n))*(A0*n)/(n-1) + (exp(-Ip))*(phA(1-
n)) * (AO*n} I (n-1); 
ｎｃｓｰ］ＨｬＭ･ｸｰＨＭｉｰＩＩＪＨＨＨｰｬｾＨＱＭｮＩＩＪＨａｏＪｮＩＯＨｮＭＱＩＩＭｰｬＪｱｬＩ＠ + (exp(-
Ip))*(((phA(l-n))*(AO*n)/(n-1))-ph*qh); 
Ulp=psi(ehO)-psi(ehO+b-B); 
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%to run the programme across all values of \sigma, from i=l to i=lO 
pht1(i)=pht; 
pltl(i)=plt; 
ehOtl(i)=ehOt; 
elOtl(i)=elOt; 
Itl(i)=It; 
qhtl(i)=qht; 
qltl(i)=qlt; 
chOtl(i)=chOt; 
clOtl(i)=clOt; 
ahtl(i)=aht; 
altl(i)=alt; 
Wltl(i)=Wlt; 
Whtl(i)=Wht; 
Wtl(i)=Wt; 
vltl(i)=vlt; 
v2t1(i)=v2t; 
CStl(i)=CSt; 
NCStl(i)=NCSt; 
Ultl(i)=Ult; 
sl(i)=s; 
Ll(i)=L; 
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%to run the programme across all values of \sigma, from i=l to i=lO 
phl(i)=ph; 
pll(i)=pl; 
ehOl(i)=ehO; 
elOl(i)=elO; 
Ipl(i)=Ip; 
qhl(i)=qh; 
qll(i)=ql; 
chOl(i)=chO; 
cl01(i)=cl0; 
ahl(i)=ah; 
all(i)=al; 
Lll(i)=Ll; 
Lhl(i)=Lh; 
vlpl(i)=vlp; 
v2p1(i)=v2p; 
Wll(i)=Wl; 
Whl(i)=Wh; 
Wl(i)=W; 
CSpl(i)=CSp; 
NCSpl(i)=NCSp; 
Ulpl(i)=Ulp 
RCl(i)=RC; 
sl(i)=s; 
Ll(i)=L; 
end 
figure 
plot(sl,Wlfbl, '*-', sl,Whfbl, 'x-', sl,Wlfbtl, '+-', sl,Whfbtl, 'o-•, 
sl,Wl, •--•, sl,Wtl, •square-') 
xlabel('Values of \sigma', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName•, 'Times') 
ylabel('Welfare•, 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text{0.015,12.75, 'W_lAfAb•, 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.6,11.6, Ｇｗｾｨａｦａ｢ＧＬ＠ 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.015,12.9, 'Wt_lAfAb', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName•, 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge•, 'FontSize',10, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.65,11.72, 'Wt_hAfAb', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.03,12.5, 'W', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.668,11.85, 'Wt', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',10, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(s1,Wlfb1, '*-', sl,Whfbl, 'x-', sl,Wlfbt1, '+-', s1,Whfbtl, 'o-') 
xlabel('Values of \sigma') 
ylabel('First-best Welfare') 
title('First-Best welfares under price and transfer regulation') 
legend('Wlfb1', 'Whfbl', 'Wlfbtl', 'Whfbtl') 
figure 
plot(sl,Wl, '*-' sl,Wtl, •x-') 
xlabel('Values of \sigma') 
ylabel('Second-best Welfare') 
title('Second-Best welfares under price and transfer regulation') 
1 egend ( ' Wl ' , ' Wt 1 ' ) 
figure 
plot(sl,RCl, '*-') 
xlabel('Values of \sigma•, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Relative change in welfare', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(38.5,0.65, 'RC', 'FontSize' ,15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(s1,Llfbl, '*-' 
sl,L1,'--') 
s1,Lhfbl, 'x-', s1,L11, '+-', s1,Lhl, 'o- · , 
xlabel('Values of \sigma', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel{'values of {first- and second-best) \mu and 
\lambda', 'Font-size' ,15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.67,0.132, 'L_lAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.6,0.07, 'L_hAfAb', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text{0.6,0.2, 'L_l', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text{0.67,0.17, 'L_h', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.6,0.325, 'L', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(sl,Ilfbl, '*-' s1,Ihfb1, 'x-', sl,Ilfbtl, '+-', sl,Ihfbtl, 'o-', 
sl,Ip1, •- - ', sl,Itl, 'square-') 
xlabel('Values of \sigma', 'FontSize' ,15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Investment', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
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text(0.68,0.52, 'I_lAfAb', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text ( 0. 65, 0. 46, • I_h"f"b', 'FontSize' ,12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.68,0.3, 'It_l"f"b', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName•, 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.6,0.2, 'It_hAf"b', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge•, 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.65,0.65, 'Ip', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.5,0.32, 'It', 'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lO, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(sl,Ipl, '+-', sl,Itl,'*-') 
xlabel('values of \sigma') 
ylabel('Second-best investment') 
title('Second-best investment under both regimes') 
legend('Ipl', 'Itl') 
figure 
plot(sl,alfbl, '*-', sl,ahfbl, 'x-', sl,alfbtl, '+-' 1 sl,ahfbtl, •o-', 
sl,all, '--', sl,ahl, 'v-', sl,altl, 'square-', sl,aht1 1 'diamond-') 
xlabel('Values of \sigma', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('First-best and Second-best access prices', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.6,32.5, 'a_l"f"b', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l5,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.66,34.5, 'a_h"f"b', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName'/ 'Times') 
text(0.68,37.6, 'at_l"f"b', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.68,39.5, 'at_hAf"b', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.5,33.8, 'a_l', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.61,35.2, 'a_h', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge•, 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.68,36.7, 'at_l', 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.66,38.2, 'at_h', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',12, 'FontName', 'Times') 
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figure 
plot(sl,all, '*-' sl,ahl, 'x-', sl,altl, '+-', sl,ahtl, 'o-') 
xlabel('values of B') 
ylabel('First-best access prices') 
title('First-best access prices under both regimes') 
legend('all', 'ahl', 'altl', 'ahtl') 
figure 
plot(sl,plfbl, '*-' sl,phfbl, 'x-', sl,plfbtl, '+-', sl,phfbtl, 'o-', 
sl,pll, '--', sl,phl, 'v-', sl,pltl, 'square-', sl,phtl, 'diamond-') 
xlabel('values of \sigma') 
ylabel('First-best and Second-best retail prices') 
title('First-best and Second-best retail prices') 
legend('plfbl', 'phfbl', 'plfbtl', 'phfbtl', 'pll', 'phl', 'pltl', 'phtl') 
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figure 
plot(sl,chOfbl, '*-', sl,clOfbl, 'x-', sl,chOfbtl, '+-', sl,clOfbtl, 'o-
', sl,clOl, '--', sl,chOl, 'v-', sl,chOtl, 'square-', 
sl,clOtl, 'diamond-') 
xlabel('values of \sigma') 
ylabel ( 'First-best and Second-best cost·s') 
title('First-best and Second-best costs') 
legend('chOfbl', 'clOfbl', 'chOfbtl', 'clOfbtl', 'ch01', 'cl01', 'chOtl',' 
clOtl') 
figure 
plot(sl,ehOfbl, '*-', sl,elOfbl, 'x-', sl,ehOfbtl, ' +-', sl,elOfbtl, 'o-
' ) 
xlabel('values of \sigma') 
ylabel('First-best efforts') 
title('First-best efforts under both regimes') 
legend(' ehOfbl', 'elOfbl', 'ehOfbtl', 'elOfbt.l') 
figure 
plot(sl,ehOtl, '+-', sl,elOtl, 'o-', sl,ehOl, '*-', sl,elOl, 'x-') 
xlabel('values of \sigma') 
ylabel('Second-best efforts') 
title('Second-best efforts under both regimes') 
legend('ehOtl', ' elOtl', ' ehOl', 'el01'} 
figure 
plot(sl,vltl, '*-', sl,v2tl,'x-', sl,vlpl,'+-', sl,v2pl,'o-') 
xlabel('values of B') 
ylabel('First-best access prices') 
title('First-best access prices under both regimes'} 
legend('vltl', 'v2tl', 'vlpl', 'v2pl') 
%focsbp.m 
%First-order under price regulation with asymmetric information. 
%03/04/02 
function q = focsbp(x} 
global AO g K s n b B c Ip L Ll Lh vlp v2p Al A2 ehO elO qh ql chO 
clO R ph pl ah al Wh Whl Wl Wll zeta LAG Pl Ph 
ph= x(l); 
pl = x(2); 
ehO = x(3); 
elO = x(4); 
Ip = x(5); 
%Demand equations for the high type and the low type of firm: 
constant elasticity n 
qh = AO * phA(-n); 
ql = AO * plA(-n); 
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%Lagrange multipiers solved from the Lerner indices for ph and pl 
Ll -((pl-(b-K*(IpAs)-elO)-c)/(pl*(l-(1)/(n))-(b-K*(IpAs)-elO)-c)); 
Lh = -((ph-(B-K*(IpAs)-eh0)-c)/(ph*(1-(1}/(n))-(B-K*(IpAs)-ep0)-c)); 
%Access prices for the high and the low type of firm 
ah (ph c); 
al = (pl- c); 
%Marginal costs for the high and the low type of firm 
chO = (B- K*(IpAs) - ehO); 
clO = (b- K*(IpAs) - elO); 
%welfares 
Wl = (plA(1-n))*(A0*n)/(n-1) - pl*ql + (pl-c)*ql- Ip- (b-K*(IpAs)-
elO)*ql- psi(elO); 
Wh = (phA(1-n))*(A0*n)/(n-1} - ph*qh + (ph-c}*qh- Ip- (B-K*(IpAs)-
ehO)*qh- psi(ehO); 
%profits 
Pl = (pl-c}*ql (b-K*(IpAs)-elO)*ql- Ip- psi(elO); 
Ph= (ph-c)*qh- Ip- (B-K*(IpAs)-ehO}*qh- psi(ehO); 
%probabilities 
vlp=(1-exp(-Ip}} 
v2p=exp(-Ip) 
%Lagrangian 
LAG=(1-exp(-Ip})*Wl + (1-exp(-Ip)}*(1+Ll}*(pl*ql-c*ql-(b-K*(IpAs)-
el0)*ql-Ip-psi(el0}-phi(el0)} + (exp(-Ip}}*Wh + (exp(-
Ip})*(l+Lh)*(ph*qh-c*qh-(B-K*(IpAs)-ehO}*qh-Ip-psi(ehO)); 
%The first-order conditions: 2 binding IR constraints {for prices), 
and 3 first order conditions (for efforts, and investment) 
q(1) = (ph-c)*qh- Ip- (B-K*(IpAs)-ehO}*qh- psi(ehO); 
q(2) = (pl-c)*ql - Ip- (b-K*(IpAs)-elO)*ql - psi(elO) -
rentp(ehO,b); 
q(3) = ehO- (gA(-l))*qh + ( gA(-1))*((1-exp(-Ip))/(exp(-
Ip)))*(Ll/(l+Lh))*(derivpsi(ehO)-derivpsi(ehO+b-B)); 
q(4) = elQ- (gA(-1))*ql; 
q(5) = {exp(-Ip))*surplus{pl/AO,n) + (exp(-Ip))*Ll*pl*ql- (exp(-
Ip))*(1+Ll)*(c*ql+(b-K*(IpAs)-elO)*ql+Ip+psi(elO)) - (exp(-
Ip))*Ll*phi(ehO) + ＨＱＭ･ｸｰＨＭｉｰＩＩＪＨＱＫｌｬＩＪＨｳＪｋＪｻｉｰａＨｳＭＱＩＩｾｱｬＭＱＩ＠ -
(exp(-Ip))*surplus(ph,AO,n) - (exp(-Ip))*Lh*ph*qh + (exp(-
Ip})*(1+Lh)*(c*qh+(B-K*(IpAs)-ehO)*qh+Ip+psi(ehO)) + (exp(-
ｉｰＩＩＪｻＱＫｌｨＩＪＨｳＪｋＪＨｉｰａＨｳｾｬＩＩＪｱｨＭＱＩ［＠
91 
92 
?%focsbtfr.m 
%First-order under transfer regulation with asymmetric information. 
%03/04/02 
function q = focsbtfr(x) 
global AO g It n b B L c K s ehOt elOt qht qlt chOt clOt pht plt aht 
alt L1 Wlt Wht Dl Dh v1t v2t 
q = zeros(5,1) 
pht = x(1); 
plt = x(2); 
ehOt = x(3); 
elOt = x(4); 
It= x(5); 
%Demand equations for the high type and the low type of firm: 
constant elasticity = n. No substitution 
qht AO * phtA(-n}; 
qlt = AO * pltA(-n}; 
%Access prices for teh high and the low type of firm 
aht = (pht- c); 
alt = (plt- c); 
%Marginal costs for the high and the low type of firm 
chOt = (B- K*(ItAs) ehOt); 
clOt= (b- K*(ItAs) - elOt); 
%welfares 
Wlt = surplus(plt,AO,n) + L*plt*qlt- (1+L)*((b-K*(ItAs)-el0t)*qlt + 
c*qlt +It+ psi(elOt)) - L*renttfr(elOt,b); 
Wht = surplus(pht,AO,n) + L*pht*qht- (l+L)*((B-K*(ItAs)-ehOt)*qht + 
c*qht +It+ psi(ehOt)) - L*renttfr(ehOt,B); 
%probabilities 
vlt=(l-exp(-It)) 
v2t=exp(-It) 
%The first-order conditions : 2 Lerner indices, and three first 
order conditions (for efforts and investment} 
q(l) (pht- (B- K*(ItAs) - ehOt) - c)/(pht) - L/((1+L)*n); 
q(2) = (plt- (b- K*(ItAs) - el0t) - c}/(plt) - L/((l+L)*n); 
q(3) = ehOt- (gA(-1))*qht + ( gA(-1})*((1-exp(- It}}/(exp(-
It)})*(L/(l+L))*(derivpsi(ehOt}-derivpsi(ehOt+b-B)); 
q(4) = el0t- (gA(-1))*qlt; 
q(5) = (exp(-It))*Wlt +(l-exp(-It}}*(1+L}*((s*K*(ItA(s-l))*qlt}-1) -
(exp(-It))*Wht + (exp(-It))*(1+L)*((s*K*(ItA(s-l))*qht)-1); 
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%18/07/01 
%phi, the mirnicing gain 
function f=phi(eO) 
global b B 
f=psi(eO)-psi(eO+b-B) 
.. 
"-
%The incumbent's isutility of effort function 
%13/07/01 
function f = psi(eO) 
global g 
f = (g/2)*((max(O,e0)}A2 
94 
%Information rent for efficient firm under price regulation 
%12/07/01 
function f = rentp(eO,beta) 
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global AO g n b B I K s c ehO elO qh ql chO clO R ph pl Lh Ll Ih Il 
ah al Lhfb phfb plfb ehOfb chOfb phOfbl 
f = (psi(eO)-psi(eO+beta-B)) 
%Rent for efficient firm under transfer regulation {\pi=t-
psi(e)=phi(e) check section 3.2 of chapter 3) 
%12/07/01 
function f=renttfr(eOt,beta) 
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global AO g nh nl b B c K I s ehOt elOt qht qlt chOt clOt R pht plt 
L aht alt phfbt plfbt ehOfbt chOfbt phfbt1 L1 
f=psi(eOt)-psi(eOt+beta-B) 
%Consumer surplus from consuming the fringe's service 
%3/2/01 
function f = surplus(p,A,n) 
global AO g nh nl b B c ehO elO qh ql chO clO R ph pl Lh Ll ah al 
Lfb pfb eOfb cOfb pfbl 
f = (pA(l-n))*(A*n)/(n-1) 
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Programmes: Chapter 4 
%solves for the regulator's optimal Bertrand coverage (the entrant 
chooses zero coverage if Bertrand competition prevails) varying the 
values of t 
%calculates the value of welfare with the regulator's and the 
entrant '.s choice of coverage 
%unit demands 
%21/07/01 (amended 11/10/01) 
global s t c g mRB mRBl mEM WB WM W Wl 
%baseline values for the parameters 
s=5; 
c=0.5; 
g=l; 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3}=1e-6; 
%starting value for the regulator's Bertrand coverage 
ff1=0.0015; 
xa0=[ff1]; 
%to vary the value of t from 0.95 to 1.95 
for i = 1:10, 
t(i)=0.95+(i-1)*0.1; 
t=t (i); 
xa=fsolve('coverage',xaO,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'coverage' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q=coverage(xa) 
pause 
xaO=xa; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'coverage' 
mRB=xa(l); 
ｗｂ］ＨｳＭ｣ＭＨｴＯＲＩＩＫＨｭｒｂＪＨｴＯＲｽＪＨＱＭＨＨＨｬＯＲＩＫＨｭｒｂＭＱｽＯＳＪｭｒｂＩａＲＫＨＱＭＨＨＱＯＲｽｾ＠
(mRB-1}/3*mRB))A2)))-((g*mRBA(2}}/2} i 
WM=(s-c-(t/2}); 
mEB=O; 
mEM=(s-c-t)/g; 
pEM=s-t; 
pEBR=(t/3)*((2+mRB}/mRB)+c; 
PM=(s-t-c)*mEM-(g*mEMA2)/2; 
PBR=(pEBR-c)*mRB-(g*mRBA2)/2; 
mubar=(2*t)/{s-c) 
if WB>=WM 
if 1>mRB & mRB>0.4 
mR=mRB 
else 
mR=O 
end 
else 
mR=O 
end 
if O<mEM & mEM <0.4 %& 
%if m2M<(2*t)/(s-c) 
%compare with 
%if 0<m2M<0.4 
mE=mEM 
else mE=0.4 
end 
%else mE=O 
% end 
& m2M<(2*t)/(s-c} 
%To run the programme across all values of t, from i 
mRBl(i)=mRB; 
WBl(i)=WB; 
WMl(i)=WM; 
mEBl(i)=mEB; 
mEMl(i)=mEM; 
pEMl(i)=pEM; 
pEBRl(i)=pEBR; 
PMl(i)=PM; 
PBRl(i)=PBR; 
mRl(i)=mR; 
mEl(i)=mE; 
mubarl(i)=mubar; 
tl(i)=t; 
end 
%figure 
%plot(tl,mE1, '*-', tl,mubarl, 'o-', tl,mEM1, 'square-') 
figure 
plot(tllmR1 1 '*-', t1 1mEl 1 'o-'} 
1 to i 
xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize' 115 1 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Values of \mu', 'FontSize',l5} 
set(gca, 'FontSize' 1151 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(l.S/0.35, '\mu_E', 'FontSize',201 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(1.510.59 1 '\mu_R', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName•, 'Times') 
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set ( gca, • YTickLabel' , [ 0, 0. 1, 0. 2 I 0. 3, 0. 4, 0. 5 1 0. 6 I 0. 7 I 0. 8] , 
• YLim • , [ 0 0 . 8] ) 
%set(gcf 1 'Position•, [420, 570, 590, 450]) 
%title('regulator and entrant optimal coverage') 
%legend( 'mRl', 'mEl') 
print -deps figureunitt.eps 
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%Solves for the regulator's optimal Bertrand coverage (the entrant 
chooses zero coverage if Bertrand competition prevails) varying the 
value of \gamma 
%calculates the value of welfare with the regualtor's and the 
entrant's choice of coverage 
%unit demands . 
%21/07/01 (amended 11/10/01) 
global s t c g mRB rnRB1 mEB mEM WB WM W W1 
%baseline values for the parameters 
s=5; 
c=0.5; 
t=1; 
options(1)=1; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting value for the regulator's choice of coverage 
ff1=0.0015; 
xa0=[ff1]; 
%to vary the value of \gamma from 1 to 20 
for i = 1:20; 
g(i}=1+(i-1) i 
g=g(i}; 
xa=fsolve('coverage',xaO,options}; 
%To print the value of the function 'coverage' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q=coverage(xa) 
pause 
xaO=xa; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in •coverage' 
mRB=xa(1}; 
WB=(s-c-(t/2)}+(mRB*(t/2)*(1-(((1/2}+(mRB-l)/3*mRB)A2+(1-((1/2}-
(mRB-l}/3*mRB))A2)))-((g*mRBA(2})/2}; 
WM=(s-c-(t/2)); 
mEB=O; 
mEM=(s-c-t)/g; 
pEM=s-t; 
pEBR=(t/3)*((2+mRB)/mRB)+c; 
PM=(s-t-c)*mEM-(g*mEMA2)/2; 
PBR=(pEBR-c)*mRB-(g*mRBA2)/2; 
if WB>=WM 
if 1>mRB>0.4 
mR=mRB 
else 
mR=O 
end 
else 
mR=O 
end 
if O<mEM 
if mEM<0.4 
mE=mEM 
else 
mE=0.4 
end 
end 
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%To run the programme across all values of \gamma, from i 
20 
1 to i :::: 
mRBl(i)=mRB; 
WBl(i)=WB; 
WMl(i)=WM; 
mEB1(i)=mEB; 
mEM1(i)=mEM; 
pEMl(i)=pEM; 
%pEBl(i)=pEB; 
PMl(i)=PM; 
PBRl(i)=PBR; 
mRl(i)=mR; 
mEl(i)=mE; 
gl{i)=g; 
end 
figure 
plot(gl,mRl, •*-•, gl,mEl, •o-•) 
xlabel(•values of \gamma•, •FontSize•,lsr •FontName•, •Times•) 
ylabel(•values of \mu•, •FontSize•,15) 
set(gcal •FontSize',15, •FontName', 'Times') 
text{14.510.3, '\mu_E', •FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.010.3, •\mu_R', •FontSize•,20, •FontName', •Times•) 
set ( gca, • YTickLabel• , [- 0 . 1, 0 1 0. 1, 0 . 2 , 0 . 3 , 0 . 4, 0 . 5 r 0 . 6] , 
• YLim • 1 [-0 . 1 , 0 . 6] ) 
%title(•Entrant and Regulator choice of coverage {unit demands)') 
%legend( •mRl', 'mEl•} 
print -deps figureunitg.eps 
%Uses 'bprices211' to solve for the incumbent's and entrant's 
Bertrand prices and sets the equation for -(Bertrand welfare) 
%elastic demands 
%21/09101 
function f=welfare(mBR) 
global AO t s ni nE c g a piB pEB qiB qEB aiB aEB mbar nE1 
mbar=mBR; 
options(1)=1; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%statring values for the two Bertrand prices 
ff1::;2; 
ff2=1.5; 
xa = [ff1,ff2]; 
xa=fsolve('bprices211',xa,options}; 
%To print the value of the function 'bprices211' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q=bprices211(xa) 
%pause 
%xaO=xa; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'bprices211' 
piB=xa(1); 
pEB=xa(2); 
qiB AO * piB"(-ni}; 
qEB = AO * pEB"(-nE); 
aiB = 1-mBR*((1/2}-((piB"(-(ni-1)))/(ni-1}-(pEB"(-(nE-1})}1(nE-
1}) /2*t} i 
｡ｾｂ＠ = mBR*((112)-((piB"(-(ni-1)))1(ni-1)-(pEB"(-(nE-1)}}1(nE-
1}) 12*t}; 
a = (1/2} + ( (piB"-(- (ni-l)}} I (ni-l}- (pEB" (- (nE-1})) I (nE-1}) 12*t; 
%-(Bertrand welfare) 
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f = -aiB*(piB"(-(ni-1)})/(ni-1} - aiB*(piB-c)*qiB- aEB*(pEB"{-{nE-
1)}}/(nE-1} - aEB*(pEB-c}*qEB + (t/2)*((1-mBR)+mBR*((a"2)+(1-a)"2)) 
+ (g*mBR"2)/2 
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%Uses 'bprices211' to solve for the incumbent's and entrant's 
Bertrand prices and sets the equation for -(entrant's profit net of 
investment) 
%elastic demands 
function f = profit(mEB) 
global AO t s ni nE c g a M piB pEB qiB qEB aiB aEB piL pEL qiL 'qEL 
piM pEM qiM qEM mbar nEl a 
mbar=mEB; 
options(l}=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for the incumbent's and the entrant's Bertrand 
prices 
ff1=2; 
ff2=1.5; 
xa = [ffl,f£2]; 
xa=fsolve('bprices211',xa,options}; 
%To print the value of the function 'bprices211' and check each 
argument is close ·to zero 
q=bprices211(xa) 
%pause 
%xa0=xa; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'bprices211' 
piB=xa(l); 
pEB=xa (2); 
qiB = AO * piBA(-ni); 
qEB = AO * pEBA(-nE); 
aiB = 1-mEB*((1/2)-((piBA(-(ni-1}}}/(ni-1)-(pEBA(-(nE-1)}}/(nE-
1)) /2*t) i 
aEB = mEB*((l/2)-((piBA(-(ni-1)))/(ni-1)-(pEBA(-(nE-1)})/(nE-
1)) /2*t) i 
a 1/2+((piBA(-(ni-1)))/(ni-1)-(pEBA(-(nE-1)))/(nE-1))/2*t; 
M = ((piBA-(ni-1))/(ni-1))-((pEBA-(nE-1))/(nE-1)) 
%-(entrant's profit net of investment) 
f = -((pEB-c)*mEB*(l-a)*qEB) + (g*mEBA2)/2 
104 
%minimizes •profitll' and ｾｷ･ｬｦ｡ｲ･Ｇ＠ with respect to \mu and solves 
for the entrant's and the regulator's choice of Bertrand coverage 
%elastic demands 
%21/09/01 
global AO a t s ni nE c g M piB pEB qiB qEB aiB aEB piL pEL qiL qEL 
piM pEM qiM qEM piBM qiBM piBMl ME MEl ME2 ME3 MEll ME21 ME31 mbar 
nEl 
%baseline values for the parameters 
A0=3.5; 
ni=l.5; 
nE=1.5; 
c=0.5; 
t::::l; 
%g=1; 
%to vary the value of \gamma from 1 to 20 
for i=1:20, 
g(i)=l+(i-1) i 
g=g(i); 
%starting value for the entrant's choice of Bertrand coverage 
mEB = 0.5; 
mEB fminu( 'profitll' ,mEB) 
%To run the programme across all values of \gamma, from i 
20 
mEBl(i)=mEB; 
qiBl(i)=qiB; 
qEBl(i)=qEB; 
al(i)=a; 
%starting value for the regulator's Bertrand coverage 
mRB 0.5; 
mRB = fminu( •welfare' ,mRB} 
1 to i 
%entrant's profit net of investment costs under Bertrand competition 
with the regulator's choice of coverage 
pro=((pEB-c}*mRB*(l-a)*qEB) - (g*mRBA2)/2 
%To run the programme across all values of \gamma, from i 
20 
piBl(i)=piB; 
pEBl(i)=pEB; 
qiBl(i)=qiB; 
qEBl(i)=qEB; 
%aiBl(i)=aiB; 
%aEBl(i}=aEB; 
mRBl(i)=mRB; 
1 to i 
Ml{i)=M; 
prol(i)=pro; 
a2(i)=a; 
gl(i)=g; 
end 
%figure 
%plot(gl,a1, '*-' gl,a2, 'o-') 
figure 
plot(gl,mEBl, 'o-', gl,mRBl, '*-') 
xlabel('Values of \gamma', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Values of \mu', 'FontSize',15} 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(15,0.11, '\mu_R', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(15,0.135, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.25, '\mu_E', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(3.0,0.27, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
%ylabel('\mu') 
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%title('Entrant and regulator choice of coverage (elastic demands)') 
%legend('mBl', 'mRB') 
figure 
plot(gl,al, 'o-', gl,a2, '*-') 
xlabel('Values of \it \gamma' 1 'FontSize' 1 15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Values of \alpha', 'FontSize',l5) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.2, '\alpha_R', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.215, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.6,0.25, '\alpha_E', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName'/ 'Times') 
text(2.6,0.265, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(gl,Ml, '*-') 
xlabel('values of \gamma') 
ylabel('values of \mu hat') 
legend('\mu hat') 
%print -deps figureelasg 
I 
. i 
I 
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%minimizes 'profitll' and 'welfare' with respect to \mu and solves 
for the entrant's and the regulator's choice of Bertrand coverage 
%elastic demands 
global AO a t s ni nE c g M piB pEB qiB qEB aiB aEB piL pEL qiL qEL 
piM pEM qiM qEM piBM qiBM piBMl ME MEl ME2 ME3 MEll ME21 ME31 mbar 
nEl 
%baseline values for the parameters 
A0=3.5; 
ni=1.5; 
%nE=1.35; 
%c=2.5; 
c=O.S; 
t=l; 
g=l; 
%to vary the value of nE from 1.37 to 1.55 
for i=1:13, 
nE(i)=(1.37)+(i-1}*(0.015}; 
nE=nE(i); 
%starting value for the entrant's Bertrand coverage 
mEB - 0.5; 
mEB = fminu('profitll',mEB} 
%pause 
%starting value for the regulator's Bertrand coverage 
mRB = 0.5; 
mRB = fminu( 'welfare' ,mRB} 
%pause 
%entrant's profit net of investment costs with the regulator's 
choice of coverage 
pro=((pEB-c)*mRB*(l-a)*qEB) - (g*mRBA2)/2 
%reletive difference between the entrant's and the regulator's 
choice of coverage 
diff=((mEB-mRB)/mRB)*lOO 
%to run the programme across all the values of nE from i=1 to i=13 
mEBl(i)=mEB; 
piBl(i)=piB; 
pEBl(i)=pEB; 
qiBl(i)=qiB; 
qEBl ( i) =qEB; 
aiBl(i)=aiB; 
aEBl(i)=aEB; 
mRBl(i)=mRB; 
ｰｲｯｬＨｩＩｾｰｲｯ［＠
al(i)=a; 
diffl(i)=diff; 
Ml(i)=M 
nEl(i)=nE; 
end 
figure 
plot(nEl,mEBl, 'o-', nEl,mRBl, '*-') 
xlabel('Values of \eta2', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Values of \mu', 'FontSize',l5) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.4,0.3, Ｇ｜ｲｮｵ｟ｾﾷＬ＠ 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l.4,0.319, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.45,0.44, '\mu_E', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l.45,0.454, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%title{'Entrant and regulator choice of coverage') 
%legend('mBl', 'mRB') 
print -deps figureelasnE 
figure 
plot(nEl,diffl) 
xlabel('Values of \eta2', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Proportionate difference(%), \it 
D', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName•, 'Times') 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%figure 
%plot(nEl,al, 'o-', nEl,a2, '*-') 
%xlabel('Values of \eta2', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%ylabel('\alpha', 'FontSize',15) 
%set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(l.2,0.15, '\alpha_R', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(l.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text{l.6,0.21, '\alpha*', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(l.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(nEl,Ml, '*-') 
xlabel('values of \gamma') 
ylabel('values of \mu hat') 
legend('\mu hat'} 
%print -deps figurediff 
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%minimizes 'profit11' and 'welfare' with respect to \mu and solves 
for the entrant's and the regulator's choice of Bertrand coverage 
%elastic demands 
%21/09/01 
global AO a t s ni nE c g piB pEB qiB qEB aiB aEB piL pEL qiL qEL 
piM pEM qiM qEM piBM qiBM piBMl ME MEl ME2 ME3 MEll ME21 ME31 mbar 
nEl 
%baseline values for the parameters 
A0=3.5; 
ni=1.5; 
nE=l.S; 
c=0.5; 
g=1; 
%A0=3.5; 
%ni=1.5; 
%nE=1.5; 
%c=0.5; 
%t=1; 
%g=l; 
%to vary the value of t from 0.95 to 1.95 
for i = 1:10, 
t(i)=0.95+(i-1}*0.1; 
t=t (i) i 
%starting value for the entrant's Bertrand coverage 
mEB 0.5; 
mEB = fminu('profitll',mEB) 
%To run the programme across all values of t, from i = 1 to i 10 
mEBl(i)=mEB; 
al(i)=a; 
piBl(i)=piB; 
pEB1(i)=pEB; 
%starting value for the regulator's Bertrand coverage 
mRB = 0.5; 
mRB fminu( 'welfare' ,mRB) 
%entrant's profit net of investment costs under Bertrand competition 
with the regulator's choice of coverage 
pro=((pEB-c)*mRB*(1-a)*qEB) - (g*mRBA2)/2 
%To run the programme across all values of t, from i = 1 to i 10 
piB2(i)=piB; 
pEB2(i)=pEB; 
qiBl(i)=qiB; 
q:EBl(i)=qEB; 
aiBl(i)=aiB; 
aEBl(i)=aEB; 
mRBl(i)=mRB; 
prol(i)=pro; 
a2(i)=a; 
tl(i)=t; 
end 
figure 
plot (tl f al 1 I O- I 1 tl I a2 I I*- I) 
xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Values of \alpha', 'FontSize',l5) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l.2,0.1, '\alpha_R', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.12, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.6,0.21, '\alpha_E', 'Fontsize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
print -deps figurealphat 
figure 
plot(tl,piBl, '*-', tl,piB2, 'o-', tl,pEBl, 'square-', tl,pEB2, '--'} 
figure 
plot(tl,mEBl, 'o-', tl,mRBl, '*-') 
xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Values of \mu', 'FontSize',l5} 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.17, '\mu_R', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.19, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.6,0.293, '\mu_E', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l.6,0.311, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%title('Entrant and regulator choice of coverage') 
%legend( 'mBl', 'mRB') 
print -deps figureelast 
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Programmes: Chapter 5 
%minimizes •profittest' and 'welfaretest' with respect to \mu and 
solves for the entrant's and the regulator's choice of Bertrand 
coverage 
%elastic demands 
%14/06/02 
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global AO a t n1 n2 C cT g s1B s2B p1B p2B q1B q2B aB P1B P2B m abar 
A B R D W proE PROE 
A0=35; 
n1=1.3; 
n2=1.3; 
C===10; 
cT=5; 
t=1; 
g=l; 
%to vary the value of t from 0.95 to 1.95 
for i = 1:401 
m(i)=0.1+(i-1)/45; 
m=m(i); 
%starting value for the entrant's Bertrand coverage 
aEB = 40; 
aEB = fminu('access'laEB) 
%welfare 
WE=(1-m*(1-a))*((p1BA(-(n1-1)))/(nl-1)) + (1-m*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B + 
m*(1-a)*({p2BA(-(n2-1)))/{n2-1}) + m*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B- (t/2)*((1-
m)+m*((aA2)+(1-a)A2)) - (g*mA2)/2; 
%profits 
proBE=(m*(1-a}*(p2B-C)*q2B) + (1-m*(1-a))*m*(l-a}*(aEB-cT}*(qlB-q2B} 
- (g*mA2)/2; 
PROBE=((1-m*(1-a}}*(plB-C}*qlB) + (1-m*(l-a)}*m*(l-a)*(aEB-cT}*(q2B-
q1B}; 
TproBE=((l-m*(1-a}}*(plB-C}*q1B} + (m*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) -
(g*mA2)/2; 
%consumer surplus 
CSBE=(1-m*(1-a)}*((p1BA{-{n1-1)))/{nl-1)) + m*(1-a)*((p2BA(-{n2-
1 ) } } I { n2 -1 ) ) ; 
NCSBE:::(1-m*(1-a)}*((p1BA(-{nl-1})}1(nl-1)) + m*(l-a}*{{p2BA(-(n2-
1))) I (n2-1)) - (tl2) * ((1-m) +m* ( (aA2) + (1-a) A2)); 
% 
pM=(CI(1-(11nl))); 
qM = AO * pMA(-nl}; 
% 
WM=((pMA(-(nl-l}})l(nl-1)} + (pM-C)*qM- {tl2); 
% 
ｃｓｍ］ＨＨｰＱｂｾＨＭＨｮＱＭＱＩＩＩＯＨｮＱＭＱＩＩ［＠
NCSM= ( (p1B"' (- (n1-1))) I (n1-1)} - ( t/2); 
% 
PROM=(pM-C)*qM; 
%To run the programme across all values of t, from i 
a1(i)=a; 
p1B1(i)=p1B; 
p2Bl(i)=p2B; 
q1B1(i)=q1B; 
q2B1(i)=q2B; 
aEB1(i)=aEB; 
proBE1(i)=proBE; 
PROBE1(i)=PROBE; 
TproBEl(i)=TproBE; 
CSBE1(i)=CSBE; 
NCSBE1(i)=NCSBE; 
WE1(i)=WE; 
s1B1(i)=s1B; 
s2B1(i)=s2B; 
m1(i)=m; 
%starting value for the regulator's Bertrand coverage 
aRB = 20; 
aRB fminu('accessR',aRB) 
%welfare 
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1 to i 10 
WR=(1-m*(1-a))*((p1B"'(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1)) + (1-m*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B + 
m*{1-a)*((p2B"'(-(n2-1))}/(n2-1)) + m*(1-a)*{p2B-C)*q2B- (t/2)*((1-
m)+m*((a"'2)+(1-a)"'2)) - (g*m"'2)/2; 
%profits 
proBR=(m*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) + (1-m*(1-a))*m*(1-a)*(aRB-cT)*(q1B-q2B) 
- {g*m"'2)/2; 
PROBR=((1-m*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B) + (1-m*(1-a))*m*(1-a)*(aRB-cT)*(q2B-
q1B); 
TproBR=((1-m*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B) + (m*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) -
(g*m"'2)/2; 
%consumer surplus 
CSBR=(1-m*(1-a))*((p1B"'(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1)) + m*(1-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-
1 ) ) ) I ( n2 -1 ) ) ; 
NCSBR=(1-m*(1-a))*((p1B"'(-(n1-1))}/(n1-1)) + m*(1-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-
1)})/(n2-1)) - ＨｴＯＲＩＪＨＨＱＭｭＩＫｭＪＨＨ｡ａＲＩＫＨＱＭ｡ＩｾＲＩＩ［＠
%To run the programme across all values of t, from i 
p1B2(i):;;p1B; 
ｰＲｂＲＨｩＩ］ｰｾｂ［＠
q1B2(i)=qlB; 
q2B2(i)=q2B; 
aRBl(i)=aRB; 
proBRl(i)=proBR 
PROBR1(i)=PROBR; 
TproBRl(i)=TproBR; 
1 to i 10 
CSBRl(i)=CSBR; 
NCSBRl(i)=NCSBR; 
WRl(i)=WR; 
a2(i)=a; 
s1B2(i)=s1B; 
s2B2(i)=s2B; 
WMl(i)=WM; 
pMl(i)=pM; 
qMl(i)=qM; 
CSMl(i)=CSM; 
NCSMl(i)=NCSM; 
PROMl(i)=PROM; 
ml(i)=m; 
end 
figure 
plot(ml,aEBl, '*-', ml,aRBl, '+-') 
xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
ylabel('access prices', 'FontSize',15) 
%set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.2,0.15, '\alpha_R', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text{1.6,0.21r '\alpha*'r 'FontSize',20 1 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(l.6,0.23r '\wedge', 'FontSize' r17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
legend('aEBl', 'aRBl') 
%figure 
%plot(tlrmEB1, '*-' tl,mRBlr 'x-') 
%print -deps figurealphat 
%figure 
%plot(tlrs1El, '*-' tl,s1R1 1 'x-', tl,s2E1 1 '+-', Tl,s2Rl, 'o-') 
%print -deps figurealphat 
%figure 
%plot(tl,proR1, 'o-', tl,proEl, '*-') 
%xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize',15 1 'FontName', 'Times') 
%ylabel('entrant profits', 'FontSize'r15) 
%set{gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text ( 1. 2, 0 .15, '\alpha_R', 'FontSize' ,20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text{l.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.6,0.21, '\alpha*', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%legend { 'proRl' , 'proEl' ) 
%figure 
%plot(t1,q1B1, '*-' tl,q2B1, 'X-' 1 tl,q1B2, '+-' 1 tl,q2B2, 'o-') 
%legend('q1Bl', 'q2Bl', 'q1B2', 'q2B2') 
%figure 
%plot(tl,s1Bl, '*-' tl,s2Bl, 'x-' r tl,s1B2, '+-'I tl,s2B2, , __ ,) 
%xlabel('values oft') 
%ylabel('Bertrand market shares') 
%title{'Bertrand market shares') 
%legend('s1Bl', 's2Bl', 's1B2', 's2B2') 
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%figure 
%p 1 o t ( t 1 , p 1B 1, ' * - ' , t 1, p2B 1, ' x- ' ) 
%xlabel{'values oft') 
%ylabel('Bertrand prices') 
%title{'Bertrand prices') 
%legend ( 'plBl' , 'p2B1' ) 
%figure 
%plot(tl,proBEl, '*-', tl,proBR1, 'o-', 
t1,PROBR1, 'square-', tl,TproBE1, '+-', 
%xlabel('values oft') 
%ylabel{'profits') 
%title{ 'profits') 
tl, FROBEl, 'x-', 
tl,TproBR1, '--') 
%legend('proBE1', 'proBR1', 'FROBEl', 'PROBR', 'TproBEl', 'TproBRl') 
%figure 
%plot(tl,WE1, '*-', tl,WR1, '+-', tl,proBEl, '--', t1,proBR1, 'x-') 
%xlabel('values oft') 
%ylabel('welfare and entrant profit') 
%title('objective functions') 
%legend('WE1', 'WRl', 'proBE1', 'proBRl') 
%figure 
%plot(tl,CSBE1, '*-', tl,CSBRl, '+-') 
%xlabel('values oft') 
%ylabel('consumer surplus') 
%title('consumer surplus') 
%legend('CSBE1', 'CSBRl') 
: %%print -deps figureelast 
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%Uses 'Bpricesl' to solve for the incumbent's and entrant's Bertrand 
prices and sets the equation for -(Bertrand welfare) 
%elastic demands 
%14/06/02 
function f=welfare(mRB) 
global AO t nl n2 C cT g a slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B alB a2B mbar PllB 
P12B P21B P22B A B R D 
mbar=mRB; 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%statring values for the two Bertrand prices 
ff1=1.9; 
ff2=2; 
ff3=20; 
va = [ff1,ff2,ff3]; 
ｶ｡］ｦｳｯｬｶ･ＨＧａｰｲｩ｣･ｳ•ｾｶ｡ＯｯｰｴｩｯｮｳＩ［＠
%To print the value of the function 'bprices211' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
y = Aprices(va) 
%pause 
vaO=va; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'bprices211' 
P1B=va(1); 
P2B=va(2); 
aB=va(3); 
q1B = AO * plBA(-nl); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
%-(Bertrand welfare) 
f = -(1-mRB*(l-a))*((plBA(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1)) - (1-mRB*(1-a))*(plB-
C)*q1B- mRB*(1-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-1)))/(n2-1)) - mRB*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B 
+ {t/2)*((1-mRB)+mRB*((aA2)+(1-a)A2)) + (g*mRBA2)/2 
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%Uses 'Bpricesl' to solve for the incumbent's and entrant's Bertrand 
prices and sets the equation for -(entrant's profit net of 
investment) 
%elastic demands 
%14/06/02 
function f = profit(mEB) 
global AO t nl n2 g C cT a al slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B aB PlB P2B 
rnbar a A B R D 
rnbar=mEB; 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for the incumbent's and the entrant's Bertrand 
prices 
ff1=0.2; 
ff2=0.2; 
ff3=20; 
va = [ffl,ff2,ff3]; 
va=fsolve('Aprices',va,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'bprices211' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
y = Aprices(va) 
%pause 
vaO=va; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'bprices211' 
PlB=va(l); 
P2B=va(2); 
aB=va (3); 
qlB = AO * plBA( - nl); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
%-(entrant's profit net of investment} 
f = -(mEB*(1-a)*{p2B-C)*q2B) - (1-mEB*(1-a))*mEB*(1 - a)*(aB-cT)*(q1B-
q2B) + (g*mEBA2)/2 
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%Uses 'Bpricesl' to solve for the incumbent's and entrant's Bertrand 
prices and sets the equation for -(entrant's profit net of 
investment) 
%elastic demands 
%14/06/02 
function f = profitR(mEB) 
global AO t nl n2 g C cT a al slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B aB PlB P2B 
mbar a · A B R D 
mbar=mEB; 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for the incumbent's and the entrant's Bertrand 
prices 
ff1=0.2; 
ff2=0.2; 
f£3=20; 
va = [ffl,ff2,ff3]; 
va=fsolve('ApricesR',va,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'bprices211' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
y = ApricesR(va) 
%pause 
vaO=va; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'bprices211' 
PlB=va(l); 
P2B=va(2); 
aB=va(3); 
qlB = AO * plBA(-nl); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
%-(entrant's profit net of investment) 
f = -(mEB*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) - (l-mEB*(l-a))*mEB*(1-a)*(aB-cT)*(qlB-
q2B) + (g*mEBA2)/2 
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%Uses 'Bprices1' to solve for the incumbent's and entrant's Bertrand 
prices and sets the equation for -(Bertrand welfare) 
%elastic demands 
%14/06/02 
function f=welfareR(mRB) 
global AO t nl n2 C cT g a slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B alB a2B mbar P11B 
P12B P21B P22B A B R D 
mbar=mRB; 
options(1)=1; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options{3)=1e-6; 
%statring values for the two Bertrand prices 
f£1=1.9; 
f£2=2; 
f£3=20; 
va = [ff1,ff2,ff3]; 
va=fsolve('ApricesR',va,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'bprices211' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
y = ApricesR{va) 
%pause 
vaO=va; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'bprices211' 
P1B=va{1); 
P2B=va(2); 
aB=va (3) ; 
q1B = AO * p1BA(-n1); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
%-{Bertrand welfare) 
f = -(1-mRB*(l-a))*((p1BA(-(n1-1)))/(nl-1)) - (1-mRB*(l-a))*(p1B-
C)*q1B- mRB*(1-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-1)))/(n2-l)} - mRB*(1-a)*(p2B-C}*q2B 
+ (t/2)*((1-mRB)+mRB*((aA2)+{1-a)A2)) + {g*mRBA2)/2 
%Uses 'Apricestestl' and solves for the incumbent's and entrant's 
Bertrand prices 
%Also checks the condition that sustains Bertrand competition 
%unregulated reciprocal access price 
%elastic demands 
%01/07/02 
global AO t s nl n2 C cT a al g slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B PlB P2B m 
plBD plM p2M qlM q2M alM a2M Ml M2 W 
%baseline values for the parameters 
A0:=35; 
n1=1.3; 
n2;::1.3; 
C=lO; 
cT=5; 
t=1.15; 
g=l; 
options(l)=l; 
options(2);::1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for PlB, P2B aB (the unregulated access price) 
ff1=0.5; 
ff2=0.2; 
f£3=30; 
va = [ffl,ff2,ff3]; 
%to vary the value of mB from 0.1 to 1 
for i=1:60, 
m(i)=O.l+(i-1)/67; 
m=m (i) 
va=fsolve('Apricestestl',va,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'Apricestestl' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
y=Apricestestl(va) 
%pause 
vaO=va; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'Apricestestl' 
PlB=va(l); 
P2B=va(2); 
aB=va (3) ; 
qlB = AO * plBA(-nl); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
a; 
slB; 
s2B; 
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%If Ml is positive then \alfa is positive and thus Bertrand 
competition always prevails 
M1 = ＨｻｰＱｂｾＨＭＨｮＱＭＱＩＩＩＯｻｮＱＭＱＩＩＭＨｻｰＲｂｾｻＭＨｮＲＭＱＩＩＩＯＨｮＲ Ｍ ＱＩＩＫｴ［＠
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%welfare with unregulated access 
ｗ］ＨｬＭｭＪＨＱＭ｡ｽＩＪＨＨｰＱｂｾＨＭＨｮＱＭＱＩＩＩＯＨｮｬＭＱＩＩ＠ + (1-m*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B + 
m*(l-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-1)))/(n2-l)) + m*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B- (t/2)*((1-
ｭＩＫｭＪＨＨ｡ｾＲＩＫＨＱＭ｡ＩａＲＩＩ＠ - (g*mA2)/2; 
%welfare post-investment with unregulated access 
WPI=(l-m*(1-a))*((p1BA(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1)) + (1-m*(l-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B + 
m*(1-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-1)))/(n2-1}) + m*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B- (t/2)*((1-
m)+m*((aA2}+(1-a)A2)); 
%entrant 1 S profits net of investment costs 
proBN=(m*(l-a}*(p2B-C)*q2B) + (1-m*(1-a))*m*(1-a)*(aB-cT)*(q1B-q2B) 
- ＨｧＪｭｾＲＩＯＲ［＠
%entrant 1 s profits 
ｰｲｯｂ］ＨｭＪＨＱＭ｡ＩｾＨｰＲｂＭｃＩＪｱＲｂＩ＠ + (1-m*(1-a))*m*(1-a)*(aB-cT)*(q1B-q2B); 
%incumbent 1 s profits 
PROB=((l-m*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B) + (1-m*(l-a))*m*(l-a)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-
qlB) ; 
%total profits net of investment costs 
TproBN=((1-m*(l-a))*(plB-C)*q1B) + (m*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) -
ＨｧＪｭｾＲＩＯＲ［＠
%total profits 
TproB=((l-m*(l-a))*(p1B-C)*qlB) + (m*(l-a)*(p2B-C}*q2B); 
% 
FR1=(1-m*(1-a))*TproBN; 
FR2=m*(l-a)*TproB; 
%access revenues 
AR1=(1-m*(l-a})*m*(1-a)*(aB-cT)*(q1B-q2B); 
AR2=(1-m*(l-a))*m*(1-a)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-q1B); 
%retail revenues 
RR1=(1-m*(l-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B; 
RR2=m*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B; 
%consumer surplus 
ｃｓｂ］ＨＱＭｭＪＨＱＭ｡ＩＩＪＨＨｰＱｂｾＨＭＨｮｬＭＱＩＩＩＯＨｮｬＭＱＩＩ＠ + m*(l-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-
1 ) } ) I ( n2 -1 ) ) ; 
%consumer surplus net of transport costs 
NCSB=(l-m*(l-a))*((plBA(-(nl-1)))/(nl-1)) + m*(l-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-
1)}}/(n2-1))- ＨｴＯＲＩＪＨＨＱＭｭＩＫｭＪＨＨ｡ｾＲＩＫＨＱＭ｡ＩａＲＩＩ［＠
%To run the programme across all values of mB, from i = 1 to i 67 
plBl(i) = plB; 
p2B1(i) p2B; 
PlBl(i) = PlB; 
P2Bl(i) ::: P2B; 
aBl(i) = aB; 
q1B1(i) = qlB; 
q2Bl(i) = q2B; 
al(i) = a; 
slBl(i)=slB; 
s2Bl(i}=s2B; 
Mll(i) ::: M1; 
Wl(i)=W; 
WPil(i)=WPI; 
proBNl(i)=proBN; 
proBl(i)=proB; 
PROBl(i)=PROB; 
TproBl(i)=TproB; 
TproBNl(i)=TproBN; 
CSBl(i)=CSB; 
NCSBl(i)=NCSB; 
FRll(i)=FRl; 
FR2l{i)=FR2; 
ARll(i)=ARl; 
AR21(i)=AR2; 
RRll(i)=RRl; 
RR2l(i)=RR2; 
ml{i) = m; 
end 
figure 
plot(ml,slBl, '*-', ml,s2Bl, 'x-') 
xlabel('coverage') 
ylabel('Bertrand market shares'} 
title('Bertrand market shares') 
legend('slBl', 's2Bl') 
figure 
plOt (ml t plBl t 1 *- 1 t ffil t p2Bl t 1 X- 1 ) 
xlabel('coverage') 
ylabel('Bertrand prices') 
title('Bertrand prices') 
legend ( 'plBl' , 'p2Bl ' ) 
figure 
·plot(ml,aBl, '*-') 
xlabel('Values of \mu', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel( 1 The Access Pricer, 'FontSize',l5) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, ,FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.67,90, 'aAB', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l.2,0.17, '\wedger, 1 FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
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plot (ml, proBl, ' *- ' , ml, proBNl, 'o- ' , ml, PROBl, 'x- ' , ml, TproBl, ' +- ' , 
ml, TproBNl, '--') 
xlabel('coverage') 
ylabel{'profits') 
title( 'profits') 
legend{'proBl', 'proBNl', 'PROBl', 'TproBl', 'TproBNl') 
figure 
plot(ml,proBl, '*-'I ml,FRll, 'o-'/ ml,PROBl, 1 X-' f ml,FR21, '+-') 
xlabel('coverage') 
ylabel('profits') 
title('profits') 
legend('proBl', 1 FR11', 'PROBl', 'FR21') 
figure 
plot (ml, Wl, ' *- ' , ml 1 proBl 1 ' -- ' ) 
xlabel{'coverage') 
ylabel('welfare and ･ｮｴｾ｡ｮｴ＠ profit') 
title('objective functions') 
legend { 'WBl ' 1 'proBl' ) 
figure 
plot{m1 1 CSB1, '*-') 
xlabel('coverage') 
ylabel('consumer surplus') 
title{'consumer surplus') 
legend ( 'CSBl' ) 
figure 
plot(m1 1 M11 1 '*-') 
xlabel ( 'values of \mu' ) 
ylabel('conditions'} 
legend ( 1 Mll 1 ) 
121 
%Uses 'Apricestestl' and solves for the incwnbent and entrant 
Bertrand prices (regulated access) 
%Also checks the condition that sustains Bertrand competition 
%elastic demands 
%01/07/02 
122 
global AO t s nl n2 C cT a al g slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B alB a2B PllB 
P12B P21B P22B m plBD plM p2M qlM q2M alM a2M Ml M2 W 
%baseline values for the parameters 
A0=35 ;. 
n1=1.3; 
n2=1.3; 
C=lO; 
cT=S; 
t=1.5; 
g=l; 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for PlB, P2B and aB (the regulated access price) 
ff1=0.5; 
ff2=0.2; 
ff3=16; 
va = [ff1,ff2,ff3]; 
%to vary the value of mB from 0.1 to 1 
for i=1:60, 
m(i)=O.l+(i-1)/67; 
m=m(i) 
va=fsolve('ApricestestlR'/va/options); 
%To print the value of the function ' ApricestestlR' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
y=ApricestestlR(va) 
%pause 
vaO=va; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'ApricestestRl' 
PlB=va(l); 
P2B=va(2); 
aB=va(3); 
qlB = AO * plBA(-nl); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
;;:t; 
s1B; 
s2B; 
%If Ml is positive then \alfa is positive and thus Bertrand 
competition always prevails 
Ml = ((plBA(-(nl-1)})/(nl-1))-((p2BA(-(n2-1))}/(n2-1})+t; 
123 
%price and quantity with a single firm monopolizing the whole market 
pM = C/(1-(1/n1)); 
qM = AO * pMA(-n1); 
%profit with a single firm monopolizing the whole market 
proM=(pM-C)*qM; 
%welfare with regulated access 
W=(1-m*(1-a))*((p1BA(-(nl-1)}}/(n1-1)) + (1-m*(1-a})*(p1B-C)*q1B + 
m*{1-a}*({p2BA(-(n2-1)}}/(n2-1)) + m*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B- (t/2)*((1-
m}+m*((aA2)+(1-a)A2}) - (g*mA2)/2; 
%welfare post investment with regulated access 
WPI=(1-m*(1-a)}*((p1BA(-(n1-1})}/(n1-1)) + (1-m*(1-a}}*(p1B-C)*q1B + 
m*(1-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-1)}}/(n2-1)) + m*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B- (t/2)*((1-
m)+m*((aA2}+(1-a)A2)); 
%welfare with a single firm monopolizing the whole market 
WM=((pMA(-(n1-1)})/(n1-1)) + (pM-C)*qM- (t/2); 
%entrant's profits net pf investment costs 
proB=(m*(1-a)*(p2B-C}*q2B) + (1-m*(1-a))*rn*(l-a)*(aB-cT)*(qlB-q2B) -
(g*mA2)/2; 
%entrant profits (post-investment) 
proBPI=(m*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) + (1-m*(1-a))*m*(1-a)*(aB-cT)*(q1B-
q2B); 
%incumbent's profits 
PROB=((1-m*(1-a})*(p1B-C}*q1B) + (l-m*(l-a))*m*(1-a)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-
q1B); 
%total profits net of investment costs 
TproB=((1-m*(1-a))*(plB-C)*q1B) + (m*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) - (g*mA2)/2; 
%consumer surplus 
CSB=(1-m*(1-a))*{{p1BA(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1)) + m*(l-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-
1 ) } ) I ( n2 -1 } ) ; 
%consumer surplus net of investment costs 
NCSB=(1-m*(1-a))*((p1BA(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1)) + m*(1-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-
1)})/(n2-1)) - (t/2)*((1-m)+m*((aA2)+(1-a)A2)); 
%consumer surplus with a single firm monopolizing the whole market 
CSBM=((pMA(-(n1-1)})/(n1-1)) - (t/2); 
%To run the progrrumne across all values of mB, from i 
p1B1(i) = p1B; 
p2B1(i) = p2B; 
P1Bl(i) = P1B; 
P2B1(i) = P2B; 
aB1(i) = aB; 
qlBl(i) = qlB; 
q2B1(i) = q2B; 
al(i) = a; 
s1Bl(i)=s1B; 
s2B1(i)=s2B; 
M11(i) = M1; 
W1(i)=W; 
1 to i 67 
WPil(i)=WPI; 
WMl(i)=WM; 
proBl(i)=proB; 
proBPil(i)=proBPI; 
PROBl(i)=PROB; 
TproBl(i)=TproB; 
CSBl(i)=CSB; 
NCSBl(i)=NCSB; 
CSBMl(i)=CSBM; 
proMl(i)=proM; 
ml(i) = m; 
end 
figure 
plot(ml,slBl, '*-', ml,s2Bl, 'x-') 
xlabel('coverage') 
ylabel('Bertrand market shares') 
title('Bertrant market shares') 
legend('slBl', 's2Bl') 
figure 
plot (ml, plBl, '*-' , ml, p2Bl, 'x-' ) 
xlabel('coverage') 
ylabel('Bertrand prices') 
title('Bertrant prices') 
legend('plBl', 'p2Bl') 
figure 
plot(ml,aBl, '*-') 
xlabel('Values of \mu', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('The Access Price', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(0.6,5, 'aAB', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(ml,proBl, '*-', ml,PROBl, 'x-', ml,TproBl, '+-') 
xlabel('coverage') 
ylabel('profits') 
title('profits') 
legend('proBl', 'PROBl', 'TproBl') 
figure 
plot(ml,Wl, '*-', ml,proBl, '--') 
xlabel('coverage') 
ylabel('welfare and entrant profit') 
title('objective functions') 
legend ( 'WBl ' , 'proBl' ) 
figure 
plot(ml,CSBl, '*-') 
xlabel ( ' coverage ' ) 
ylabel('consumer surplus') 
title('consumer surplus') 
legend ( 'CSBl ' ) 
%figure 
124 
%plot(rnB1,M11, 'o-', rnB1,M21, '*-'} 
%xlabel('Values of \mu', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName•, 'Times'} 
%ylabel('conditions'r 'FontSize',15) 
%set(gca, 'FontSize',15/ 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(0.6 1 0.9 1 'Ml', 'FontSize' 1 15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize' ,12r 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(0.7,0.7, 'M2', Ｇｆｯｮｴｳｩｾ･ＧＬＱＵＬ＠ 'FontName', 'Times'} 
%text(1 . 6,0.23 1 '\wedge',.'FontSize',l2, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
figure 
plot(ml,M11 1 '*-') 
xlabel('values of \mu') 
ylabel('conditions') 
legend('Mll'} 
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%uses 'Bpricestestl' to solve for the incumbent's and the entrant's 
Bertrand prices (unregulated access} 
%sets up the equations for the access price 
%elastic demands 
%01/07/02 
function y=Apricestestl(v) 
global aB AO a nl n2 m g C cT t slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B PlB P2B A B 
R D 
y zeros(3,1); 
PlB = v(l) i 
P2B = v(2); 
aB = v (3); 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for the two Bertrand prices 
ffl=l6; 
ff2=20; 
xa = [ffl,ff2]; 
xa=fsolve('Bpricestestl',xa,options}; 
%To print the value of the function 'Bpricestestl' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q=Bpricestestl(xa) 
%pause 
xaO=xa; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in ' Bpricestestl' 
plB=xa(l); 
p2B=xa(2); 
%market shares 
slB = (1-m*(l-a)); 
s2B = m*(l-a); 
% 
A= (m/2*t)*plB*qlB + (1-m*(l-a))*nl; 
B = (m/2*t)*p2B*q2B + rn*(l-a)*n2; 
%R = ((alB-cT)*q2B-(a2B-cT)*qlB) 
D = (m/2*t); 
%the derivatives of plB and p2B with respect to aB from the firms' 
implicit reaction functions 
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y(l) = (C*PlB/(p1BA2)) - (((DA2)*(-q1B*P1B+q2B*P2B)*qlB*plB-
s1B*D*P1B*q1B*(l-n1))/(AA2)) - ((2*(DA2)*(-q1B*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB)+D*(s1B-s2B)*(q2B-q1B))/A) - (((s1B-s2B)*D*(aB-cT)*(-
n2*{p2BA(-n2-1))*P2B+nl*(p1BA(-n1-1))*P1B))/A) + (((slB-
s2B)*(DA2)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-qlB)*((l-nl)*qlB*PlB+(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*nl))/(AA2)) - ((D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(s2B-slB)*(aB-
cT)*(nl/plB)+slB*s2B*(nl/plB)-slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(nl/(plBA2))*PlB)/A) + 
((slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(nl/plB)*D*((l-nl}*qlB*PlB+(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*nl))/(AA2)); 
y(2) = (C*P2B/(p2BA2)) - ((-(DA2)*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*q2B*p2B-
s2B*D*q2B*P2B*(l-n2))/(BA2)) - ((2*(DA2)*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB)+D*(slB-s2B)*(q2B-q1B))/B) - (((slB-s2B)*D*(aB-cT)*(-
n2*(p2BA(-n2-1))*P2B+nl*(plBA(-n1-l))*PlB))/B) + (((slB-
s2B)*(DA2)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-qlB)*((l-n2)*q2B*P2B-(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*n2))/(BA2)) - ((D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(s2B-slB)*(aB-
cT)*(n2/p2B)+slB*s2B*(n2/p2B)-slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(n2/(p2BA2))*P2B)/B) + 
((slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(n2/p2B)*D*((l-n2)*q2B*P2B-(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*n2))/(BA2)); 
%first order condition from the maximization of total profit with 
respect to the access price 
y(3) = D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(p1B-C)*qlB + slB*PlB*qlB*(l-(plB-
C)*(nl/plB)) - D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(p2B-C)*q2B + s2B*P2B*q2B*(l-
(p2B-C)*(n2/p2B)); 
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%uses 'Bpricestest1' to solve for the incumbent's and the entrant's 
retail prices 
%sets up the equations for access prices 
%the access prices in this programme are called 
%01/07/02 
function y=ApricestestlR{v) 
global aB AO a n1 n2 m g C cT t s1B s2B p1B p2B q1B q2B P1B P2B A B 
R D 
y = zeros{3,1); 
PlB = v { 1); 
P2B = v(2); 
aB = v(3); 
options(1)=1; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for the two Bertrand prices 
ff1=16; 
ff2=20; 
xa = [ffl,ff2]; 
xa=fsolve('Bpricestestl',xa,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'Bpricestestl' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q=Bpricestestl(xa) 
%pause 
xaO=xa; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'Bpricestest1' 
p1B=xa(1); 
p2B=xa(2); 
%market shares 
s1B (1-m*(1-a)); 
s2B = m*(1-a); 
% 
A {m/2*t)*p1B*q1B + {1-m*(1-a))*nl; 
B = (m/2*t)*p2B*q2B + m*(l-a)*n2; 
%R = ((alB-cT)*q2B-{a2B-cT)*qlB) 
D = (m/2*t); 
%the derivatives of plB with respect to afrom firms' implicit 
reaction functions 
129 
y(l) = (C*PlB/(plBA2)) - (((DA2)*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*qlB*plB-
slB*D*PlB*qlB*(l-nl))/(AA2)) - ((2*(DA2)*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB)+D*(slB-s2B)*(q2B-qlB))/A) - (((slB-s2B)*D*(aB-cT)*(-
n2*(p2BA(-n2-l))*P2B+nl*(plBA(-nl-l))*PlB))/A) + (((slB-
s2B)*(DA2)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-qlB)*((l-nl)*qlB*PlB+(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*nl))/(AA2)) - ((D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(s2B-slB)*(aB-
cT)*(nl/plB)+slB*s2B*(nl/plB)-slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(nl/(plBA2))*PlB)/A) + 
((slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(nl/plB)*D*((l-nl)*qlB*PlB+(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*nl))/(AA2)); 
y(2) = (C*P2B/(p2BA2)) - ((-(DA2)*(-q1B*P1B+q2B*P2B)*q2B*p2B-
s2B*D*q2B*P2B*(l-n2))/(BA2)) - {(2*(DA2)*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB)+D*(slB-s2B)*(q2B-qlB)}/B} - (((slB-s2B)*D*(aB-cT)*{-
n2*(p2BA(-n2-l))*P2B+nl*(plBA(-nl-l))*PlB))/B) + (((slB-
s2B)*(DA2)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-qlB)*((l-n2)*q2B*P2B-(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*n2))/(BA2)) - ((D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(s2B-slB)*(aB-
cT)*(n2/p2B)+slB*s2B*(n2/p2B)-slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(n2/(p2BA2))*P2B)/B) + 
((slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(n2/p2B)*D*((l-n2)*q2B*P2B-(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*n2))/(BA2)); 
%first order conditions from the maximization of total profit with 
respect to the access price 
y(3) = D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(((plBA(-(nl-1)))/(nl-1))-((p2BA(-(n2-
1))}/(n2-1))) + D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*((plB-C)*qlB-(p2B-C)*q2B) - (1-
m*(l-a))*(plB-C)*nl*(plBA(-nl-l))*PlB- m*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*n2*(p2BA(-
n2-l))*P2B + t*(l-2*a)*D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B); 
%sets up the two equations for Bertrand prices 
%elastic demands 
%Dl/D7/D2 
function q=Bpricestest1(x) 
global aB AD a nl n2 m g C cT t s1B s2B plB p2B q1B q2B P11B P21B 
P12B P22B A B R D 
q = zeros(2,1); 
plB x(l); 
p2B x(2); 
%Bertrand quantities 
qlB =AD* p1BA(-n1); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2}; 
%the incumbent's share of the contested market 
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a= (1/2)+(((p1BA(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1))-((p2BA(-(n2-1)})/(n2-1)))/(2*t); 
%first order condition from the incumbent's maximization problem 
q(1) = ((plB-C)/plB) - ({1-m*(1-a)) + (1-2*m*(1-a))*(m/2*t)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-q1B) + (1-m*(1-a))*m*(l-a)*(aB-
cT)*(n1/plB))/{(m/2*t)*qlB*p1B + (1-m*(1-a))*nl); 
%first order condition from the entrant's maximization problem 
q(2) = ((p2B-C)/p2B) - {m*{1-a) + {1-2*m*(l-a))*(m/2*t)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB} + (1-m*(1-a})*m*(1-a)*(aB-
cT)*(n2/p2B)}/((m/2*t)*q2B*p2B + m*(1-a)*n2); 
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%minimizes 'profitR' and 'welfareR' with respect to \mu and solves 
for the entrant's and the regulator's choice of Bertrand coverage 
(regulated access price) 
%elastic demands 
%05/07/02 
global AO a t nl n2 C cT g slB s2B p1B p2B q1B q2B aB P1B P2B mbar A 
B R D W proE PROE 
%baseline values for the parameters 
A0=35; 
n1=1.3; 
n2=1.3; 
C=10; 
cT=5; 
%t=1; 
g=l; 
%to vary the value of t from 2.1 to 2.6 
for i = 1:11, 
t(i)=1+(i-1)*0.05; 
t=t(i); 
%starting value for the entrant's Bertrand coverage 
mEB = 0.1; 
mEB = fminu('profitR',mEB) 
%social welfare with the entrant choosing m 
WE=(l-mEB*(l-a))*((p1BA(-(nl-l)))/(n1-1)) + (1-mEB*(l-a))*(plB-
C)*qlB + mEB*(1-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-l)))/(n2-1)) + mEB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B 
- (t/2)*((1-mEB)+mEB*((aA2)+(1-a)A2)) - (g*mEBA2)/2; 
%entrnant•s profits net of investment costs with the entrant 
choosing coverage 
proBE=(mEB*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) + (1-mEB*(1-a))*mEB*(l-a)*(aB-
cT)*(qlB-q2B) - (g*mEBA2)/2; 
%incumbent profits with teh entrant choosing coverage 
PROBE=((l-mEB*(l-a))*(plB-C)*qlB) + (1-mEB*(1-a))*mEB*(1-a)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB); 
%total profits net of investment costs with the entrant choosing 
coverage 
TproBE=((1-mEB*(1-a))*(p1B-C}*q1B) + (mEB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B} -
(g*mEB"2}/2; 
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%consumer surplus with the entrant choosing coverage 
CSBE=(1-mEB*(1-a})*((p1B"(-(n1-1)}}/(n1-1)) + mEB*(1-a)*((p2B"(-(n2-
1 ) ) ) I ( n2 -1 ) ) ; 
%access revenues with the entrant choosing coverage 
ARE1=(1-mEB*(1-a))*mEB*(1-a)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-q1B}; 
ARE2=(1-mEB*(1-a))*mEB*(1-a)*(aB-cT)*(qlB-q2B); 
%retail revenues with the entrant choosing coverage 
RRE1=(1-mEB*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*qlB; 
RRE2=mEB*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B; 
%To run the programme across all values of t, from i 
mEBl(i)=mEB; 
a1(i)=a; 
p1Bl(i)=p1B; 
p2Bl(i)=p2B; 
P1B1(i)=P1B; 
P2Bl(i)=P2B; 
qlBl(i)=qlB; 
q2Bl(i)=q2B; 
aBl(i)=aB; 
proBEl(i)=proBE; 
PROBEl(i)=PROBE; 
TproBEl(i)=TproBE; 
CSBE1(i)=CSBE; 
WEl(i)=WE; 
ARE11(i)=ARE1; 
ARE21(i)=ARE2; 
RRE11(i)=RRE1; 
RRE21(i)=RRE2; 
s1B1(i)=s1B; 
s2B1(i)=s2B; 
t1(i)=t; 
%starting value for the regulator's Bertrand coverage 
mRB = 0.4; 
mRB = fminu( 'welfareR' ,mRB) 
1 to i 10 
%social welfare with the regulator choosing coverage 
WR=(1-mRB*(1-a))*((p1B"(-(n1-1)})/(n1-1)) + (1-mRB*(1-a))*(p1B-
C)*q1B + mRB*(1-a)*((p2B"(-(n2-1)))/(n2-1)) + mRB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B 
- (t/2)*((1-mRB)+mRB*((a"2}+(1-a)"2}) - (g*mRB"2}/2; 
%entrant's profits net of investment with the regulator choosing 
coverage 
proBR=(mRB*(l-a}*(p2B-C)*q2B) + (1-mRB*(1-a))*mRB*(1-a)*(aB-
cT}*(q1B-q2B) - (g*mRB"2)/2; 
%incumbent's profits with the regulator choosing coverage 
PROBR=((1-mRB*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B) + (1-mRB*(1-a))*mRB*(1-a)*(aB-
cT) * (q2B-q1B) ; 
%total profits net of investment with the regulator choosing 
coverage 
TproBR=((1-mRB*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B) + (mRB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) -
(g*mRB"'2)/2; 
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%consumer surplus with the regulator choosing coverage 
CSBR=(1-mRB*(1-a))*({plB"'(-(nl-1)))/(ni-1)) + mRB*(l-a)*((p2B"'(-(n2-
l ) ) ) I ( n2 -1 ) ) ; 
%access revenues with the regulator choosing coverage 
ARRl=(l-mRB*(l-a))*mRB*{l-a)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-qlB); 
ARR2=(1-mRB*(l-a))*mRB*(l-a)*(aB-cT)*(qlB-q2B); 
%retail revenues with the regulator choosing coverage 
RRRl=(l-mRB*(l-a))*(plB-C)*qlB; 
RRR2=mRB*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B; 
%To run the programme across all values of t, from i 
mRBl(i)=mRB; 
plB2(i)=plB; 
p2B2{i)=p2B; 
PlB2(i)=PlB; 
P2B2(i)=P2B; 
qlB2(i)=qlB; 
q2B2(i)=q2B; 
aB2(i)=aB; 
mRBl(i)=mRB; 
proBRl(i)=proBR 
PROBRl(i)=PROBR; 
TproBRl(i)=TproBR; 
CSBR1(i)=CSBR; 
WRl(i)=WR; 
ARRll(i)=ARRl; 
ARR2l(i)=ARR2; 
RRR11(i)=RRR1; 
RRR2l(i)=RRR2; 
a2(i)=a; 
slB2(i)=slB; 
s2B2(i)=s2B; 
tl(i)=t; 
end 
figure 
plot(tl,aBl, '*-', tl,aB2, '+-') 
1 to i 
xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Access Prices', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize' 1 15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.2,18.8, 'a_R"'B', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.45,20, •a_E"'B', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(tl,mEBl, '*-', tl,mRBl, 'x-') 
xlabel{'Values of \itt', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel{'Values of \mu', 'FontSize',l5) 
set{gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
10 
text(2.25,0.28, '\mu_EAB', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(2.25,0.205, 'mu_RAB', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%print -deps figurealphat 
%figure 
%plot(tl,s1El, '*-', tl,slRl, 'x-', t1,s2El, '+-', Tl,s2Rl, •o-') 
%print -deps figurealphat 
%figure 
%plot(tl,proRl, 'o-', tl,proEl, '*-'} 
%xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%ylabel('entrant profits', 'FontSize',l5} 
%set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text{l.2,0.15, '\alpha_R', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(l.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
%text{l.6,0.21, '\alpha*', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%legend('proRl', 'proEl') 
figure 
plot(tl,qlBl, '*-', tl,q2B1, 'x-', tl,q1B2, '+-', tl,q2B2, 'o-') 
legend('qlBl', 'q2Bl', 'qlB2', 'q2B2') 
figure 
plot(tl,slBl,'*-' tl,s2Bl, 'x-', tl,s1B2,'+-', tl,s2B2, '--') 
xlabel('values oft') 
ylabel('Bertrand market shares') 
title('Bertrand market shares') 
legend('slBl', 's2Bl', 's1B2', 's2B2') 
figure 
plot(tl,plBl, '*-', tl,p2Bl, 'x-', tl, plB2, '+-', tl,p2B2, '--') 
xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Retail Prices', 'FontSize',lS) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.55,19, 'pl_EAB', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.15,16, 'p2_EAB', 'Fontsize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.2,18.8, 'pl_RAB', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.45,20, 'p2_RAB', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
figure 
plot(tl,proBEl, '*-' tl,proBRl, 'o-', tl,PROBEl, 'x-', 
tl,PROBRl, 'square-', tl,TproBEl, '+-', tl,TproBRl, '--') 
xlabel('values oft') 
ylabel ("'profits') 
title('profits'} 
legend('proBEl', 'proBRl', 'FROBEl', 'PROBR', 'TproBEl', 'TproBRl') 
figure 
plot{tl,WEl, '*-', tl,WRl, '+-', tl,proBEl,' tl,proBRl, 'x-') 
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xlabel('values oft') 
ylabe1 ( • welfare and entrant profit') 
title('objective functions') 
legend('WEl', 'WRl', 'proBEl', 'proBRl') 
figure 
plot(tl,CSBEl, '*-', tl,CSBRl, '+-') 
xlabel('values oft') 
ylabel('consumer surplus') 
title('consumer surplus'} 
legend('CSBEl', 'CSBRl') 
figure 
plot(tl,AREll, '*-', tl,ARE21, 'x-', tl,RREll, '+-', tl,RRE21, '--'} 
xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
ylabel('Retail and Access Revenues', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.55,0.1, 'AR_lAE', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.15,-0.4, 'AR_2AE', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.55,1.45, 'RR_lAE', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(l.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(2.15,0.36, 'RR_2AE', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName•, 'Times'} 
text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge•; 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
figure 
plot(tl,ARR11, '*-' tl,ARR21, 'x-', tl,RRR11, '+-', tl,RRR21, '--') 
xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('Retail and Access Revenues', 'FontSize',15) 
set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(2.55,0.1, 'AR_lAR', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text{l.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l5, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text{2.15,-0.4, 'AR_2AR', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(2.55,1.55, 'RR_lAR', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
text(1.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(2.15,0.32, 'RR_2AR', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times'} 
%print -deps figureelast 
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%uses 'Bprices' to solve for the incumbent's and the entrant's 
Bertrand prices 
%sets up the equations for access prices 
%elastic demands 
%05/07/02 
ｦｵｮ｣ｾｩｯｮ＠ y=ApricesR{v) 
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global aB AO a nl n2 mbar g C cT t slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B PlB P2B A 
B R D 
y zeros(3,1); 
PlB = v(l}; 
P2B = v (2); 
aB = v(3); 
options(l}=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for the two Bertrand prices 
ff1=16; 
ff2=20; 
xa = [ffl,ff2]; 
xa=fsolve('BpricesR',xa,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'BpricesR' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q=BpricesR{xa) 
%pause 
xaO=xa; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'BpricesR' 
plB=xa(l); 
p2B=xa (2); 
%market shares 
slB (1-mbar*{l-a)); 
s2B = mbar*{l-a); 
% 
A= (rnbar/2*t)*plB*qlB + (1-mbar*(l-a))*nl; 
B = {mbar/2*t)*p2B*q2B + mbar*{l-a)*n2; 
%R = ((alB-cT)*q2B-{a2B-cT)*q1B) 
D = (mbar/2*t); 
%the derivatives of plB and p2B with respect to aB from the firms' 
implicit reaction functions 
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y(l) = {C*P1B/(p1BA2)) - (((DA2)*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*q1B*plB-
slB*D*PlB*qlB*(l-n1))/(AA2)) - ((2*(DA2)*(-q1B*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB)+D*(s1B-s2B)*(q2B-qlB))/A) - (((s1B-s2B)*D*{aB-cT)*{-
n2*(p2BA(-n2-l))*P2B+nl*(plBA(-n1-1))*PlB))/A) + {{{s1B-
s2B)*(DA2)*(aB-cT)*{q2B-q1B)*((l-nl)*qlB*P1B+(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*nl})/(AA2}) - {(D*(-qlB*P1B+q2B*P2B}*{s2B-slB)*(aB-
cT)*(n1/p1B)+slB*s2B*(nl/p1B)-slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(n1/(p1BA2))*P1B)/A) + 
((slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(nl/plB)*D*((1-nl)*q1B*P1B+(-
q1B*PlB+q2B*P2B)*nl}}/(AA2)); 
y(2) = (C*P2B/(p2BA2)) - ((-(DA2)*(-q1B*P1B+q2B*P2B)*q2B*p2B-
s2B*D*q2B*P2B*(l-n2))/(BA2)) - {{2*(DA2)*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*{aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB)+D*(slB-s2B}*(q2B-qlB))/B) - {((slB-s2B)*D*(aB-cT)*{-
n2*(p2BA(-n2-1))*P2B+nl*(plBA(-nl-l))*PlB)}/B) + (((slB-
s2B)*(DA2)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-qlB)*((l-n2)*q2B*P2B-(-
q1B*PlB+q2B*P2B)*n2))/(BA2)) - ((D*(-q1B*P1B+q2B*P2B}*(s2B-s1B}*(aB-
cT)*(n2/p2B)+s1B*s2B*(n2/p2B}-s1B*s2B*(aB-cT}*(n2/(p2BA2))*P2B)/B) + 
((s1B*s2B*(aB-cT)*{n2/p2B)*D*((l-n2)*q2B*P2B-(-
q1B*P1B+q2B*P2B)*n2))/(BA2)); 
%first order condition from the maximization of total profit with 
respect to the access price 
y(3) = D*(-q1B*P1B+q2B*P2B)*{{(p1BA(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1))-((p2BA(-(n2-
1)))/(n2-1}}} + D*(-qlB*P1B+q2B*P2B)*((plB-C)*q1B-(p2B-C)*q2B) - {1-
mbar*(l-a))*(plB-C)*nl*(plBA(-nl-l))*PlB- mbar*(l-a)*(p2B-
C)-*q2B*n2*(p2BA(-n2-l}}*P2B +t*(l-2*a)*D*{-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B); 
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%sets up the two equations for Bertrand prices 
%elastic demands 
%05/07102 
function q=BpricesR(x) 
global aB AO a n1 n2 mbar g C cT t s1B s2B p1B p2B q1B q2B P11B P21B 
Pl2B P22B A B R D 
q = zeros(2,1); 
plB = X (1); 
p2B = x(2); 
%Bertrand quantities 
qlB = AO * p1BA(-n1); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
%the incumbent's share in the constested market 
a = ( 112 ) + ( ( ( p 1B A ( - ( n1-1 ) ) ) I ( n1-1 ) ) - ( ( p2 B A ( - ( n2 -1 } ) ) I ( n2 -1 ) ) ) I ( 2 * t ) ; 
%first order condition from the incumbent's maximization problem 
q(1) = ({p1B-C)/p1B) - ((1-mbar*(1-a)} + (1-2*mbar*(1-
a)}*(mbarl2*t)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-q1B} + (1-mbar*(1-a))*mbar*(l-a)*(aB-
cT)*(n11p1B))/((mbarl2*t)*qlB*p1B + (1-mbar*(1-a))*nl); 
%first order condition from the entrant's maximization problem 
q(2} = ((p2B-C}/p2B) - (mbar*(1-a) + (1-2*mbar*(1-
a))*(mbar/2*t)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-q1B) + (1-mbar*(1-a})*mbar*(1-a)*(aB-
cT)*(n2/p2B))/((mbar/2*t)*q2B*p2B + mbar*(1-a)*n2); 
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%uses 'ApricesR' to solve for the regulated access price and sets up 
the equation for -(entrant's profit net of investment costs) 
%elastic demands 
%05/07/02 
function f = profitR(mEB) 
global AO t nl n2 g C cT a al slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B aB PlB P2B 
mbar a A B R D 
mbar=mEB; 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options{3)=1e-6; 
%statring values for the derivatives of PlB, P2B and aB (the 
regulated access price} 
f£1=0.2; 
ff2=0.2; 
ff3=20; 
va = [ffl,ff2,ff3]; 
va=fsolve{ 1 ApricesR',va,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'ApricesR' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
y = ApricesR{va} 
%pause 
vaO=va; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'ApricesR' 
PlB=va{l); 
P2B=va{2); 
aB=va{3); 
q1B = 
q2B 
AO * p1B" ( -nl) ; 
AO * p2B"(-n2); 
%-{entrant's profit net of investment} 
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f = -(mEB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) - (l-mEB*(l-a))*mEB*(l-a)*(aB-cT}*(qlB-
q2B) + (g*mEB"2)/2 
%uses 'ApricesR' to solve for the regulated access price and sets up 
the equation for -(Bertrand welfare) 
%elastic demands 
%05/07/02 
function f=welfareR(mRB) 
global AO t nl n2 C cT g a slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B alB a2B mbar PllB 
Pl2B P21B P22B A B R D 
mbar=mRB; 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%statring values for the derivatives of PlB, P2B and aB {the 
regulated access price) 
ff1=1.9; 
f£2=2; 
ff3=20; 
va = [ffl,f£2,££3]; 
va=fsolve('ApricesR'rva,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'ApricesR' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
y = ApricesR(va) 
%pause 
vaO=va; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'ApricesR' 
PlB=va(l); 
P2B=va(2); 
aB=va(3); 
qlB = AO * plBA(-nl); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
%-(Bertrand welfare) 
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f = -(1-mRB*(1-a))*((p1BA(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1)) - (1-mRB*(1-a))*(p1B-
C)*q1B- mRB*(1-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-1))}/(n2-1)) - mRB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B 
+ (t/2)*({1-mRB)+mRB*((aA2)+(1-a)A2)) + {g*mRBA2)/2 
%minimizes 'profit' and 'welfare' with respect to \mu and solves for 
the entrant's and the regulator's choice of Bertrand coverage 
(regulated access price) 
%elastic demands 
%05/07/02 
global AO a t n1 n2 C cT g s1B s2B p1B p2B q1B q2B aB P1B P2B mbar A 
B R D W proE PROE 
%baseline values for the parameters 
A0=35; 
n1=1.3; 
n2=1.3; 
C=10; 
cT=5; 
%t=l; 
g=1; 
%to vary the value of t from 1 to 1.5 
for i = 1:11, 
t(i)=1+(i-1)*0.05; 
t=t(i); 
%starting value for the entrant's Bertrand coverase 
mEB 0.1; 
mEB = fminu('profit',mEB) 
%social welfare with the entrant choosing m 
WE=(1-mEB*(1-a))*((p1BA(-{n1-1)))/(n1-1)) + (1-mEB*(l-a))*(plB-
C)*qlB + mEB*(1-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-1)))/(n2-1)) + mEB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B 
- (t/2)*((1-mEB)+mEB*((aA2)+(1-a)A2)) - (g*mEBA2)/2; 
%entrnant's profits net of investment costs with the entrant 
choosing coverage 
proBE=(mEB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) + {1-mEB*(l-a))*mEB*(1-a)*(aB-
cT)*(q1B-q2B) - (g*mEBA2)/2; 
%incumbent profits with teh entrant choosing coverage 
PROBE=((l-mEB*(l-a))*(plB-C)*qlB) + (1-mEB*(l-a))*mEB*(l-a)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB); 
%t.otal profits net of investment costs with the entrant choosing 
coverage 
TproBE=((l-mEB*(l-a))*(plB-C)*qlB) + (mEB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) -
(g*mEB"2)/2; 
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%consumer surplus with the entrant choosing coverage 
CSBE=(1-mEB*(1-a))*((p1B"(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1)) + mEB*(1-a)*((p2B"(-(n2-
l ) ) ) I ( n2 -1 ) ) ; 
%To run the programme across all values of t, from i 
mEBl(i)=mEB; 
al(i)=a; 
plBl(i)=plB; 
p2Bl(i)=p2B; 
PlBl(i)=PlB; 
P2Bl(i)=P2B; 
qlBl(i)=qlB; 
q2Bl(i)=q2B; 
aBl(i)=aB; 
proBEl(i)=proBE; 
PROBE1(i)=PROBE; 
TproBE1(i)=TproBE; 
CSBEl(i)=CSBE; 
WE1(i)=WE; 
s1B1(i)=s1B; 
s2B1(i)=s2B; 
t1(i)=t; 
%starting value for the regulator's Bertrand coverage 
mRB 0.4; 
mRB = fminu( 'welfare' ,mRB) 
1 to i 10 
%social welfare with the regulator choosing coverage 
WR=(1-mRB*(1-a))*((p1B"(-(n1-1)))/(n1-1)) + (1-mRB*(1-a))*(p1B-
C)*qlB + mRB*(l-a)*((p2B"(-(n2-l)))/(n2-1)) + mRB*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B 
- (t/2)*((1- mRB)+mRB*((a"2)+(1-a)"2)) - (g*mRB"2)/2; 
%entrant's profits net of investment costs with the regulator 
choosing coverage 
proBR=(mRB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) + (1-mRB*(1-a))*mRB*(1-a)*(aB-
cT)*(qlB-q2B) - (g*mRB"2)/2; 
%incumbent's profits with the regulator choosing · coverage 
PROBR=((1-mRB*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B) + (1-mRB*(1-a))*mRB*(l-a)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-q1B); 
%total profits net of investment costs with the regulator choosing 
coverage 
TproBR=((1-mRB*(1-a))*(p1B-C)*q1B) + (mRB*(1-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) -
(g*mRB"2}/2; 
%consumer surplus with the regulator choosing coverage 
CSBR=(1-mRB*(1-a))*((p1B"(-(nl-1)))/(n1-1)) + mRB*(1-a)*((p2B"(-(n2-
1 ) ) ) I ( n2 -1 ) ) ; 
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%To run the programme across all values of t, from i = 1 to i = 10 
mRBl(i)=mRB; 
p1B2(i)=p1B; 
p2B2(i)=p2B; 
PlB2(i)=PlB; 
P2B2(i)=P2B; 
qlB2(i)=qlB; 
q2B2(i)=q2B; 
aB2(i)=aB; 
mRBl(i)=mRB; 
proBRl(i)=proBR 
PROBRl(i)=PROBR; 
TproBRl(i)=TproBR; 
CSBRl(i)=CSBR; 
WRl(i)=WR; 
a2(i)=a; 
slB2(i)=slB; 
s2B2(i)=s2B; 
tl(i)=t; 
end 
figure 
plot(tl,aBl, '*-', tl,aB2, '+-') 
xlabel('Values of \itt', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
ylabel('access prices', 'FontSize',15) 
%set(gca, 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.2,0.15, '\alpha_R', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.6,0.21, '\alpha*', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',17, 'FontName', 'Times') 
legend('aBl', 'aB2') 
figure 
plot(tl,mEBl, '*-', tl,mRBl, 'x-') 
%print -deps figurealphat 
%figure 
%plot(tl,s1El, '*-', tl,slRl, 'x-', tl,s2El, '+-', Tl,s2Rl, 'o-') 
%print -deps figurealphat 
%figure 
%plot(tl,proR1, 'o-', tl,proEl, '*-'} 
%xlabel{'Values of \itt', 'FontSize',15, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%ylabel('entrant profits', 'FontSize',15} 
%set(gca, 'FontSize',lS, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.2,0.15, '\alpha_R', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.2,0.17, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.6,Q.21, '\alpha*', 'FontSize',20, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%text(1.6,0.23, '\wedge', 'FontSize',l7, 'FontName', 'Times') 
%legend('proR1', 'proEl') 
figure 
plot(tl,qlBl, '*-', tl,q2Bl, 'x-', tl,q1B2, '+-', tl,q2B2, 'o-') 
legend('qlBl', 'q2Bl', 'qlB2', 'q2B2') 
figure 
plot(tl,slBl, '*-', tl,s2Bl, 'x-', tl,s1B2, '+-', tlls2B21 '--'} 
xlabel('values oft'} 
ylabel{'Bertrand market shares') 
title ( 'Bertrand market shares 1 } 
legend('slBl', 's2B1', 's1B2 1 , 's2B2') 
figure 
plot ( tl, plBl, I*-' , tl, p2Bl, 'x-' ) 
xlabel('values oft') 
ylabel('Bertrand prices') 
title('Bertrand prices') 
legend('plBl', 'p2Bl') 
figure 
plot(tl,proBEl, '*-', tl,proBRl, 'o-', tl,PROBEl, 'x-', 
tl,PROBRl, 'square-', tl,TproBEl, '+-', tl,TproBRl, '--') 
xlabel( 1 values oft') 
ylabel ('profits 1 ) 
title ('profits 1 ) 
legend('proBEl', 'proBRl', 'FROBEl', 'PROBR 1 , 'TproBEl', 'TproBRl') 
figure 
plot(tl,WEl, '*-', tl,WRl, '+-', tl,proBEl, '--•, tl,proBRl, 'x-') 
xlabel('values oft') 
ylabel('welfare and entrant profit') 
title('objective functions') 
legend('WEl', 'WRl', 'proBEl', 'proBRl') 
figure 
plot(tl,CSBEl, '*-', tl,CSBRl, '+-') 
xlabel('values oft') 
ylabel('consumer surplus') 
title('consumer surplus') 
legend('CSBEl', 'CSBRl') 
%print -deps figureelast 
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%uses 'Bprices' to solve for the incumbent's and the entrant's 
Bertrand prices (unregulated access price) 
%sets up the equations for access prices 
%elastic demands 
%05/07/02 
function y=Aprices(v) 
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global aB AO a nl n2 mbar g C cT t slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B PlB P2B A 
B R D 
y zeros(3,1); 
PlB = v(l); 
P2B = v (2) i 
aB = v (3); 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options{3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for the two Bertrand prices 
ff1=16; 
ff2=20; 
xa = [ffl,ff2]; 
xa=fsolve('Bprices',xa,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'Bprices' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
q=Bprices(xa) 
%pause 
xaO=xa; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in 'Bprices' 
p1B=xa(1); 
p2B=xa(2); 
%market shares 
s1B (1-mbar*(1-a)); 
s2B = mbar*(l-a); 
% 
A= (mbar/2*t)*p1B*qlB + (1-mbar*(1-a))*n1; 
B = (mbar/2*t)*p2B*q2B + mbar*(1-a)*n2; 
%R = ((alB-cT)*q2B-(a2B-cT)*qlB) 
D = (rnbar/2*t); 
%the derivatives of plB and p2B with respect to aB from firms' 
implicit reaction functions 
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y(l) = (C*PlB/(plBA2)) - (((DA2)*(-qlB*P1B+q2B*P2B)*qlB*plB-
slB*D*P1B*qlB*(1-nl)}/(AA2)) - ((2*(DA2)*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB)+D*(slB-s2B)*(q2B-q1B))/A) - (((slB-s2B)*D*(aB-cT)*(-
n2*(p2BA(-n2-l))*P2B+nl*(plBA(-nl-l))*PlB))/A) + (((slB-
s2B)*(DA2)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-qlB)*((l-nl)*q1B*PlB+(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*nl))/(AA2)) - ((D*(-qlB*P1B+q2B*P2B)*(s2B-s1B)*(aB-
cT}*(nl/p1B)+slB*s2B*(nl/plB)-slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(nl/(plBA2))*PlB)/A) + 
((slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(nl/plB)*D*((l-nl)*qlB*PlB+(-
q1B*PlB+q2B*P2B)*nl))/(AA2)); 
y(2) = (C*P2B/{p2BA2)) - ((-(DA2)*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B}*q2B*p2B-
s2B*D*q2B*P2B*(1-n2))/(BA2)) - ((2*(DA2)*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(aB-
cT)*(q2B-qlB)+D*(slB-s2B)*(q2B-qlB)}/B} - (((slB-s2B)*D*(aB-cT}*(-
n2*(p2BA(-n2-l))*P2B+nl*{plBA(-nl-l))*PlB})/B} + (((slB-
s2B)*(DA2)*{aB-cT)*(q2B-q1B)*((l-n2)*q2B*P2B-(-
q1B*P1B+q2B*P2B)*n2))/(BA2)) - ((D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(s2B-slB)*(aB-
cT)*(n2/p2B)+slB*s2B*(n2/p2B)-slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(n2/(p2BA2))*P2B)/B) + 
((slB*s2B*(aB-cT)*(n2/p2B)*D*((l-n2)*q2B*P2B-(-
qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*n2))/(BA2)); 
%first order conditions from the maximization of total profit with 
respect to the access price 
y(3) = D*(-qlB*PlB+q2B*P2B)*(plB-C)*qlB + slB*PlB*qlB*(l-(p1B-
C)*(nl/plB)) - D*(-q1B*P1B+q2B*P2B)*(p2B-C)*q2B + s2B*P2B*q2B*(l-
(p2B-C)*(n2/p2B)); 
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%sets up the two equations for Bertrand prices (unregulated access) 
%elastic demands 
%05/07/02 
function q=Bprices(x) 
global aB AO a n1 n2 mbar g C cT t slB s2B plB p2B q1B q2B P11B P21B 
Pl2B P22B A B ·R D 
q = zeros(2,1}; 
p1B 
p2B = 
X (1) i 
X ( 2) ; 
%Bertrand quantities 
q1B = AO * p1BA(-n1); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
%the incumbent's share of the contested market 
a= {1/2)+(((p1BA(-(n1-1})}/(nl-1))-((p2BA(-(n2-1}))/(n2-1}))/(2*t); 
%first order condition from the .incumbent's maximization problem 
q(1) = ((p1B-C)/p1B) - ((1-mbar*(1-a)) + (1-2*mbar*(1-
a})*(mbar/2*t)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-q1B) + (1-mbar*(1-a))*mbar*(l-a)*(aB-
cT)*(nl/plB))/((mbar/2*t)*q1B*p1B + (1-mbar*(1-a))*n1); 
%first order condition from the entrant's maximization problem 
q(2) = ((p2B-C)/p2B) - (mbar*(l-a) + (1-2*mbar*(1-
a))*(mbar/2*t)*(aB-cT)*(q2B-qlB) + (1-mbar*(l-a))*mbar*(l-a)*(aB-
cT)*(n2/p2B)}/((mbar/2*t)*q2B*p2B + mbar*(l-a)*n2}; 
148 
%Uses 'Aprices' to solve for the unregulated access price and sets 
the equation for -(entrant's profit net of investment) 
%elastic demands 
%05/07/02 
function f = profit(mEB) 
global AO t nl n2 g C cT a al slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B aB PlB P2B 
mbar a A B R D 
mbar=mEB; 
options{l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%starting values for PlB, P2B and aB {the unregulated access price) 
f£1=0.2; 
ff2=0.2; 
ff3=20; 
va = (ffl,ff2,ff3]; 
va=fsolve('Aprices',va,options); 
%To print the value of the function 1 Aprices ' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
y = Aprices(va) 
%pause 
vaO=va; 
%To call up the values of the arguments i n 'Aprices' 
PlB=va(l); 
P2B=va (2); 
aB=va(3); 
qlB = AO * plBA(-nl); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
%-(entrant's profit net of investment) 
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f = -(mEB*(l-a)*(p2B-C)*q2B) - (1-mEB*{l-a))*mEB*(l-a)*(aB-cT)*{qlB-
q2B) + {g*mEBA2)/2 
%Uses 'Aprices' to solve for the unregulated access price and sets 
the equation for -(Bertrand welfare) 
%elastic demands 
%05/07/02 
function f=welfare{mRB) 
global AO t nl n2 C cT g a slB s2B plB p2B qlB q2B alB a2B mbar PllB 
P12B P21B P22B A B R D 
mbar=mRB; 
options(l)=l; 
options(2)=1e-6; 
options(3)=1e-6; 
%statring values for PlB, P2B and aB (the unregulated access price) 
ffl::::l.9; 
ff2=2; 
f£3=20; 
va = [ffl,ff2,ff3]; 
va=fsolve('Aprices',va,options); 
%To print the value of the function 'Aprices' and check each 
argument is close to zero 
y = Aprices(va) 
%pause 
vaO=va; 
%To call up the values of the arguments in •Aprices• 
PlB=va{l); 
P2B=va{2); 
aB=va(3); 
qlB = AO * p1BA(-n1); 
q2B = AO * p2BA(-n2); 
%-(Bertrand welfare) 
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f = -{1-mRB*{l-a))*{{plBA(-(nl-1)))/{nl-1)) - (1-mRB*(1-a))*(p1B-
C)*qlB- mRB*(l-a)*((p2BA(-(n2-1)))/(n2-1)} - mRB*(1-a)*(p2B-C}*q2B 
+ {t/2}*((1-mRB)+mRB*((aA2)+{l-a)A2}) + (g*mRBA2}/2 
